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PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 



PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 



ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND 



BY 
T. LOTHROP STODDARD, A.M., Ph.D. (Harv.) 

Author of "The French Revolution in San Domingo," Etc. 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1917 



;2 $"2 3 
.S71 



Copyright, 1917, by 
The Century Co. 



Published, May, 1917 



AY 31 1917 

©CI.A462762 



PKEFACE 

This book resolved itself from the first into a 
series of choices. The problem was, how to por- 
tray within the limits of a single volume the war 
psychology of the various European nations. 
That problem was not ,m easy one. The portrayal 
of national states of mind requires treatment dif- 
fering radically from that employed in a narrative 
of events. The only satisfactory method of por- 
traying thought and emotion is the use of direct 
evidence — the testimony of the people themselves. 
This explains the numerous direct quotations 
which will be found in the succeeding pages. No 
words of a foreign observer could mirror the 
spirit of warring Europe as do the voices of its 
sons and daughters crying out from a full heart 
in the very hour of trial. 

The evidence adduced has been of the most 
contemporary and popular character. Speeches, 
press-comment, pamphlets, brochures — the words 
of and for the moment : these best bespeak the stir- 
rings of the national soul. Official utterances, 
carefully weighed and craftily spoken as they are, 
are never quoted save when they faithfully rep- 
resent popular feeling or when they produce a 
marked effect upon public opinion. 

Lastly, natives alone are permitted upon the 
witness stand. For example: in the chapter on 



PREFACE 

England, only Englishmen speak; in the chapter 
on France, only Frenchmen; and so on. What 
other Europeans say about England or France 
may be discovered in subsequent chapters devoted 
to other peoples. The only departures from this 
direct-quotation rule are the closing chapters deal- 
ing with minor nationalities, where considerations 
of space made the employment of this method im- 
practicable. 

The great objection to our method is, of course, 
precisely this matter of space. But there is no 
other way of portraying with equal vividness the 
national temper, especially in times of intense emo- 
tion. For this reason I have elected to confine 
myself to a full presentation of the great currents 
of European thought and feeling regarding the 
war and future intra-European relations. Many 
interesting collateral issues have been thereby ex- 
cluded from consideration, and important ques- 
tions, such as Europe's attitude toward America 
and the Far East, have been perforce entirely 
passed over. All this is unfortunate, but I have 
preferred to emphasize essentials rather than sac- 
rifice clearness to detail. 

T. Lotheop Stoddabd. 

Brookline, Mass., March 14, 1917. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Before the Storm 3 

I England 7 

II France . 39 

III Germany 71 

IV Austria-Hungary 119 

V Italy 145 

VI Russia 178 

VII The Balkans 220 

A. Serbia 223 

B. Bulgaria 235 

C. Greece 246 

D. Rumania ........ 254 

VIII Turkey and the Moslem East .... 260 

IX Belgium and Holland 284 

A. Belgium 284 

B. Holland 290 

X Scandinavia 296 

A. Denmark , 302 

B. Norway 303 

C. Sweden 304 

XI Spain and Portugal 308 

A. Spain 308 

B. Portugal . . 312 

Conclusion 314 

Index 317 



PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 



PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 



BEFORE THE STORM 

THE immediate reason for the Great War may- 
have been a murder, a monarch, a clique, a 
policy, or a philosophy. The underlying cause 
was unquestionably a militant spirit of unrest. 
The preceding decades plainly heralded one of 
those great crises in Man's historic evolution, such 
as the Reformation and the French Revolution, 
which stand forth as periods of " revaluation of all 
values." 

The twentieth century dawned upon a worn- 
out age, foredoomed to speedy dissolution. The 
omens clearly betokened its approaching end. All 
the ancient ideals and shibboleths were withering 
before the fiery breath of a destructive criticism. 
Everywhere the solid crust of tradition cracked 
and split under the premonitory tremors of the 
impending cataclysm. The old was patently about 
to make way for the new. 

Many observers saw in all this the symptoms of 
decadence. They were wrong. A decadent age 
cannot regenerate itself; it must gain salvation 
from without. The Roman Empire awaited sul- 
lenly the cleansing fire of Barbarism. But twen- 
tieth century Europe was in no such supine mood. 

3 



4 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Never had the race manifested a more superabun- 
dant energy. Never was thought more active or 
action more intense. A scant half-century had 
transformed a semi-rural continent into a swarm- 
ing hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital 
and men. Its adventurous sons quartered the 
solid earth and scoured the seven seas for the 
wealth of the outer world. Its no less adventur- 
ous intellects invaded the unknown realms of 
science and speculation to wring from Nature her 
hidden treasures and enrich the mental life. 
Never was Europe so wealthy, so eager, so virile, 
as on the fateful First of August, 1914. 

But — "Man does not live by bread alone. " All 
this prosperity, all this mighty edifice of material 
well-being, rested upon outworn and insecure 
foundations. The stupendous changes of the pre- 
ceding half-century had created a mechanical en- 
vironment differing not merely in degree but in 
kind from that of past generations. Material con- 
ditions had radically altered : the idealistic frame- 
work had remained fundamentally the same. The 
soul of Europe was like a youthful giant pinched 
in his swaddling-clothes. The archaic bonds 
galled and chafed at every turn. Hence the pro- 
found dissatisfaction, the universal unrest. Had 
the European been a weakling he would have re- 
signed himself in fatalistic apathy, conformed to 
the cramping bands of the past, and sunk gradu- 
ally into a bloodless mummy like the ancient Egyp- 
tian or the citizen of decadent Rome. 

However, the twentieth century European was 



BEFORE THE STOEM 5 

no weakling. He was every inch a man, in- 
stinct with virile life and resolved to attain a 
worthy future. Accordingly, he began to tug and 
strain at his swathings, and it was inevitable that 
some day he would cast this Nessus' garment from 
him, even though in so doing he should tear the 
living flesh from his bones. 

It is this revolt against the past, this determina- 
tion to throw off cramping limitations even before 
the new ideal goals are yet in sight, which gives 
the key to recent European history. Everywhere 
we see bursting forth increasingly acute irrup- 
tions of human energy : a triumph of the dynamic 
over the static elements of life ; a growing prefer- 
ence for violent and revolutionary, as contrasted 
with peaceful and evolutionary, solutions, running 
the whole politico-social gamut from "Imperial- 
ism" to "Syndicalism." Everywhere we discern 
the spirit of unrest setting the stage for the final 
catastrophe. 

Although a catastrophe was inevitable, its exact 
nature was up to the last moment somewhat un- 
certain. For instance, it might conceivably have 
taken the form of a series of local convulsions 
within the various European state bodies. When 
the Great War began England was actually on the 
verge of civil strife, Russia was in the throes of an 
acute social revolt, Italy had just passed through 
a "Red Week" threatening anarchy, and every 
European country was suffering from grave in- 
ternal disorders. It was a strange, nightmarish 
time, that early summer of 1914, to-day quite over- 



6 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

shadowed by subsequent events but which later 
ages will assign a proper place in the chain of 
world-history,. 

However, it is through the weakest spot in the 
earth-crust that the pent-up lava bursts its way, 
and since the international situation was the most 
dangerous point of Europe's instability it was 
here that war's eruption took place. The story 
of the events leading up to the Great War has been 
told and re-told ad nauseam, and need not here be 
repeated. We recollect all the moves in the dip- 
lomatic game. We remember the varied setting 
of the historic background: the rivalry of Briton 
and Teuton, the feud of Teuton and Slav, the 
vendetta of Gaul and German, the Roman dream 
of Italy, the Balkan bear-garden, the awakening 
East. This book is not a story of current events. 
It is a study of Europe's state of mind. The point 
here emphasized is Europe's incredibly volcanic 
psychology when the cataclysm began. The re- 
actions of the various European peoples to that 
cataclysm will be the subject of the succeeding 
pages. 



CHAPTER I 

ENGLAND 

NO nation was more affected by the prevalent 
unrest than England just before the war. 
For years past Great Britain had been the scene 
of profound political and social disputes that had 
more than once threatened the country with armed 
strife. The Irish question in particular seemed 
fast degenerating into civil war, and during the 
opening phase of the great European crisis at the 
end of July, 1914, blood was actually flowing in 
Ireland between the Irish Nationalists and the 
British regular troops. 

Indeed, so immersed was the British people in 
its internal difficulties that the first days of the Eu- 
ropean crisis passed almost unnoticed. Not until 
July 29 did the London " Times" urge British par- 
ties to "close ranks" and suspend their political 
strife in face of the external peril. 

When the full gravity of the international situ- 
ation was finally grasped, domestic disputes were 
quickly shelved ; but even then public opinion was 
by no means united on the attitude which England 
was to assume. Strong opposition to war devel- 
oped both in Parliament and in the country. The 
Liberal press emphatically urged the maintenance 
of neutrality, and the declaration of war on Ger- 

7 



8 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

many, August 4, was preceded by three resig- 
nations from the Cabinet — Lord Morley, Mr. 
Charles Trevelyan, and the labor leader John 
Burns. 

The cause of Serbia excited no enthusiasm. 
Serbia had long been in bad odor with Englishmen, 
and the British press did not hesitate to voice most 
unflattering opinions. The London " Outlook' ' 
laid the responsibility for the existing crisis flatly 
at Serbia's door. It declared that country to be 
"frankly impossible as a neighbor," and went on 
to say: "It must be contended that Serbia has 
been receiving an amount of sympathy which is 
quite unwarranted by circumstances. The highly 
colored portrayals of her as a gallant little nation 
fighting against odds in defense of downtrodden 
fellow nationals is utter fudge." A North Coun- 
try paper regretted that Serbia could not be 
"towed out to sea and sunk." 

Distrust of Eussia was widespread. The recent 
Eussian entente had never been really popular in 
England, and the British government's complai- 
sance toward Eussian aggression in Persia, Ar- 
menia, and the near East generally had alarmed 
most Liberal and even some Conservative circles. 
A number of anti-Eussian manifestos were now 
issued, notably one by a group of Cambridge in- 
tellectuals, declaring that war against Germany on 
behalf of Eussia and Serbia would be a "sin 
against civilization." The labor press unitedly 
condemned war in the interest of ' ' Eussian autoc- 
racy." 



ENGLAND 9 

War once declared, however, the bulk of public 
opinion rallied round the Government in support 
and approval. The national temper was, on the 
whole, dignified and serious, jingo outbursts being 
surprisingly rare. The press voiced a stern, yet 
lofty, resolution. The prevailing note was that 
this was a "war to end war." "The British peo- 
ple,'' declared the London "Times" of August 10, 
"are fighting for the cause of an established and 
abiding peace," and on August 16 it remarked, "If 
ever there was a war against war, it is the war we 
are entered upon to-day." The London "Ex- 
press" struck a sterner note: "Fighting must 
now go on until either Germany's power to intimi- 
date Europe has been taken from her forever or 
until Britain has been beaten to her knees and 
can fight no more. We are fighting for our own 
existence as a great world power." 

Although both resolute and confident, the British 
public seemed at first rather dazed. The English 
publicist, H. Fielding-Hall, writing in an American 
magazine, the ' ' Century, ' ' declared : " It is a war 
as passionless as if we were about to fight an earth- 
quake, a whirlwind, or a volcano — the more de- 
termined for that. That is our present temper." 
The general opinion was that the war would be a 
short one. When Lord Kitchener declared it 
would probably last three years he was almost 
universally disbelieved. The traditional British 
phlegm showed in the current shibboleth, "Busi- 
ness as usual!" 

Continued opposition to the war was still voiced 



10 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

by extreme pacifists and by a portion of the labor 
press, while a number of prominent Radicals, al- 
though admitting that the struggle could not now 
be stopped, severely criticized the Government for 
bringing on the war, and urged its circumscription 
to definite objectives which would permit an early 
pacification. This opposition soon crystallized 
into an organization known as the " Union of Dem- 
ocratic Control," which began an ardent propa- 
ganda for a speedy and moderate peace. The 
point of view of this school of thinkers is best ex- 
pressed in an article by the well-known writer, H. 
N. Brailsford, in the " Contemporary Review" for 
September, 1914. "We are taking a parochial 
view of Armageddon," he declared, "if we allow 
ourselves to imagine that it is primarily a struggle 
for the independence of Belgium and the future 
of France. The Germans are nearer the truth 
when they regard it as a Russo-German war. . . . 
We are neither Slavs nor Germans. ... A me- 
chanical fatality has forced France into this strug- 
gle, and a comradeship, translated by secret com- 
mitments into a defensive alliance, has brought 
us into the war in her wake. It is no real concern 
of hers or ours. It is a war for the Empire of the 
East. If our statesmanship is clear-sighted it will 
stop the war before it has passed from a struggle 
for the defense of France and Belgium into a colos- 
sal wrangle for the domination of the Balkans and 
the mastery of the Slavs. ... To back our West- 
ern friends in a war of defense is one thing, to fling 
ourselves into the further struggle for the Empire 



ENGLAND 11 

of the East quite another. No call of the blood, 
no imperious calculation of self-interest, no hope 
for the future of mankind, requires us to side with 
the Slav against the Teuton. ... It lies with pub- 
lic opinion to limit our share in this quarrel and to 
impose on our diplomacy, when victory in the West 
is won, a return to its national role of peacemaker 
and mediator in a quarrel no longer its own." 

This, however, was not the view taken by most 
Englishmen, who were fast coming to consider the 
war a lif e-and-death struggle between England and 
Germany. A decade of Anglo-German rivalry had 
diffused an immense amount of suspicion and ill- 
will among the British people, and the outbreak of 
hostilities quickly focused this previously latent, 
half-articulate feeling into intense hostility against 
England's chief antagonist. Germany's initial 
successes, British defeats, and tales of Teutonic 
atrocities in Belgium, quickly fanned this hostility 
to fever heat. Popular sentiment demanded the 
utter crushing of "Prussian militarism," — what 
H. G. Wells called "this drilling, trampling fool- 
ery" led by Prussian junkers "with a taste for 
champagne and frightfulness," — and the German 
soldiers were generally dubbed "Huns." 

At first this hatred was directed against the 
Prussian leaders and military men rather than 
against the whole German people. The Kaiser 
and the Hohenzollern family were special targets 
for abuse which, in some of the popular organs, at- 
tained truly extraordinary virulence. Horatio 
Bottomley's penny weekly, "John Bull," termed 



12 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

Emperor William ' ' The Butcher of Berlin, ' ' " That 
mongrel Attila," "The fiend of hell let loose 
on civilization," and predicted that he would be 
"known to infamy forever as William the 
Damned." Another popular penny weekly, "The 
Passing Show," asserted that the Kaiser "is a 
Mohammedan, a Lutheran, and a Eoman Catholic 
as the humor suits him ; but his taste in neckties is 
vulgar; his mind is that of a third-rate Hooligan 
with three strains of madness in his blood." Ac- 
cording to this paper "the Hohenzollern brood 
must be exterminated. For if we leave to a time 
of peace the question of the treatment of the Lord 
High Hun, he will not only get off cheaply, but may 
remain on the throne of Prussia and be succeeded 
by a degenerate cracksman, who is neither gentle- 
man nor sportsman, as some burglars have been 
known to be." 

But the tidings of German unanimity and hatred 
of England soon turned the stream of British 
wrath against the whole German people. "It is 
not a case of a refined and high-minded people 
overborne by a single * caste, ' " exclaimed the 
1 ' Pall Mall Gazette > ' early in October, 19.14. ' < We 
are fighting with a nation whose moral level is in- 
trinsically low, which has little trace of humane in- 
stinct, and still less comprehension of the meaning 
of honorable obligation. ... It is not only her rul- 
ers, but her people, who have to receive their les- 
son, and there is but one educational process to 
which the bully has ever been found susceptible." 
That leading organ of the Anglican church, ' ' The 



ENGLAND 13 

Guardian," was equally severe. " There is abso- 
lutely no room for magnanimity, ' ' it declared about 
the same date. "It is imperative that the disease 
of militancy which has laid hold upon an entire 
people should be extirpated. It is absurd to say 
that conditions of peace must be such that a 
proud nation can accept them. We have to do, 
not with a proud, but with a criminal, nation. . . . 
She must finally be deprived of the power to do 
mischief. 'Never again' must be the motto of the 
Allies when the final reckoning comes.' ' Even so 
normally pacific an organ as the Nonconformist 
"British Weekly" exclaimed, "There may be 
those who think that German militarism is the gos- 
pel of only a few among the German people. For 
this we see no reason. Militarism is not a tem- 
porary flush of spirit. The color behind it has 
been prepared for with persistent assiduity, with 
infinite duplicity, with illimitable cunning, for a 
long term of years. In fighting the war lords of 
Germany we are fighting Antichrist. That arro- 
gance must be crushed out with iron heels." The 
noted critic, G. K. Chesterton, declared that the 
solution of the Teutonic enigma was that the Ger- 
mans were "Barbarians," "though the Prussians 
themselves cannot form a notion of what we mean 
— precisely because they are barbarians. ' ' 

Some voices, it is true, were raised against 
this rising tide of passion. The London "Labor 
Leader" deprecated the "efforts being made to 
arouse the hatred of British workers against the 
workers of Germany," and added, "Any word 



14 PBESENT-DAY EUBOPE 

now spoken by us against the German people will 
make our task, and their task, more difficult in the 
years to come." And Dr. Conybeare of Oxford, 
in a letter to the New York "Nation," asserted, 
"After all is said and done, the Germans are our 
natural allies in Europe ; they are, after the Dutch, 
the only European race akin to us." But these 
voices were few in number and found no popular 
echo. 

During the autumn of 1914 the political settle- 
ment of Germany after the war was much dis- 
cussed, and the idea of resolving the German Em- 
pire into its component fragments as these existed 
before 1866 found considerable favor. This idea 
was, however, scouted by most well-informed stu- 
dents of world-politics. "The Teutons are — and 
will remain — one united community," declared 
that keen observer, Dr. E. J. Dillon, in the "Con- 
temporary Eeview" for January, 1915. "Those 
among the Allies — and their name is legion — who 
anticipate a recrudescence of the separatist spirit 
which for centuries made Germany a house di- 
vided against itself are doomed to disappointment. 
Bavarians and Saxons, Schwabs and Prussians, 
are all tarred with the same Kultur brush. The 
corrosive ideas of the Prussian schemers have 
been imbibed and assimilated by all branches of 
the German race, including those of Austria, with 
whose patriotic sentiments they now blend indis- 
solubly. ' ' 

The opening months of 1915 saw a distinct 
change in the popular mood — a hardening of the 



ENGLAND 15 

war-temper, a broadening of aspirations, and a 
much more realistic attitude. Eussian successes 
in Galicia and the Carpathians, and the spectacu- 
lar attack on the Dardanelles threw Allied pros- 
pects into a bright light, and the spring found a 
thoroughly optimistic Great Britain. 

The realist note was clear. In its leader of 
March 8, 1915, entitled "Why we are at war," 
the London "Times" declared frankly: "There 
are still, it seems, some Englishmen and English- 
women who greatly err as to the reasons that have 
forced England to draw the sword. . . . They do 
not reflect that our honor and our interest must 
have compelled us to join France and Russia, even 
if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights 
of her small neighbors. Why did we guarantee 
the neutrality of Belgium? For an imperious 
reason of self-interest. . . . We keep our word 
when we have given it, but ... we do not set up 
to be international Don Quixotes, ready at all times 
to redress wrongs which do us no hurt. ' ' And on 
March 17, the "Morning Post" wrote: "This 
country did not go to war out of pure altruism, as 
some people suppose, but because her very exist- 
ence was threatened. . . . That is what really un- 
derlies 'the scrap of paper' and all the talk of 
1 German Militarism ' ! " 

The rising war spirit of the nation was equally 
plain. "The absurd talk about this being a war 
against militarism has now subsided," asserted 
the ' ' Morning Post. " " After all, the British Em- 
pire is built up on good fighting by its army and its 



16 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

navy; the spirit of war is native to the British 
race." Leading publicists like Archibald Hurd 
asserted that this war, far from ending arma- 
ments, would increase them even in the event of 
an Allied victory. The British Empire must not 
only retain its present naval preponderance, but 
must also maintain a much larger military estab- 
lishment than ever before. Many voices also de- 
manded the retention of Germany's conquered 
colonies as necessary for the future safety and 
prosperity of the British Empire. Some plans 
went even further in their scope. One of the 
most ambitious of these was the demand of the 
English writer, D. L. B. Castle, for the annexation 
of Germany's North Sea coast, which appeared in 
the " National Review" of July, 1915. Recogniz- 
ing the impossibility of resolving the German Em- 
pire into its political fragments, Mr. Castle as- 
serted that England must at all costs prevent a 
German war of revenge, which, owing to the rapid 
development of submarines, might be fatal to Eng- 
land by shutting off her food-supply. 

These same months witnessed a further deepen- 
ing of the gulf of hatred toward Germany. Just 
as the opening period of the war had seen the at- 
tack shift from the German leaders to the Ger- 
man people, so now the assault was broadened to 
include German ideas and cultural achievements. 
"I cannot see what is proposed by the German 
idea," wrote Rudyard Kipling to the Paris 
"Temps," "unless it is to march with parade- 
step across a series of hells philosophically con- 



ENGLAND 17 

structed, with the object of self -adoration for the 
noise it makes with all its harness. At least the 
Arabs offer a choice between Islam and the sword, 
but the Boche has only the sword in his philoso- 
phy.' ' "The Germans," wrote H. G. Wells in 
the London "Daily Chronicle," "have been made 
into a kind of scientifically equipped Zulus." 
Professor A. H. Sayce of Oxford, in the London 
" Times, " penned a sweeping indictment of Ger- 
man literary ability. Goethe was the exception to 
the rule, but Schiller was ' ' a milk and water Long- 
fellow," Heine a Jew who "regarded the Ger- 
mans as barbarians," and Kant "more than half 
Scottish in origin." "On the artistic side," con- 
tinued Professor Sayce, "perhaps the less said 
the better. German taste in architecture and 
dress is proverbial. A people who have destroyed 
the art treasures of Belgium and Eastern France 
are outside the pale of civilization. They are still 
what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barba- 
rians who raided our ancestors and destroyed the 
civilization of the Eoman Empire. For a thou- 
sand years the blight of German conquest hung 
over Western Europe, until at last the conquer- 
ors perished in internecine conflict or were ab- 
sorbed into the older populations, and the Dark 
Ages came to an end. We must trust that they 
will not return under a new avalanche of Teutonic 
barbarism, and that the Germans may resume their 
old vocation as the intellectual 'hewers of wood 
and drawers of water' for Western Europe." 
Another English scholar, Sir Clifford Allbutt, does 



18 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

not even except Goethe in his critique of German 
intellectual ability. Professor E. Ray Lankester 
asserted that Germany's reputation in the field of 
scientific research "is due to the irresponsible 
gush of young men who have benefited by the nu- 
merous and well-organized laboratories of German 
universities." Similar denials of German musi- 
cal and artistic ability appeared from English 
pens at this same period. 

The spring and summer of 1915 saw a further 
exacerbation of British public opinion against the 
German people. German naval bombardments of 
English coast towns, Zeppelin raids, and numer- 
ous sinkings of English passenger ships, culminat- 
ing in the Lusitania disaster, roused a perfect 
wave of fury in England and evoked repeated calls 
for reprisal and revenge. Major-General Sir Al- 
fred E. Turner wrote in the "Saturday Review" 
of September 18, 1915, "No terms can safely be 
made with such a people of outsiders, to whom 
the quality of mercy is not known, and who, like 
all other savages, regard generosity and forbear- 
ance as signs of weakness. . . . Germans are only 
to be subdued by force and frightfulness, their 
own weapons, and it is high time that velvet gloves 
should be taken off, as they were when we fought 
with the Dervishes of the Sudan, the Zulus, and 
the Boxers of China, who were akin in more than 
one sense to the Prussians." "To avenge!" 
writes W. S. Lilly in the "Nineteenth Century and 
After" of July, 1915, "The words strike the key- 
note." "However the world pretends to divide 



ENGLAND 19 

itself," asserted Rudyard Kipling, "there are 
only two divisions in the world to-day, — human be- 
ings and Germans. And the German knows it. 
Human beings have long ago sickened of him and 
everything connected with him: of all he does, of 
all he says, thinks, or believes. From the ends of 
the earth to the ends of the earth they desire noth- 
ing more greatly than that this unclean thing 
should be thrust out from the membership and the 
memory of the nations." Edward Jenks, in the 
July "Contemporary Review," urges the imposi- 
tion of a lasting tabu upon everything German. 
"It is the most ancient of all social sanctions, and 
still the most terribly effective. If it does not 
now as formerly mean actual physical starvation 
or death from beasts of prey, it means commer- 
cial ruin, intellectual starvation, social extinction. 
Let no one think that such a punishment, applied 
to a nation, would be a light one. . . . There will 
be no appeal from the sentence; no possibility of 
condoning it. The ' Everlasting No ' will then take 
on an entirely new aspect for its champions, when 
the Gorgon face shall be turned inwards, when 
those who have made an alliance with the powers 
of darkness shall see the thick darkness descend 
upon the guarded Brandenburger Tor and the pil- 
lared eagles of Schonbrunn." 

This intense wave of anti-German feeling is of 
course also accounted for by British exasperation 
at the increasingly unfavorable state of affairs 
both abroad and at home. Italy's adhesion to the 
Allies in May, 1915, was soon more than counter- 



20 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

balanced by a whole series of crushing disasters. 
The Austro-German offensive in Galicia, which be- 
gan in the early days of June, never slackened till 
the Teutons were masters of all Poland, and Rus- 
sia's defeat was only the prelude to Germany's 
great Balkan " drive," which ground Serbia and 
Montenegro to dust, won Bulgaria to the Teutonic 
cause, and opened the road to Turkey and the near 
East. That rendered the Allied evacuation of 
Gallipoli inevitable, and this British disaster was 
obviously to be followed by another humiliation 
farther east, where the surrender of the British 
Mesopotamian army cooped up at Kut-el-Amara 
had become merely a question of time. Not even 
in the West was solace to be found, for the "big 
push" in northern France, kept up for months at 
a huge sacrifice of life, had yielded most meager 
results. The Allies' military prospects, so bright 
in early 1915, had thus by the close of the year be- 
come gloomy in the extreme. 

But even the military disasters, taken by them- 
selves, did not tell the whole story. Despite a 
rigid censorship, the English public was gradually 
waking to the fact that these Allied reverses were 
due, in part at least, to British "muddling" and 
ineptitude. The humiliating failure in northern 
France was the logical fruit of Great Britain's 
faulty munitions system. The disasters in Meso- 
potamia and at Gallipoli were the results of blun- 
dering British strategy. The Balkan collapse 
was bound up with short-sighted British diplo- 
macy. Obviously, the British governmental mech- 



ENGLAND 21 

anism was not standing np properly under the 
strain of the Great War. 

That realization, to be sure, did not come in a 
day. It took time to penetrate the armor of Brit- 
ish optimism. But the facts were too damning to 
be ignored, and a gradual process of disillusion- 
ment spread through ever-widening circles of the 
British people. Voices began to be raised criti- 
cizing the Government's shortcomings, warning 
against the consequences of "muddle," and de- 
manding thorough-going reform. 

As far back as January, 1915, Austin Harrison, 
editor of the influential "English Beview," had 
raised a warning note against the easy optimism 
which then prevailed. England, he asserted, did 
not yet realize the magnitude of her task, "the 
terrible nature of the war she is engaged upon," 
while "ink-pot gibes at the Germans" and the 
"silly prattle" about cockney valor would never 
win victory. From that time on leading organs, 
and publicists like Dr. E. J. Dillion, J. Ellis Bar- 
ker, etc., began a regular campaign of education 
under the slogan "Wake up, England!" 

Criticism of the English governmental system 
grew continually sharper and more uncompromis- 
ing. "The old mechanism of government which 
kept the British nation unprepared for the war 
is still in daily use unmodified, ' ' wrote Dr. Dillon 
in the "Fortnightly Eeview" of January, 1916. 
"While everything and everybody around us is 
changed or changing, that remains as it was. . . . 
Its action is mischievous, not helpful. It works 



22 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

havoc with our best-laid plans, and belies our most 
reasonably hopeful forecasts. . . . Our effete sys- 
tem of governance, with its roots in a dead past 
and its blighting shadow flung across the present 
and future of the nation, must be swept away. 
The illusions with which it is warping British 
thought and sapping British force must be dis- 
pelled. . . . Unless that system, together with its 
old parliamentary doctrines, its cherished tradi- 
tions of liberty, its sharply accentuated individual- 
ism, its conservative predilections, and its insular 
illusions, be speedily adjusted to the new condi- 
tions, much that is precious, not only to the race, 
but also to civilized man generally, will be swept 
away into history by the Teuton tide of which the 
present war is but the first inrush." In the 
"Nineteenth Century and After" of February, 
1916, Mr. J. Ellis Barker is equally severe : ' ' The 
British Government, as at present constituted, is 
not the organization of efficiency, but its negation. 
It is an organization similar to that which caused 
the downfall of Poland. It is the organization of 
disorganization. Amateurs are bound to govern 
amateurishly, and their insufficiency will be partic- 
ularly marked if they have to run an unworkable 
government machine and are pitted against per- 
fectly organized professionals." No mere re- 
placement of a Liberal by a Conservative Cabinet 
would suffice, for "it is questionable whether an- 
other set of amateurs will do better than the pres- 
ent one. The fault lies chiefly with the system. 
Government by debating society has proved a fail- 



ENGLAND 23 

ure. It should be abolished before it is too late." 
The warning note grew more insistent as time 
went on. " Unless we quicken our movements," 
cried Dr. Dillon in February, 1916, " damnation 
will fall on the sacred cause for which so much gal- 
lant blood has flowed. And as yet there are no 
signs of any quickening. ' ' And in May, 1916, he 
wrote: "We are not winning the war, nor are 
we adopting the means to win it. . . . The result 
has been to inoculate the nation with the bacteria 
of general paralysis. A little while longer, and 
we shall be slouching into irreparable disaster." 

The cardinal reform which all these critics de- 
manded was the transformation of cabinet gov- 
ernment into a dictatorship. "Temporary autoc- 
racy," urged Dr. Dillon, "is what we need during 
a struggle like the present. Eespect for individ- 
ual liberty and parliamentary rights should give 
way to considerations of a higher order for the 
sake of more momentous issues." 

The reasons for such drastic demands were to 
be found not only in governmental inefficiency but 
also in certain disquieting aspects of the national 
temper. We have already seen how strong had 
been the opposition to war in the summer of 1914. 
Now this opposition, while it had diminished with 
the course of the struggle, had by no means en- 
tirely died away. The extremely class-conscious 
British labor-unions persisted in regarding the 
war as the work of capitalist diplomacy, and labor 
leaders like Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald 
formally refused to give it their blessing. Also 



24 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

radical groups such as the "Union of Democratic 
Control" joined the labor opposition in demanding 
an early and compromise peace, while extreme pa- 
cifists like Bertrand Russell denounced the war on 
principle, and refused to assist it in any way, 
shape, or manner. Lastly, symptoms of moral 
flabbiness and selfish indifference were unmistak- 
ably apparent in many circles, particularly in the 
lower middle classes. The result of all this was 
slacking and shirking in munition factories, dan- 
gerous strikes even in such vital industrial 
branches as the shipyards and coal mines, and fail- 
ure of the most energetic recruiting campaigns to 
produce by voluntary enlistment the armies neces- 
sary for the further prosecution of the war. 
Even appeals like that of Minister Lloyd-George 
before the Trade-Union Congress at Bristol in the 
autumn of 1915 — "I beg you as a man brought up 
in a workman's home, do not set the sympathy of 
the country against labor by holding back its might 
by regulations and customs when the poor old 
land is fighting for its life" — did not produce the 
desired effect. 

But the second half of 1916 saw an almost start- 
ling change in the national consciousness. Stung 
to the quick by internal shortcomings and external 
failures, England at last roused to the peril, and 
before the year was out sweeping legislation had 
revolutionized the British governmental system 
and radically transformed the whole aspect of 
English life. The armies had been filled by com- 
pulsory military service, the munitions muddle 



ENGLAND 25 

had been solved by industrial conscription, and 
cabinet government had vanished before an om- 
nipotent triumvirate headed by Lloyd-George. 
With the opening of 1917 England stood on an 
efficiency basis. 

It must not be thought that this disheartening 
time had caused any perceptible abatement of the 
national longing for a decisive victory. Unques- 
tionably there was much pessimism and some de- 
spair, but hatred and abhorrence of the German 
flamed up as hotly as before. ' ' Unless the Allies 
grind to powder the lawless murderers in the red 
mill of war," asserted Dr. Dillon, "the sands of 
civilization will have run down." Writing in 
"Blackwood's Magazine" for August, 1916, Ma- 
jor-General C. E. Callwell maintained that Ger- 
many must be beaten, crushed, and permanently 
kept down, for "the German nation is a nation of 
barbarians, a nation without honor, without chiv- 
alry, and without shame." Normally, the victor 
may, and often should, grant terms that are not 
degrading, ' ' but the Germans can no longer be ac- 
counted a civilized race. . . . Paper guarantees 
are worse than worthless when they are furnished 
by rogues. . . . We are dealing with a wild beast 
that has to be caged and that has to be kept in a 
cage until it is tamed." Sir Harry Johnston, in 
the English "Review of Reviews" for April, 1916, 
wrote that Germany must be "punished to the 
full; whether we can accomplish this punishment 
in six months, in one year, in ten years, or in 
fifty." And the eminent English philosopher, L. 



26 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

P. Jacks, stated in his organ, the "Hibbert Jour- 
nal," "I write with deliberation when I say that 
we are fighting hell. ' ' 

Such being the prevalent English temper toward 
Germany, it was easy to foresee that the peace ru- 
mors which at this time began to be bruited abroad 
would not meet with a particularly warm recep- 
tion from British public opinion. Peace had of 
course always been discussed in England — a peace, 
that is, based on the postulate of absolute Allied 
victory. But as time passed, and Teutonic stay- 
ing-power became plainer, peace talk of a different 
sort began. It was clear that Germany could be 
crushed, if at all, only after a long war, the for- 
mula for which was expressed in the word "attri- 
tion." But this word sounded unpleasant in 
many ears, for, as an anonymous wit expressed it, 
"it meant that after all the Huns were killed oif 
there would be a few Allies left." So the year 
1916 saw a genuine discussion of peace possibili- 
ties — a discussion quickened by events like the 
German chancellor's olive-branch speech at the 
close of the year and President Wilson's pacific 
moves at the beginning of 1917. 

The feeling of most Englishmen was evidently 
hostile to a compromise peace. British anti- 
German sentiment has been so fully analyzed that 
a few examples of this majority temper should 
suffice. To begin with, Premier Lloyd-George 
himself had early taken up a most uncompromis- 
ing attitude. Speaking to an American news- 
paper man in October, 1916, Lloyd-George said: 



ENGLAND 27 

" Britain has only begun to fight; the British Em- 
pire has invested thousands of its best lives to 
purchase future immunity for civilization ; this in- 
vestment is too great to be thrown away. . . . The 
fight must be to the finish — to a knockout." 
Whether or not the British government has since 
modified its attitude, certain it is that this official 
declaration elicited the warm approval of a ma- 
jority of the British press, and no diminution of 
that approval is visible in these opening months of 
1917. In late December the London ' ' Daily Mail ' ' 
remarked: "The Allies know that no peace with 
a nation of tigers, and murderers, and statesmen 
who regard all treaties as scraps of paper would 
be worth the paper and ink. So long as Germany 
has not been completely and decisively beaten, no 
peace with her can be more than a truce which 
she would violate the first moment it served her 
purpose." And the London "Post" asserted: 
"There can be no compromise, and the war is 
there to prove it. What the German mind is at 
present incapable of understanding is the simple 
fact that German arrogance, German militarism, 
German ambition, German immorality, masquer- 
ading as the Higher Good, and German cruelty, 
are so intolerable to the civilized nations now in 
arms against these horrors that rather than accept 
them the Allies prefer death." And Lord Cur- 
zon remarked in mid- January, 1917, "Our spirit 
cannot falter, since an inconclusive peace or a 
patched-up peace means for us not only humilia- 
tion, but destruction." 



28 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

At the same time this uncompromising temper 
was by no means universal. The cost of "attri- 
tion" was intolerable to many persons, who ex- 
pressed their belief that a victory gained by such 
means would involve all parties in a common ruin. 
Bertrand Russell wrote: "If the war lasts long, 
all that was good in the ideals of Germany, France, 
and England will have perished, as the ideals of 
Spartans and Athenians perished in the Pelopon- 
nesian War. All three races, with all that they 
have added to our civilization, will have become 
exhausted, and victory, when it comes, will be as 
barren and as hopeless as defeat." That an 
avowed non-resister like Bertrand Russell should 
have thus written is no surprise, but what is of 
greater significance is the fact that similar senti- 
ments were now expressed by prominent English- 
men like Earl Beauchamp, Lord Brassey, and Lord 
Loreburn, men not identified with extreme pacifist 
circles. Lord Loreburn, in the London "Econ- 
omist" of June 10, 1916, expressed his fear that 
an "attrition" victory would mean general bank- 
ruptcy and ' ' such a destruction of the male youth 
of Europe as will break the thin crust of civiliza- 
tion which has been built up since the Dark Ages." 
And Lord Loreburn 's point of view was emphat- 
ically endorsed by the editor of the "Economist," 
the well-known economic writer, Francis W. Hirst, 
who remarked: "The time seems to have come 
when rulers will have to consider the true inter- 
ests of their subjects or fellow-citizens in this re- 
gard, and when the State, which has claimed the 



ENGLAND 29 

right to exact from the individual his life or his 
property, will have to reduce its pretensions and 
abate the struggle for glory and prestige, not be- 
cause they are worthless and undesirable, but be- 
cause a State which had lost its men and its money 
could hardly call itself victorious; for after it 
had imposed peace as a conqueror, it would be 
compelled for years to play second fiddle to other 
powers. ... Of course you want to crush your 
enemy in war. Of course you want victory. Of 
course you wish your enemy to admit that he is 
beaten, and to sue for peace. But equally, of 
course, unless you are misled by a false and flimsy 
rhetoric, you do not want to destroy the society, 
the traditions, the wealth, and the happiness of 
your own people. You do not want to see your 
allies ruined for the sake of reducing an enemy 
to abject despair. So when attrition and ex- 
haustion have reached a certain point, you are 
willing to discount the future and to take counsel 
with the still small voices of reason and common 
sense." The matter was put more pungently by 
George Bernard Shaw, who, writing in an Ameri- 
can periodical, the "New Eepublic," of January 
6, 1917, said: "Non-German Europe is not go- 
ing to spend the remainder of the duration of this 
planet sitting on Germany's head. A head with 
the brains of sixty millions of people in it takes 
more sitting on than we shall have time for." 

Such pronouncements, however, though numer- 
ous and weighty, were those of a minority, and 
aroused angry retorts from the bulk of English 



30 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

public opinion. In many quarters they were 
treated as near-treason and were accused of being 
inspired by the machinations of Judaeo-German 
"High Finance." Mr. Hirst's attitude, for ex- 
ample, which made a great sensation, cost him his 
editorship. Typical of these protests against 
compromise is one penned by L. J. Maxse, editor 
of the influential " National Review": "The 
main object of peace should be to crush and per- 
manently cripple Prussia, not only because she 
wantonly provoked war, but because of the hor- 
rors perpetrated wherever a Prussian foot has 
trod. The Prussians and their miscreant dy- 
nasty are the pariahs and lepers of civilization, 
and as such are unfit to be a Great Power. We 
might as well enthrone Satan as enable them to 
resume their bloodthirsty career whenever it suits 
the worshipers of might over right. On this all 
genuine Pacifists should be able to agree with all 
genuine Militarists. The former desire to pre- 
vent the recurrence of war, which can only be 
done by destroying the Prussian scorpion. The 
latter are no less anxious to prevent the honor- 
able profession of arms ever being again de- 
graded as in the present war by these cold- 
blooded murderers of women and children, air- 
poisoners, well-poisoners, savages, besides whose 
record all recorded savagery pales. To-day all 
our public men, after their wont, shout with the 
largest crowd, and the largest crowd is deter- 
mined to do justice by Prussia. But we know the 
Rt. Hon. Faintheart and the Rt. Hon. Feebleguts 



ENGLAND 31 

too well to suppose that the mood will last and 
that he will remain robust when the Ehine Whine 
sets in. Then our bleaters will give tongue and 
our * blighters' will chip in. We shall see the old 
Potsdam Press in full working order, devoted 
by day and by night to the sacred cause of 'letting 
off the Boche.' Winners, we shall be told, can 
afford to be generous. . . . But surely if the Prus- 
sians lose it is for them to pay and for the 
Allies to receive the milliards? If the process of 
payment reduces German Kultur to be a hewer of 
wood and drawer of water for the rest of the cen- 
tury for European civilization, so much the bet- 
ter for the world. ' ' 

Such is the present state of British public opin- 
ion toward the question of peace. What are the 
real beliefs and intentions of the British govern- 
ment we of course do not know, nor for our pres- 
ent purpose does it greatly matter. The point to 
be noted is that in these opening months of 1917 
British public opinion is still predominantly for 
war and ready to make the sacrifices necessary 
to its continued prosecution. 

Naturally every one recognizes that the strug- 
gle must end some time, and this raises the preg- 
nant query, " After the war?" But in treating 
this vital matter we must carefully delimit the 
scope of our inquiry. A full analysis of Eng- 
land's attitude toward European reconstruction 
would carry us too far into the realm of specu- 
lation. Of course nearly all Englishmen have 
very definite ideas as to how the political map of 



32 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Europe should be redrawn, but since the specific 
points of that redrawal will be determined by 
the valor of armies and the skill of diplomats 
rather than by popular passion, extensive discus- 
sion of the shifting currents of contemporary 
public opinion thereon would be a rather profit- 
less undertaking. 

Much more useful is it to understand the de- 
gree of popular sympathy or antipathy which 
Englishmen to-day feel toward the various Euro- 
pean peoples. This is a matter of practical im- 
portance. A pronounced trend of public senti- 
ment regarding any foreign nation may harden 
the decisions of governments and influence 
statesmen in the laying out of future policies. 

Of course the main line of cleavage runs be- 
tween friends and enemies. The war has natu- 
rally tended to draw Englishmen ever closer to 
their Allies and to sunder them ever more widely 
from their foes. This process has, however, not 
operated in uniform fashion. Taking first the 
popular status of Great Britain's allies, the out- 
standing feature is the profound English sym- 
pathy for France. Anglo-French relations had, 
it is true, been cordial since 1904, but the heroism 
and efficiency of France in the present war have 
deepened English liking into an enthusiastic ad- 
miration which appears to promise lasting 
friendship between the two peoples. Toward 
Russia, British feeling has sensibly warmed, and 
in some circles this rises to genuine enthusiasm. 
But English philo-Russian literature bears cer- 



ENGLAND 33 

tain marks of artificial stimulation, and British 
critics accuse the extreme pro-Russian propa- 
ganda of Mr. Stephen Graham and others of be- 
ing sicklied o'er with sentimentality. For Italy, 
British friendship seems rather casual and not 
without mental reservations. Belgium has re- 
ceived unstinted praise, and the traditional Eng- 
lish policy of safeguarding her small neighbor 
from foreign conquest has been powerfully re- 
inforced by ties of warm popular affection. As 
to Serbia, former English dislike has been quite 
effaced by the staunch fighting qualities of that 
little nation. 

A word about neutrals. Convinced as they are 
that they are fighting the battle of civilization, 
Englishmen believe that the neutrals should be in 
the war "doing their bit," and since Englishmen 
are inclined to ascribe neutrality either to selfish 
"profiteering" or to cowardice, the predominant 
British attitude tends to be a compound of dis- 
like and contempt. Of course political exigen- 
cies and a strict censorship suppress the more 
violent manifestations, but Kipling's phrase, 
"Damn all Neutrals!" undoubtedly expresses the 
predominant British feeling. 

On its enemies English public opinion is gen- 
erally severe, though the degree of bitterness 
varies considerably with the specific cases. Tur- 
key was from the start condemned to death. Bul- 
garia, while usually accorded political life, is to 
be reduced to a negligible quantity. British dis- 
like of Austria has waxed greatly with the course 



34 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

of time. At the beginning of the war Austria 
was regarded with contemptuous disdain as the 
senile dupe of Prussian militarism. To-day, 
however, many Englishmen regard her guilt as 
equal to Germany's, and accordingly demand her 
political extinction, the deposition of Hapsburgs 
and Hohenzollerns being held alike necessary to 
the future well-being of Europe. 

The arch-enemy, however, continues to be Ger- 
many, and upon Germany British wrath remains 
unwaveringly fixed. The desire to "smash" 
Germany is as keen as ever, but the difficulty of 
the process is becoming more and more recog- 
nized. Most thoughtful Englishmen now admit 
that the undoing of German unity is impossible, 
and many even forecast a junction of the Aus- 
trian Germans with their racial brethren. Since, 
however, they fear that defeat will work no 
change of heart in the German people, English- 
men are greatly concerned with the problem of 
averting a German war of revenge, and the gen- 
eral opinion seems to be that the only safe 
method is to "keep Germany down.'' The pop- 
ular plans for doing this are of course both nu- 
merous and varied. They embrace not merely 
military and political safeguards, but also radical 
economic measures, such as Allied boycotts of 
German goods, commerce, shipping, etc. This in 
turn involves the idea of the permanency of the 
present "Grand Alliance" and a general pooling 
of Allied resources. 

English hatred of Germany and English friend- 



ENGLAND 35 

ship for France are, in fact, the two salient fea- 
tures of the British state of mind. So pro- 
nounced are they that they promise to be import- 
ant factors in determining the course of European 
life after the war. To be sure, several influential 
elements of English thought refuse to contem- 
plate a permanent estrangement of the British 
and German peoples, but the bulk of British 
public opinion plainly believes that any immedi- 
ate healing of the breach is impossible. The 
eminent English essayist, Edmund Gosse, re- 
marks: "I cannot imagine that the passions 
which the war stirs up can have any other effect 
but of deepening and widening the abyss. I 
fancy that at least for a generation no intellect- 
ual relations will be possible between France and 
England on the one side and Germany on the 
other. If I am not mistaken, the neutral nations 
will form the only link between the Allies and 
Germany after the war." H. G. Wells, in his 
"What is Coming," undoubtedly strikes a popu- 
lar chord when he writes: "The primary business 
of the Allies is not reconciliation with Germany. 
Their primary concern is to organize a great 
league of peace. . . . There will be a bitterness 
in the memories of this and the next generation 
that will make the spectacle of ardent French- 
men, or Englishmen, or Belgians, or Russians em- 
bracing Germans with gusto — unpleasant, to say 
the least of it. We may bring ourselves to under- 
stand, we may bring ourselves to a cold and rea- 
sonable forgiveness, but it will take sixty or sev- 



36 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

enty years for the two sides in this present war 
to grow kindly again. Let us build no false hopes 
nor pretend to any false generosities. These 
hatreds can die out only in one way : by the pass- 
ing of a generation, by the dying out of the 
wounded and the wronged. Our business, our un- 
sentimental business, is to set about establishing 
such conditions that they will so die out. And 
that is the business of the sane Germans, too. 
. . . That is not to be done by any conscientious 
sentimentalities, any slobbering denials of un- 
forgettable injuries. We want no pro-German 
Leagues any more than we want anti-German 
Leagues. We want patience — and silence. My 
reason insists upon the inevitableness and neces- 
sity of this ultimate reconciliation. I will do no 
more than I must to injure Germany further, and 
I will do all that I can to restore the unity of 
mankind. None the less is it true that for me for 
all the rest of my life the Germans I shall meet, 
the German things I shall see, will be smeared 
with the blood of my people and my friends that 
the wilfulness of Germany has spilt." 

Many Englishmen take an even more pessi- 
mistic view. The eminent British scientist, Sir 
William Ramsay, for example, believes that no 
intercourse whatever with Germany can take 
place under a century. "I am afraid," he writes, 
"that the horror of the whole civilized world at 
the moral decay of the Germans makes it most 
unlikely that international relations with individ- 
uals of that nation will be resumed before several 



ENGLAND 37 

generations have passed. Men of science will 
always recognize scientific achievements, inde- 
pendent of nationality. But should any attempt 
be made to resume friendly relations with Ger- 
many and Austria by means of invitations to sci- 
entific congresses, we shall certainly all resent 
it." 

Indeed, some English thinkers almost despair 
of the future and fear a permanent breakdown of 
European solidarity and civilization. In April, 
1916, the London "Nation" remarked gloomily: 
"Europe is now being mentally conceived as 
inevitably and permanently dual. . . . We are 
ceasing to think of Europe. . . . The normal end 
of war (which is peace) is to be submerged in the 
idea of a war-series indefinitely prolonged. Soon 
the entire Continent will have but one longing — 
the longing for rest. The cup is to be dashed 
from its lips! For a world steeped in fear and 
ruled by the barren logomachy of hate, diplo- 
matic intercourse would almost cease to be possi- 
ble. ... In the matter of culture, Modern Eu- 
rope would tend to relapse to a state inferior even 
to that of Medieval Europe, and to sink far below 
that of the Eenaissance. ' ' 

These are serious and weighty words on which 
we will do well to ponder. There is indeed much 
to arouse anxiety for the future of mankind. 
And yet before we abandon ourselves to melan- 
choly reveries we should remember certain facts. 
For one thing, England's present implacable tem- 
per is no new or unprecedented phenomenon in 



38 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the history of British national psychology. To 
him who doubts this assertion I recommend a 
perusal of Burke's " Reflections on the Revolu- 
tion in France" or the " Letters of a Regicide 
Peace." Assuredly current British cartoons of 
the Kaiser are no more virulent and certainly in 
better taste than British lampoons on the Cor- 
sican a hundred years ago. 

Of course the answer to this is that Anglo- 
French hatreds took nearly a century to die away. 
That is true. But it is also true that the world 
moves faster now than ever before. Most of the' 
Allies of to-day were enemies a generation ago. 
A couple of decades hence a turn of Fate's rap- 
idly revolving wheel — pan-Russianism, an awak- 
ened Orient, a general rising of the colored world, 
or some giant evolution as yet beyond our ken — 
may force Briton and Teuton fair into each 
other's arms. Necessity, like politics, makes 
strange bedfellows. Who knows? 



CHAPTER n 

FRANCE 

FRENCH national psychology exhibits a strik- 
ing contrast between surface variability and 
underlying permanence: a combination of mo- 
bility and solidity — mobility of thought and feel- 
ing with solidity of character. This comes out 
strongly in the field of politics. Fickleness for 
forms is coupled with instinctive adhesion to tra- 
ditional tendencies and policies. 

During the generation which followed the 
Franco-Prussian War, to be sure, this truth was 
somewhat obscured. Eighteen seventy — "The 
Terrible Year" — acted like a blow in the solar 
plexus. The soul of France was temporarily 
paralyzed, and surface variability, freed from its 
stabilizer, went almost unchecked, acute factional 
broils, materialism, and pessimism long making 
France an uncertain quantity in European af- 
fairs. 

But about the beginning of the present century 
France recovered from the shock of 1870 and de- 
termined to play a positive role in the world. 
Two general attitudes toward foreign policy were 
visible — both springing from the historic past. 
One of these, flowing from the humanitarian 
idealism of the eighteenth century and the Revo- 

39 



40 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

lution, sought to make France once more the re- 
generative center of mankind by concentrating 
French energy upon constructive ideas and social 
reform. Aggressive foreign policies and " re- 
venge" for 1870 were to be eschewed. An exam- 
ple of this party's attitude toward European af- 
fairs is Francis Delaisi's book, "The Inevitable 
War," which appeared in 1911. Believing an 
Anglo-German war certain, Delaisi saw both 
sides courting France — Germany for money, 
England for men. His thesis was that France 
should aid neither, but should conserve her 
strength and emerge the moral arbiter and re- 
conciler of Europe. The most prominent figure 
of this school in French political life was M. 
Joseph Caillaux. The party's adherents were 
mostly drawn from the working classes of the 
towns, especially the great labor organization 
known as the "C. G. T." (Confederation Generate 
du Travail), and from the peasantry of the 
South— the Midi. 

At the same time, however, another trend of 
French thought had become evident; one based 
upon traditions even older in the history of 
France. The French have always displayed 
strong likings for military prowess and an ex- 
pansive foreign policy — especially toward the 
Rhine. They have before their eyes the vision 
of a glorious past and remember that up to the 
formation of German and Italian unity France 
was unquestionably the first Power in Europe — 
La Grande Nation. Also, for many Frenchmen, 



FRANCE 41 

the humiliation and "mutilation" of 1870 was a 
perpetual agony. It is therefore not surprising 
that the reviving spirit of France expressed it- 
self largely in terms of La Grande Nation, re- 
venge upon Germany, and the recovery of Alsace- 
Lorraine. The Russian alliance and the entente 
with England powerfully stimulated this feeling, 
while the various colonial disputes with Germany 
quickened hostility against the Teutons. The 
chief political exponent of "The New France,' ' 
M. Theophile Delcasse, worked frankly for such a 
diplomatic isolation and encirclement of Germany 
that she would one day be faced with the alter- 
native of either disgorging Alsace-Lorraine or be- 
ing crushed in a hopeless war. The strength of 
the " Patriots' ' lay among the old nobility, the 
army, the bourgeoisie and intellectuals, and the 
peasantry of the East and North. Its optimistic 
temper is revealed by an abundant literature in 
the years preceding the present conflict, a good 
example being Colonel Arthur Boucher's "La 
France victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain" 
(1911). 

The opening months of 1914 saw France torn 
by the struggles of these two parties, complicated 
by manifestations of France's rather factious 
parliamentary life such as the Affaire Caillaux. 
The temper of "New France" was shown in the 
inaugural address of the eminent French writer, 
Maurice Barres, elected president of the Ligue 
des Patriotes July 12, 1914, after the death of the 
poet, Paul Deroulede. On that occasion M. Bar- 



42 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

res said: "We shall all continue his (Derou- 
lede's) task — the union of all Frenchmen for the 
reclaiming of the lost provinces. The first act of 
the President of the League of Patriots will be 
to salute next Sunday the statue of Lorrainese 
Jeanne d'Arc on the very spot where the Saint 
of the Patrie poured out her blood, and to bring 
flowers of remembrance and hope to the statue of 
Strasburg. Vivent V Alsace et la Lorraine, quand 
memel" 

Given so much optimistic sentiment, it is not 
strange that the rapid German invasion of Bel- 
gium and France in what Frenchmen regarded as 
a brutal attempt to dominate Europe and crush 
France into lasting insignificance, should have 
roused the deep patriotism of the French people 
to a peculiarly high pitch of exaltation. Before 
the German peril France rose as one man to de- 
fend the threatened soil of the Patrie. 

The quick thrust of the French armies into 
Alsace during the opening days of the war evoked 
a veritable delirium of joy. The spirit of the 
nation was mirrored in the proclamation of Gen- 
eral Joffre to the inhabitants of the invaded prov- 
ince: "Children of Alsace! After forty-four 
years of dolorous waiting, French soldiers again 
tread the soil of your noble land. They are the 
first laborers in the noble work of the revenge! 
For them, what emotion! what pride! To carry 
through this work they offer their lives; the 
French nation is behind them to a man, and in the 
folds of their battle flags are inscribed the magic 



FEANCE 43 

words of Right and Liberty, Vive V Alsace! Vive 
la France!" "At last it dawns!" cried Maurice 
Barres. "The day hoped for during forty-four 
years! The red trousers appear on the crest of 
the Vosges, and our soldiers reconquer Alsace dis- 
tracted with joy ! ' ' And on August 10 he wrote : 
"It is a morning landscape, a sky of gold, silver 
and azure. August, 1914! The bugle resounds 
among the hills ; the tricolor flag advances among 
the vineyards and woodlands; Alsace intones the 
Marseillaise. The fetters of Alsace are broken. 
Deroulede, we are at Mulhouse! Vive la Repub- 
lique Frangaise!" 

This jubilant mood was, however, of short du- 
ration. The brilliant sunrise was soon overcast 
by clouds. The mighty German tide crashed re- 
morselessly through Belgium and surged almost 
to the walls of Paris. Yet France stood firm. In 
the early days of September, it is true, when 
things looked blackest, there seem to have been 
a few French politicians who were ready for a 
separate peace, but the popular watchword was 
everywhere, "11 faut tenir!" — "Hold out!" 
France held, and the German tide was borne back 
from the Marne to the Aisne. 

The smoldering hatred for the Teuton flared 
up fiercely from the first. To quote two of the 
most moderate expressions of this feeling, the 
well-known French economist, Paul Leroy-Beau- 
lieu, wrote in his organ, "L'Economiste Fran- 
cois,' ' of August, 1914, "Such is the greed of the 
German ogre. Is it not quite time that all in- 



44 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

dependent countries of Europe united in order 
to prevent the establishment of his growing 
tyranny and to stop the inroads of a country 
which is none other than a beast of prey?" And 
the eminent French philosopher, Henri Bergson, 
exclaimed: "The struggle against Germany 
which is now going on is no more or less than a 
struggle of civilization against barbarism. . . . 
The German ogre must be placed in such a condi- 
tion that it will be impossible for him to devour his 
neighbors. ' ' 

This feeling was speedily envenomed by the 
course of events. The huge death grapple of mil- 
lions of fighting men over France's northern 
provinces must under any circumstances have 
caused immense suffering and desolation. But 
the issue was now complicated by charges of 
wholesale German atrocities which the French 
government soon formulated in a series of offi- 
cial reports that roused horror and fury through- 
out the country. The Paris " Temps" called on 
the men of France to resist to the death this at- 
tack "directed against all human laws by the 
coalition of German and Austro-Hungarian bar- 
barians raging, in a sort of criminal drunkenness, 
and leagued, like the Huns of Attila, to destroy 
the invincible supremacy of human civilization." 
The publication of the first official atrocities' re- 
port made a great sensation. Its language was 
severe, the preamble stating: "There has never 
been a war between civilized nations which has 
been of such a savage and ferocious nature. Pil- 



FEANCE 45 

lage, rape, incendiarism, and murder are the 
practices current among the enemy." The press 
comment may be judged by the words of the con- 
servative "Journal des Debats." On January 
15, 1915, it said: "We are stricken as though un- 
der the blow of a collective dishonor to humanity 
by the mere enumeration of all these acts of pre- 
meditated bestiality, organized sadism, methodic 
rape, which appear as the day's work of the Ger- 
man army.' , 

The destruction of historic monuments, partic- 
ularly the bombardment of Eheims Cathedral, 
seemed to rouse as much popular fury as the re- 
ported atrocities upon the civilian inhabitants. 
"La France" (Paris), of late September, 1914, 
thus expressed the nation's "Public horror and 
wrath": "Can such a crime be pardoned? No, 
a thousand times no! Let there be a holy war 
that shall conquer at all costs and wipe out 
the immoral horde of Potsdam. The glorious 
chimes of Eheims will be heard no more, but Nem- 
esis will surely come." And the "Journal des 
Debats" of September 25 exclaimed, "After Lou- 
vain, after Eheims, what vengeance will not be 
permissible to make these barbarians expiate the 
shame of being Germans ! ' ' 

"Barbarians" was, indeed, the word most 
often employed by Frenchmen to describe the 
Germans, just as the word "Hun" was rising into 
popularity across the Channel. Insistence was 
everywhere laid upon the savage qualities of the 
Teutons. In an article entitled ' ' Barbarians : Past 



46 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

and Present," the " Journal des Debats" of Sep- 
tember 25, 1914, remarked: " Really, there is 
something to be said for the barbarians of old. In 
any case, they were infinitely better than their 
unworthy descendants; they aspired to become 
civilized, whereas the pseudo-civilized barbari- 
ans of to-day reveal the mentality of the cave-man 
beneath the masque of the pedagogue." 

Many Frenchmen found it hard to believe that 
their Frankish ancestors were of Teutonic blood, 
and attempted either to deny it or to apologize 
for it, ascribing their subsequent improvement to 
the saving grace of Latin culture. For example, 
the Abbe Stephen Coube, canon of Orleans, wrote : 
"You tell me that the Franks all had German 
blood in their veins. It is possible. I say, 'It is 
possible,' because many persons deny this, and 
perhaps they are right. But let us admit it, for 
the sake of argument. Well ! This is an original 
sin, which we must confess with humility. But 
happily our forefathers were quickly purified in 
the baptism of Latin civilization. They thereby 
cleansed themselves of the primitive barbarism 
contracted in the Hyrcynian forest and de-Ger- 
manized themselves so well that the Germans have 
denied and cursed them ever since." 

Others, however, asserted positively that 
Frenchmen and Germans were not of the same 
race. In October, 1914, a writer in the Clerical 
organ, "La Croix," denied that the Prussians 
were Aryans. Instead, they were descended from 
"certain nameless prehistoric tribes" of non-Eu- 



FEANCE 47 

ropean origin. Such opinions were not confined 
to Clerical writers. In the spring of 1915 the 
famous savant Camille Flammarion asserted be- 
fore the French Astronomical Society: "All the 
evidence tends to prove that this race is in its very 
blood the implacable enemy of our laborious and 
tranquil civilization which can develop only in 
labor and in peace. The present war is another 
stage in the struggle of the civilized against the 
barbarians, begun more than two thousand years 
ago. We are even justified in thinking that this 
race differs from our own in origin as well as in 
type of evolution. The unity of the human spe- 
cies has never been proven. "We probably do not 
descend from the same race of simians, and fur- 
thermore we bear in us the element of Greco-Latin 
civilization, which differs sensibly from that of the 
Teutons. An abyss separates us, despite certain 
crossings and some psychic exceptions. No. Ger- 
mans and Frenchmen do not speak the same in- 
tellectual language. They are not the same race. 
The vulture, bird of prey, is not of the same race 
as the skylark which soars singing into the lumi- 
nous azure. . . . This is a question of life or death 
for modern civilization. Here is a beast which 
must be struck down. Delenda est Carthago!" 

Given such a race as the Germans, who were not 
merely "barbarians" but "uncivilizable" barbari- 
ans, the presence among them of any true culture 
was obviously unthinkable. Accordingly, a wide- 
spread demand arose for the sundering of all in- 
tellectual and artistic bonds between the two peo- 



48 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

pies, since such contact would merely corrupt 
French culture as it had already been cor- 
rupted in the past. Professor Louis Reynaud of 
the University of Poitiers wrote a book to prove 
that every noteworthy feature in German life was 
of Latin, especially French, origin and inspira- 
tion. "The sole literary interpreter of the Ger- 
man spirit, Maurice Maeterlinck, writes in 
French,' 9 remarked M. Maurice Barres. "I 
should never bother my head finding out what the 
' intellectuals' over the Rhine were thinking." A 
"League for French Culture" was formed, sup- 
ported by such eminent litterateurs as M. Rene 
Doumic, for the purification of the national genius 
and its future development along genuine French 
lines. 

For that matter, many persons saw in the war 
itself one of the main causes for such a devel- 
opment. The war's regenerative action upon 
French life was widely noted. "Ah! How beau- 
tiful she is, this France of 1914!" exclaimed Mau- 
rice Barres. "What a universal freshness! It 
seems that all souls are become new and simple 
again. Before, we had known only the chrysalis. 
To-day, France opens her wings!" His idea of 
the future is equally optimistic: "How beautiful 
she will be after victory, this regenerated France. 
It is a new world which begins." M. Georges Oh- 
net wrote in the l ' Gaulois ' ' of March, 1915 : ' ' The 
virility of the race, the self-abnegation and devo- 
tion of the people, the simple heroism of our sol- 
diers, the proud courage of our women, and the 



FRANCE 49 

prudence of political parties — in a word, the 
whole firm and healthy national organism, justi- 
fies us in looking forward to a fruitful and magnifi- 
cent renaissance." The well-known Protestant 
pastor, Wilfred Monod, in a sermon preached 
about this same date at the Oratoire, Paris, said: 
"Who will deny that the French people have 
passed, during the last months, through one of 
those moral crises which can end in a radical and 
healing conversion? Let us have the courage to 
acknowledge that in more than one respect our na- 
tion offered certain alarming symptoms of anemia, 
and even of degeneracy. . . . Suddenly the 
trumpet sounded 'To arms!' Then were mani- 
fested in the social organism, with surprising spon- 
taneity, those phenomena of defense which appear 
in sick persons reacting toward health. . . . The 
spectacle was wonderful. Such have been the 
fruits of the trial. ' ' 

The deep emphasis laid upon "Latinism," both 
as regards culture and blood, accounts for the 
spirit of the intense propaganda carried on dur- 
ing the first year of the war to sweep in the "Latin 
sister" Italy. This appeal made a profound im- 
pression upon Italian public opinion and was un- 
questionably one of the great reasons why Italy 
joined the Allies in May, 1915. The effect upon 
France was electrical. The utterances of her 
leaders reflected the popular emotion. On May 
25, M. Paul Deschanel, president of the Chamber 
of Deputies, announced Italy's decision as follows : 
"To-day, as fifty-six years ago, Italy is with us. 



50 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

. . . France salutes fraternally the flight of the 
Roman eagles. . . . And now, glorious dead of 
Magenta and Solferino, rise and fire with your gen- 
erous breath the two immortal sisters, in justice 
forever reunited!" To this M. Viviani added: 
"In the name of the Government of the Republic, I 
salute the Italian nation in its unshakable firm- 
ness. ... In this momentous hour France turns 
her gaze and her heart toward that august land of 
heroism and of beauty. Sons of the same race, 
let our lips utter the cry of our conscience and our 
heart — the unanimous, vibrating cry, 'Vive 
Vltalie! Vive la France!' " "It is not for 
naught that we have common origins," said the 
"Journal des Debats," September 10, "that cen- 
turies, yea, millenniums, of incessant interchange 
have formed the genius of two great peoples ; that 
they have the same intellectual formation, the 
same sensibility, the same qualities and sometimes 
also the same defects. Special circumstances may 
cause family disagreements; but in critical hours 
the family discovers itself and the bonds are re- 
knit more solidly than before." 

In a previous chapter we noted the optimistic 
spirit of England during the first half of 1915. 
This was equally true of France, though French 
optimism was of a sterner and more exalted type, 
since France was suffering more directly from 
the war. Save for a handful of pacifists like Ro- 
main Rolland, public opinion was unanimous in 
demanding a fight to a finish. Indeed, M. Rol- 
land 's pacific utterances drew down upon him a 



FRANCE 51 

storm of indignation. In his organ "La Revue" 
for July, 1915, the distinguished French publicist 
Jean Finot furiously denounced all pacifists every- 
where and stigmatized pleas for mercy toward the 
Germans as practically lese-humanite. Accord- 
ing to M. Finot the Kaiser, the Crown Prince and 
all the German leaders must be tried, condemned, 
and hanged. "What a moral solace for all to be 
able to be present at such a spectacle," M. Finot 
concluded. "No Frenchman can now utter the 
word 'Peace,' " asserted M. Paul Sabatier. "To 
use it would be akin to treason. ... If our sol- 
diers go down to the last man, everybody who has 
not yet taken up arms will fight to the last car- 
tridge, to the last stone of our mountains that we 
can hurl against a 'Kultur' which is naught save 
worship of the sword and the golden calf." M. 
Gabriel Hanotaux, in the "Revue Hebdomadaire ' ' 
of January 2, 1915, asserted that this was not 
merely a politico-economic struggle but a genuine 
religious war. Germany must therefore be beaten 
to her very soul. The sentiment of the northern 
provinces was voiced by the "Petit Calaisien" 
(Calais), which said, in April, 1915, "This war 
shall continue until the enemies of the Triple 
Entente have been crushed into the dust." M. 
Stephen Pichon in his organ, the Paris "Petit 
Journal," thus apostrophized Germany: "You 
will have to reimburse the Allies for all the costs 
of the war, and this will be an enormous sum. 
But this is not all. You will have to pay for the 
cathedrals, the museums, the palaces, the huts,, 



52 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

you bombarded and burned, the butcheries you 
committed, for the widows and orphans you have 
made. That will make billions and billions that 
you will have to pay us. Oh, no! Not at once, 
for you could not do that. ... It will take you a 
long time — ten years, twenty years, thirty years. 
. . . Until Germany has paid this off, Russian 
garrisons will occupy Breslau and Dresden, Eng- 
lish garrisons Hamburg and Frankfort, a Belgian 
garrison shall occupy Cologne, a French one Cob- 
lenz and Mainz. Only after the last penny has 
been paid will the Allies withdraw, and even then 
not until after they have blown up the last Ger- 
man fortress." 

With regard to the future settlement of Ger- 
many, French opinion was practically unanimous 
in demanding that not merely the German im- 
perial form of government but also German po- 
litical unity must be destroyed. The superior 
population, wealth, and energy of Germany had 
pressed so heavily on France that a continuance 
of such conditions was deemed intolerable. A 
similar fate was decreed for Austria-Hungary, 
while Turkey was to be divided up among the Al- 
lied Powers, Syria falling to France. A typical 
pronouncement is that of the "Figaro," "The 
empires of the barbarians must be shattered." 

At the beginning of the war the destruction of 
German unity was generally held to be an easy 
task, owing to the supposed survival of Teutonic 
separatism. In October, 1914, Maurice Barres 
wrote, "The German power will be broken, di- 



FEANCE 53 

vided, converted to reason, and the Germans them- 
selves, once more become Saxons, Bavarians, 
Badenese, Protestants, Catholics, etc., will kiss 
our knees as they thank us for having cured them 
of their costly collective delirium of pride." 

In face of the patent solidarity of German pub- 
lic opinion, however, such optimism quickly van- 
ished. Nevertheless, France remained convinced 
of the necessity for the destruction of German 
unity, and the only result was that popular fury, 
hitherto concentrated upon the Prussians, was 
broadened to include all Germans. In January, 
1915, the French publicist Jacques Daugny wrote 
an impassioned article in the "Nouvelle Eevue" 
to disillusion "those naive souls who imagine that 
Germany, once purged of the Hohenzollerns, will 
become again the patriarchal and romantic land 
of Goethe and Schiller. . . . The German soul has 
been poisoned forever; it dreams of nothing but 
violence and domination. Let us, then, not com- 
mit the folly of leaving in the hands of our enemy 
the fragments of his sword. Like Siegfried, he 
would only reforge it to strike us once more." 
The violence of French public opinion is revealed 
by the words of the well-known French author 
Onesime Eeclus. In his book "Le Ehin Fran- 
cois," published in the summer of 1915, he ex- 
claims: "The stinking beast is down! We are 
going to divide up its flesh and its bones. We will 
make of it [Germany] an insolvent debtor, a 
merchant walled off by prohibitive tariffs, an ad- 
miral commanding fishing boats, a generalissimo 



54 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

with not even a ridiculous national guard under 
his orders." 

The implacable temper displayed toward the 
German people is strikingly shown by an article 
of Louis Leger in the " Revue Hebdomadaire " 
for December 18, 1915. M. Leger is a distin- 
guished specialist on Slavic affairs, and his article 
recommends the lopping off of all eastern Ger- 
many for the aggrandizement of powerful Polish 
and Bohemian kingdoms under the protection of 
Russia. The suggested pruning of Germany's 
eastern frontier is drastic. Slav wedges must be 
driven into the heart of Saxony and to within a 
short distance of Berlin. The fate of the annexed 
German populations is not left in doubt: they 
must be incontinently Slavized or exterminated. 
"Well!" exclaims M. Leger, "as to the Germans, 
who have in the past Germanized so many peoples 
— it will be their turn to be Slavized. If they 
balk at this metamorphosis they will have just one 
thing to do — get out, slink back into Germania's 
bosom, or go settle beyond the seas. Their reign 
has lasted long enough. But, though insolent in 
success, in adversity they have much suppler 
backbones than most people think." The extir- 
pative note comes out clearly: " ' Ausrotten' ('root 
them out') once cried Bismarck of the Poles in 
Prussia. Now, in our turn, let us cry 'Ausrot- 
ten.' . . . All these regions must be de-German- 
ized. When a tree spreads a harmful shade we 
cut it down; we do more — we tear it up by the 
roots. Well, just so must we tear up the Prussian 



FEANCE 55 

tree by the roots. The regions so long infected 
by its shade must be colonized by Poles, Russians, 
and Lithuanians. All these peoples are prolific 
enough to quickly fill the gaps left by the disap- 
pearance of the descendants of the Teutonic 
knights whose successors have all too largely re- 
venged themselves for the vow of chastity once 
professed by their predecessors." 

Such being the French temper toward the gen- 
eral post-war settlement of Germany, we are in a 
position to appreciate France's attitude toward 
the re-drawing of Germany's western frontier. 
On one point French public opinion is unanimous 
— Alsace-Lorraine must return to France. About 
that there is absolutely no discussion. This mat- 
ter once settled, however, divergent views appear. 
Many Frenchmen declare themselves satisfied 
with the prospect of regaining Alsace-Lorraine 
and aver that the destruction of German unity 
would furnish sufficient guarantees against fur- 
ther trouble. A notable example of this way of 
thinking is the eminent economist Yves Guyot. 

But such is emphatically not the opinion held 
by another powerful body of French thought, 
which demands extensive annexations in western 
Germany. These doctrines require our attention. 
Of course, the recent trend of the war makes an 
Allied conquest of western Germany a very remote 
possibility. Nevertheless, Ehineward expansion 
is the oldest of French policies, and the acquisi- 
tion of the whole left bank of the Ehine (includ- 
ing Belgium and Holland) as France's " natural" 



56 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

frontier has been the dream of Frenchmen for 
nearly a thousand years. When we remember 
the unchanging, even atavistic, character of 
French basic thinking, we must realize that such 
historic aspirations, once roused, will not easily 
sink to sleep again, and that no matter how cruelly 
these hopes may be deceived by the present course 
of events they will influence French national sen- 
timent and foreign policy for a long time to come. 
The philosophy of what we may term French 
Neo-Imperialism is admirably set forth by that 
able specialist on world-politics, Professor Edou- 
ard Driault, in his recent book "La France et la 
Guerre: Les Solutions Franchises" (1916). "We 
may as well say it, since we are at the end of the 
nightmare," he begins. "For a century France 
was a conquered nation. ' * The weight of Water- 
loo bore down France's spirit even before Sedan, 
and since 1870 the best proof of France's moral 
abasement is the way she fixed her gaze upon Al- 
sace-Lorraine, to the exclusion of her older and 
wider dreams. "How much more magnificent, 
how much more splendid in its imaginative flight, 
was the policy of Old France. Our forefathers 
had not the l souls of the conquered.' They were 
naive and young. They did not trouble them- 
selves with political philosophy, principles of na- 
tionalities, etc., they had the faith which moves 
mountains — which moves frontiers over moun- 
tains. What will give us back the faith of our 
fathers?" M. Driault 's answer is, "The image 
of Ancient Gaul"; that is, everything west of the 



FEANCE 57 

Rhine. "Our forefathers remembered it. They 
had in their blood, in their very nature, the concept 
that Gaul, the image and model of France, 
stretched to the Pyrenees, to the Alps — to the 
Rhine; that for long centuries the Romans and 
Gallo-Romans had given to this admirable geo- 
graphical figure a unity of language, institutions, 
and culture which has forever given its popula- 
tions a common soul. Gaul was then closed to the 
Germans, to the barbarians. . . . But during the 
century since Waterloo, what a miserable specta- 
cle ! On the word of historians obsessed by defeat 
we have accepted the notion that the final frontier 
of France was that of 1789 ... a false impression, 
a pitiable doctrine of resignation !" To-day 
France is broad awake. But how shall this ad- 
mirable spirit be sustained? How shall France 
be saved? "She will be saved only if she no 
longer has that soul of the vanquished which she 
got from Sedan and Waterloo; only if she takes 
up again the glorious tradition of Ancient Gaul, 
of Royal France, and of the soldiers of the First 
Republic.' ' 

The Neo-Imperialists adduce many arguments 
for their proposed annexations of German soil. 
Some lay stress on strategic necessities, not even 
Alsace-Lorraine being held sufficient to prevent 
new assaults of the "barbarians." M. Driault 
holds that the safety of all western Europe, in- 
cluding England, is at stake. Other writers em- 
phasize economic considerations. The vast coal 
and iron deposits of western Germany must pass 



58 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

under French control, both for the future eco- 
nomic prosperity of France and to prevent Ger- 
many from amassing new wealth for subsequent 
wars of revenge. 

The objection that the inhabitants of these re- 
gions are Germans is rebutted either by assert- 
ing that the principle of nationality cannot be set 
up in favor of a people which has trampled the 
rights of others under foot, or by asserting that 
the populations on the left bank of the Ehine are 
not genuine Germans but Teutonized Gauls whose 
German veneer would quickly rub off under 
French rule. Says M. Driault : "We wish to rees- 
tablish the century old traditions of France's his- 
tory, momentarily broken by the Prussian acci- 
dent. There is no Prussian ' right' to the left 
bank of the Ehine ; there is only a Prussian usur- 
pation. We have here a Ehineland, Celtic at bot- 
tom and with centuries of Gallo-Eoman educa- 
tion." "The occupation of the left bank of the 
Ehine by the Germans is the fruit of a long usur- 
pation," writes Paul Marmottan in his "Notre 
Frontiere Naturel" (1915). "Its territories 
were Gaulish. The Ehine is not a German river." 
"We are merely following our most ancient, im- 
mutable, and glorious national tradition in claim- 
ing the left bank of the Ehine, ' ' asserts Professor 
J. Dontenville in his "Apres la Guerre" (1915). 
While Senator Frank Chauveau in "La Paix et 
la Frontiere du Ehin" (1915) exclaims, "These 
are our necessary limits, traced by nature and by 
history. . . . We will have the Ehine frontier." 



FRANCE 59 

The easy assimilation of these territories is em- 
phasized. "It is in the name of their Latinism 
that we reclaim them," insists Onesime Eeclus, 
and further remarks, "Do not regard the Cisrhe- 
nanes as pure Germans, but as half Frenchmen, 
half-brothers who wish to reenter the family." 
"On these Cisrhenanes, men of a civilization at 
bottom identical with our own," writes Professor 
Dontenville, "the charm of our culture, so finely 
and delicately superior to Kultur, will soon oper- 
ate irresistibly." "The French nationality, au- 
reoled with the prestige of victory," says M. Dri- 
ault, "will radiate as in former days to the 
Rhine." Some writers admit that there will be a 
minority among the annexed populations which 
will prove refractory to French assimilation. 
For such recalcitrants expulsion is widely recom- 
mended. "Those Germans who are not pleased 
with the new French supremacy may recross the 
Rhine," writes M. Marmottan. "We shall not 
stop them." And Onesime Reclus asserts: 
"Never will France have a better occasion of say- 
ing to the Germans of Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne, 
Aix-la-Chapelle : 'This is my house; if you don't 
like it, get out ! ' " M. Reclus is also hopeful as to 
the effects of education: "We shall not neglect 
the school, as we did too often in Alsace-Lorraine ; 
especially as it is by the school that the Germans 
have been turned into a pack of wild beasts. We 
shall teach these people French." 

The final argument of the Neo-Imperialists is 
the doctrine of "compensations." Since all her 



60 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

allies will get something by the war, France must 
not be left out. ''And we!" exclaims Senator 
Chauveau, "we, who have suffered the most, sac- 
rificed the most, risked the most: we shall then 
have nothing!" "Go to!" cries M. Marmottan. 
"Are we going to let Germany be divided up with- 
out cutting our slice of the cake 1 ' ' 

The annexation of the whole left bank of the 
Rhine naturally involves the problem of France 's 
future relations with Belgium and Holland. To 
be sure, Belgium is frequently offered the terri- 
tories lying between her present frontier and the 
Rhine, but the same writers invariably claim that 
the presence of so many Germans within her body 
politic would be too much for Belgian digestion, 
so Belgium is expected to refuse. Belgium is, 
however, to be consoled at Holland's expense by 
the acquisition of the Maestricht salient, Dutch 
Flanders at the mouth of the Scheldt, and Hol- 
land's suzerainty over Luxemburg. The Dutch 
are not expected to object, and are offered Ger- 
man territory as compensation. The virtual en- 
circlement of Belgium and Holland by French 
territory would result in a close understanding 
between the three nations. Some writers call this 
new status "Restored Gaul," others the "Gaulish 
Region." Perhaps the censorship here hinders 
speculation. 

The final problem which the French Neo-Imper- 
ialists attempt to solve is the attitude which their 
projected Greater France is to assume toward the 
various Germanic states beyond the Rhine. Most 



FRANCE 61 

writers think that these should constitute a French 
sphere of influence. Some writers believe that 
France should take the principal strategic 
"bridge-heads" on the right bank, while one Neo- 
Imperialist, M. Jacques Daugny, asserts that the 
French frontier should go far beyond the Ehine 
to the crests of the Black Forest. "Germans 
have quite sufficiently told us, ' ' writes M. Daugny, 
"that the Rhine is not a frontier. It is, indeed, 
merely a marvelous route traced by Nature be- 
tween two fertile plains which in reality form 
only one whole from the Vosges to the Black For- 
est. To be developed in peace, this valley must 
know but one master. Our frontier must, there- 
fore, follow the crest of the Black Forest, the 
watershed between the basins of the Rhine and 
the Danube." 

French Neo-Imperialism is the reflection of the 
optimistic period which reached its climax with 
Italy's entrance into the war in May, 1915. How- 
ever, the long series of German triumphs and Al- 
lied disasters which began in June gradually 
evoked less confident notes from the chorus of 
French public opinion. Downright pessimism 
was, it is true, sternly repressed by the rigid cen- 
sorship, but the sense of strain under which 
France was laboring could not be entirely denied 
a voice. "The Allies have failed since the 
Marne," wrote M. Gustave Herve in his organ 
the "Guerre Sociale" of early July, 1915. The 
paper was at once suppressed, but the words had 
been written. 



62 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

So profound was the impression made by Ger- 
man resisting power that by the spring of 1916 a 
new thought-current was plainly visible in French 
public opinion. Its cardinal tenet was revealed 
in its watchword, "The War after the War!" 
Fundamentally, its aim was the same as that 
of the Neo-Imperialists : Germany must be 
"smashed," German unity must be destroyed, and 
a regenerated France must take a leading position 
in the world. Hatred of the Teuton flamed as 
hotly as ever within the French heart. "The en- 
tire universe will charge the beast that menaces 
the universe," cried Gabriel Hanotaux in the 
"Revue Hebdomadaire" of January 3, 1916. 
"The chastisement is slow, but it is coming, com- 
ing. You have lusted after material well-being, 
booty, gold, women; your sadism was to foul the 
world with its ' eugenics. ' You purposed to rape 
humanity through terror. Wait! This terror is 
coming back upon you. It is you who will trem- 
ble, you who will grow pale. Misery and despair 
will destroy in you the last vestige of your pride !" 

The crushing of Germany thus remained the 
cardinal tenet of French thought. Nevertheless, 
many Frenchmen began to fear either that Ger- 
many could not now be crushed on the battlefield 
or that even were her sword shattered in the pres- 
ent conflict German energy would quickly amass 
fresh wealth and forge new weapons for a subse- 
quent war of revenge. The logical conclusion 
was that Germany must be permanently kept 
down by a standing league of the Allied Powers 



FRANCE 63 

which should be not only military but also eco- 
nomic in character. Similar opinions were of 
course being voiced in England, but "War after 
the War" projects were received much more en- 
thusiastically in Prance than across the Channel. 
For this there were several reasons. To begin 
with, France had shown much less resisting power 
to Germany's aggressive economic methods than 
had England, and French industry had suffered 
severely from German competition in the years 
immediately preceding the war. Frenchmen 
therefore felt that the elimination of this competi- 
tion was necessary for the security of their indus- 
trial future. Again, the political destruction of 
Germany was in France generally held to be im- 
perative, whereas in England the prevailing opin- 
ion was that it was impracticable. Lastly, Pro- 
tectionist France felt no such wrench as did tra- 
ditionally Free-trade England at the prospect of 
far-reaching international tariff agreements. 

From the very beginning of the war an active 
propaganda had been carried on in France for the 
permanent exclusion of German economic activity 
within the boundaries of the Eepublic and its col- 
onies. Proposals for concerted economic discrim- 
ination against Germany by all the Allies thus 
found the ground well prepared. The French 
press was enthusiastic from the first. In Decem- 
ber, 1915, the well-known French writer, Jean 
Richepin, announced in the ' ' Figaro " : " The idea 
of a commercial league which will continue after 
the war a tireless, merciless struggle against Ger- 



64 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

man hegemony after breaking it by force of arms, 
is one that I most heartily approve. On several 
occasions I have treated the subject under the 
significant title of ' The Second War. ' I shall per- 
severe in this campaign with so much the more en- 
ergy now that I perceive the unanimous ardor of 
all the Allies in their determination to carry out 
this idea. By this means and by this alone will 
our victory be completely and absolutely consoli- 
dated." About the same date the "Nouvelliste 
de Bordeaux" thus outlined the measures neces- 
sary to secure Germany's economic downfall: "It 
is quite possible now to indicate some of the meth- 
ods that seem essential: absolute refusal of natu- 
ralization to all Germans in the conquering coun- 
tries; refusal to allow the establishment of com- 
mercial agencies; the stock exchanges of Paris, 
London, and Petrograd pitilessly closed to the 
stocks from beyond the Rhine. Above all, the 
Allies must seize by right of conquest certain ter- 
ritories the loss of which will mean to the German 
provinces a notable decrease in their economic 
wealth." M. Sancholle-Heuraux, in "La Revue" 
for May, 1916, remarked, "At its last congress the 
French Socialist party declared that it did not de- 
sire the economic ruin of the Central empires. 
This idealistic affirmation was a deplorable er- 
ror. ' ' The economic conference of the Allied gov- 
ernments held at Paris in June, 1916, and its 
recommendation for future economic collabora- 
tion excited the warm approval of nearly all the 



FRANCE 65 

French press. A few Free Traders like Yves 
Guyot looked askance on principle, and other eco- 
nomic writers like Max Hoschiller and Henri 
Hauser doubted its practicability, but the majority 
opinion ran obviously the other way. 

An interesting phase of this trend toward per- 
manent politico-economic action against Germany 
is the movement known as "Pan-Latinism." 
This movement had been in evidence from the 
very beginning of the war. We have already seen 
how powerfully French appeals to ethnic and cul- 
tural solidarity had influenced Italian sentiment 
in the opening months of 1915. But this propa- 
ganda had been only a part of a still wider appeal 
addressed to the whole Latin world. As early as 
February, 1915, a " Pan-Latin " congress had 
convened at the Paris Sorbonne, where prominent 
representatives of all the "Latin" nations, in- 
cluding Latin America and Greece, affirmed the 
ethnic and cultural solidarity of the Latin 
race and expressed the warmest sympathy 
for France. The French attitude was well 
expressed in the opening speech of the pre- 
siding officer, M. Paul Deschanel, president of the 
French Chamber of Deputies: "Behold, in our 
venerable Sorbonne, the whole Latin family re- 
united. ... A family, one in its magnificent di- 
versity. One, because the ancient rivalries be- 
tween Latin peoples have no longer any raison 
d'etre; because their very shadows have disap- 
peared; because all our interests are inseparable. 



66 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

One, because throughout the ages every effort of 
the Hellenic and Latin conscience has been toward 
the same ideal: Liberty by Right." 

Pan-Latin sentiment has unquestionably been 
of great benefit to France. Besides its effect 
upon Italy, it had much to do with the entrance 
of Rumania and Portugal into the war on the 
Allies' side. The only refractory member of the 
Latin confraternity appears to be Spain, whose 
attitude will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 

The philosophy of Pan-Latinism is ably ex- 
pounded by the well-known French publicist, 
Louis Bertrand, in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" 
of September 15, 1916. He regards the Teutonic 
peril as a standing menace to Latin civilization no 
matter how badly Germany may be defeated in 
the present war. For that reason Latin solidar- 
ity is an obvious measure of racial and cultural 
self-preservation. He urges Latinism's best 
minds to an immediate working out of both theory 
and practical details. "In order that it may be 
possible, it must be believed in and desired. It 
must constitute a faith. Pan-Germanism is, at 
bottom, nothing but a mystic will. . . . For four 
hundred years, after a long period of hesitation 
and resistance, the Mediterranean world accepted 
the 'Pax Romana,' which was nothing but a per- 
petual struggle against barbarism. To-day, in 
order to continue this struggle, why should the 
Western world refuse to accept the 'Latin 
peace'?" 

Other French thinkers glimpse even broader 



FEANCE 67 

unions against Teutonism. For example, M. Jean 
Finot, in his organ ''La Revue" for December, 
1915, recommends a lasting Franco-Anglo-Italian 
cultural solidarity. "In the great reconstruction 
after the war we must, first and foremost, break 
with the pretended German civilization, with the 
influence of its savants, philosophers, and writers. 
Europe must renew the traditions interrupted at 
the time of the Renaissance. In the intellectual 
and moral domain, all those treasures of which 
humanity is so proud have been above all created 
by the three peoples to-day, allies and friends: 
the English, the French, and the Italians. But 
their activity has always lacked cohesion and 
unity. The Germans, seizing upon the conquests 
of thought and imagination made by those three 
peoples, have made the world believe in their spe- 
cial genius and their great merits. Being merely 
propagators of others' thought, they have never- 
theless made us believe that they were its authors. 
. . . Under the beneficent influence of these three 
countries, human thought and inspiration have 
developed in harmonious fashion." To carry on 
this development, conscious cooperation is neces- 
sary for the fulfilment of the "New Renaissance" 
which should follow the war. Of course this does 
not imply discrimination against other peoples. 
But it does imply a virtual "quarantine of the 
manifestations of 'Kultur,' which will doubtless 
continue to poison the universe for long years to 
come. And just as the security of nations must 
be guaranteed against the espionage and militar- 



68 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

ism of Germany, so the conscience of peoples must 
be defended against the moral contagion of a col- 
lectivity which will long retain the evil effects of 
the Great War." 

After all this we are not surprised to find most 
Frenchmen frankly pessimistic concerning the 
problem of future relations with the Teutonic 
Powers. A few French thinkers, it is true, like 
the pacifist Romain Rolland, assert the absolute 
necessity of speedily re-knitting the broken bonds 
of European solidarity, and predict that this will 
take place. In June, 1915, M. Rolland wrote: 
' ' The fate of mankind is above that of all patriots. 
The intellectual ties between the hostile nations 
are bound to be restored. Those who differ 
simply commit suicide.' ' But such is not 
the opinion of most Frenchmen. Much more 
representative of French public opinion were 
the words of Paul Sabatier, penned at about 
the same time: "It does not seem possible that 
these connections can ever be restored. It will 
hardly be possible to bridge the gap which has 
opened between French and German scientists; 
the grief of the conquered race can only widen it. 
Mutual hatred is so intense that it is to be feared 
that both Germans and Frenchmen will see only 
the enemy in the scientists whom they have to 
review and criticize." 

At the close of the previous chapter we dis- 
cussed the possibility of a fairly rapid subsidence 
of the present Anglo-German hatred. Regarding 
the future of Franco-German relations, however, 



FRANCE 69 

we are avowedly pessimistic. The two cases are 
radically dissimilar. The English and German 
peoples have many common ties of blood, religion, 
and culture. This is their first real war with one 
another, and the present struggle, though desper- 
ate, is being waged at arm's length, with no inva- 
sions of home territory and with few direct in- 
juries inflicted upon the civilian populations. 
Also, both nations possess a realistic temper open 
to compromises and practical solutions. 

The French and German peoples, on the other 
hand, have never been good neighbors. They 
have behind them a record of rivalry and inter- 
mittent warfare stretching back beyond recorded 
history which has left an evil legacy of mutual 
wrongs and humiliations. For the last half cen- 
tury their relations have been of the very worst, 
1870 having been neither forgiven nor forgotten. 
To all this is now being added the present fright- 
ful war with its burden of suffering, destruction, 
and death unparalleled in modern history. All 
the old scars have been ripped wide open, and 
ideas and aspirations thought long dead stalk 
forth into the light of day. The terrible atrocity 
charges, whether exaggerated or no, are implic- 
itly believed by Frenchmen, who to-day regard 
the Germans as irreclaimable savages. The na- 
tional temperaments, manners, and customs are 
alike antipathetic, while material interests are 
generally opposed. 

All this betokens a persistence of Franco-Ger- 
man hostility into the indefinite future, especially 



70 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

when we remember that the French are markedly 
traditionalist in their thinking, prone to fixed 
ideas, and instinctively averse to sacrifice cher- 
ished principles in realist compromise. As things 
now appear, nothing short of an imminent peril to 
western Europe would draw the two peoples to- 
gether. 



CHAPTER in 

GEEMANY 

THE outstanding feature of German national 
psychology is its extreme complexity. Ger- 
man unity is so recent and so federal in type that 
there is no cultural or intellectual center which 
sets the tone for the whole country as London 
and Paris do for England and France. Of course 
the war has decisively proved that all Germans are 
agreed upon certain fundamentals, such as the 
preservation of German unity and the mainte- 
ance of the Empire's territorial integrity, but be- 
yond these axioms there is the widest diversity of 
aim and outlook, from extreme " Pan-German" 
imperialists and absolutist Prussian Junkers to 
extreme Social Democrats who deplore war on 
principle and oppose all territorial annexations. 

Matters are still further complicated by the in- 
dividual German's habit of introspection. The 
mystical strain inherent in the Teutonic nature, 
the tendency toward self-analysis, and the will- 
ingness to look facts in the face no matter how 
disagreeable the conclusions, all lead the average 
German to react to a particular situation without 
much reference to the past. He is restrained 
neither by the Latin love of logical continuity nor 
by the Anglo-Saxon fear of inconsistency, and he 

71 



72 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

will therefore talk and act very differently on 
different occasions. This comes out strikingly 
in the intellectual development of thinkers like 
Friedrich Naumann or in the writings of a strong 
personality like Maximilian Harden. 

The eve of the Great War found Germany full 
of unrest. Her astonishing economic transfor- 
mation had raised a whole series of internal 
problems which were being debated with great 
intellectual intensity, while the external political 
situation appeared so unfavorable that Germany's 
future was regarded with profound apprehension. 
The sense of isolation and impending foreign peril 
during the years immediately preceding the war 
produced a highly alarmist literature, good ex- 
amples being Colonel Frobenius's "Germany's 
Hour of Destiny" and General von Bernhardi's 
" Germany and the Next War." 

Under these circumstances, the effect of the 
Austro-Serbian crisis of July, 1914, upon Ger- 
many was electrical. German public opinion re- 
garded the menace to Austria as deadly and de- 
manded that Germany's one dependable ally 
should be supported at all costs. Serbia was not 
only thought to be aiming at the disruption of 
Austria-Hungary but was considered a mere cat 's 
paw of Russian Pan-Slavism and lust of world do- 
minion. At the beginning of the crisis the nor- 
mally mild-spoken Berlin "Vossische Zeitung" 
exclaimed warmly: "The bloody crime of Sera- 
jevo was only one link in the long train of assas- 
sination and horror by which the revolutionary 



GERMANY 73 

propagandists in Belgrade were working to pro- 
mote the official policy of Serbia." And a little 
later the Berlin "Kreuzzeitung" declared: "No 
great Power can allow an insignificant neighbor 
to torment and injure it, especially when this 
insignificant Power relies on its ability to rattle 
the saber of another great Power." The Teu- 
tonic attitude is well set forth in an article by the 
eminent German publicist Hans Delbriick, printed 
in an American periodical, the "Atlantic 
Monthly" for February, 1915, but written during 
the early months of the war. Referring to the 
"Greater Serbian" peril for both Austria and 
Germany, he wrote : ' l The danger to the Austrian 
Empire which arises from it is very considerable, 
not only because Serbia is Serbia, and because 
she has partizans in the Hapsburg monarchy it- 
self, but because she is the advance guard of the 
Pan-Slavic idea and the outpost of mighty Russia. 
Nor should we speak of Austro-Hungarian craze 
for dominion ; it is the instinct for self-preservation 
of a great Power, which cannot, without despair- 
ing of its own future, tolerate the existence of 
the Greater Serbian idea either within its borders 
or on its frontiers. A prospective Greater Serbia 
would not only sever large tracts of territory from 
the Austrian Empire, but would cut her off from 
the sea, which in these days means death to a 
great Power. The Greater Serbian idea and 
Austria cannot exist side by side. Austria would 
not only have ceased to be a great Power, but she 
would have been dismembered as a state, if she 



74 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

had not adopted vigorous measures. For the 
same reason it is a matter of course that the Ger- 
man Empire should stand at Austria's side. Had 
we tolerated the subjugation and dismemberment 
of Austria by Russia we should have had to wage 
the next war against Russia and France alone. 
Under no circumstances could we leave this dan- 
ger to our descendants; the preservation of the 
Hapsburg monarchy was therefore a vital issue for 
the German Empire." 

In those circles which had long held a European 
conflict to be inevitable, the prospect of war was 
hailed as the best way out of an intolerable situa- 
tion. At the end of July the ' ' Militarische Rund- 
schau" declared: "If we do not decide for war, 
that war in which we shall have to engage at the 
latest in two or three years will be begun in far 
less propitious circumstances. At this moment 
the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, 
moral factors and right are on our side, as well 
as might. Since we shall have to accept the con- 
test some day, let us provoke it at once. Our 
prestige, our position as a great Power, our honor, 
are in question; and yet more, for it would seem 
that our very existence is concerned." This, 
however, does not represent the viewpoint of the 
mass of German public opinion. The German 
people as a whole showed no eagerness for war 
and approved their government's reserved atti- 
tude until the Russian mobilization made quick 
action imperative. 

Once the die was cast, however, the entire 



GERMANY 75 

German people rallied round the Government in 
a passion of spontaneous loyalty. German una- 
nimity is well shown by the following editorial in 
"Vorwarts," the chief organ of the Social Demo- 
crats : "We were always open enemies of the mon- 
archic form of government, and we always shall 
be. . . . But we have to acknowledge to-day that 
William II has shown himself the friend of uni- 
versal peace." 

The great reconciler of the traditionally pacifist 
Social Democrats was the "Russian Peril." On 
this point the party was absolutely united, save 
for a handful of ultra-pacifists like Karl Lieb- 
knecht and Rosa Luxemburg. "War in our coun- 
try," declared the Chemnitz "Volksstimme," 
"compels all comrades to unite against the foe. 
All must set aside the aims and purposes of their 
party, and bear in mind one fact — Germany, and 
in a larger sense all Europe, is endangered by 
Russian despotism. . . . Germany's women and 
children must not become the prey of Cossack 
bestiality; the German country must not be the 
spoil of Cossacks ; because if the Allies should be 
victorious, not an English governor or a French 
republican would rule over Germany, but the Rus- 
sian Czar. Therefore we must defend at this mo- 
ment everything that means German culture and 
German liberty against a merciless and barbaric 
enemy." Even so staunch a pacifist as the So- 
cialist Deputy, Haase, made in the Reichstag the 
following declaration: "Germany is threatened 
with annihilation by Russian despotism, and to 



76 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

prevent this danger the Government can count on 
the support of the Social Democratic party." 

Fear and abhorrence of Russia were well nigh 
universal throughout Germany. For several 
years past, Russo-German relations had not been 
good, while the rising tide of Russian nationalism 
had quickened the traditional dread of this mighty 
neighbor into deep alarm. Hence the German 
people entered the struggle as in a crusade for the 
defense of Western civilization against Asiatic 
barbarism. The Teutonic attitude is well ex- 
plained by the eminent German psychologist, Pro- 
fessor Hugo Miinsterberg. In his book, "The 
War and America," written in 1914, he asserted: 
' ' Germans know what a German defeat must mean 
to the ideal civilization of the world. The culture 
of Germany would be trampled down by the half- 
cultured Tartars." And he paints this truly 
gloomy picture of the results of Russian victory: 
"If Russia wins to-day and Germany is broken 
down, Asia must win sooner or later, and if A sia 
wins, the achievements of the Western world will 
be wiped from the earth more sweepingly than 
the civilization of old Assyria. The anti-Asiatic 
work will and must appear sinful and treacherous ; 
it will be obliterated from the globe and the dark- 
ness of old will reign again." 

This feeling against Russia in great part ex- 
plains the subsequent German attitude toward 
England. At the outbreak of the European con- 
flict the mass of the German people regarded it as 
essentially a Russo-German war and considered 



GERMANY 77 

themselves the champions of Western culture. In 
such a struggle they believed that England must 
remain neutral. When, therefore, England joined 
Russia, the German people took it as the vilest 
treachery to the cause of civilization. The fact 
that, despite a decade of Anglo-German rivalry, 
many Germans still regarded the English as Teu- 
tonic kinsfolk, aggravated England's shame of 
" cultural apostasy" by the guilt of "race- 
treason." 

The explosion of popular fury against England 
was therefore instantaneous and general. "What 
is happening to-day," asserted Professors Ernst 
Haeckel and Rudolf Eucken in a joint manifesto, 
"will be inscribed in the annals of history as an 
indelible shame to England. England fights to 
please a half-Asiatic Power against Germanism. 
She fights not only on the side of barbarism, but 
also of moral injustice, for it is not to be forgot- 
ten that Russia began the war because it was not 
willing that there should be thorough expiation of 
a wretched murder. It is the fault of England 
that the present war is extended to a world war, 
and that all culture is thereby endangered. And 
why all this? Because she was envious of Ger- 
many's greatness, because she wished at all costs 
to hinder a further extension of this greatness." 
Professor Lamprecht declared that the war would 
result in the spread of German culture over all 
the world, from which only one country would be 
excluded— England. "The German world," he 
wrote, "to-day is one. There is only one renegade 



78 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

brother. Up and at him! English culture must 
be in a bad way indeed when it allies itself with 
the Mongolians. . . . Germany is now the pro- 
tector of European civilization, and after bloody 
victories the world will be healed by being Ger- 
manized." And so convinced an opponent of 
Russia as Paul Rohrbach closed his book, "Der 
Krieg und die deutsche Politik" (1914), with the 
following words: "Russia, with her population 
of one hundred and seventy million, must at all 
hazards be reduced, and her ability to attack cen- 
tral Europe diminished. But the real enemy of 
Germany, and not only of Germany but of the 
culture and civilization of all Europe — that enemy 
is England. Peace with England is impossible 
until her power to do harm has been broken for- 
ever. . . . Then, and then only, Germany's future 
will be assured. To display leniency toward 
England is now but to commit an act of treason 
against the future of the German Empire." 

Reports of anti-German outbursts in England 
lashed the waves of Teutonic hate to even 
greater fury. "Who was it that did conspire to 
bring about this war?" queried the eminent dram- 
atist, Gerhart Hauptmann, in early October, 1914, 
"who even whistled for the Mongolian, for the 
Jap, that he should come to bite viciously and cow- 
ardly at Europe's heels? It is with great pain 
and bitterness that I pronounce the word i Eng- 
land.' I belong to those barbarians upon whom 
the English University of Oxford bestowed the 
degrees of doctor honoris causa. . . . Haldane, 



GERMANY 79 

former English minister of war, and with him 
numerous Englishmen, undertook regular pil- 
grimages to the small barbarian city of Weimar, 
where the barbarians, Goethe, Schiller, Herder, 
Wieland, and others, have exerted themselves 
for the humanity of the whole world." "It is 
a fight between England and Germany to 
the bitter end — to the last German if need 
be," declared Herr Witting, head of the 
Deutsche Bank, to an American journalist in 
late October, 1914. "It is a war of annihilation 
between two countries and nations. England has 
wanted it, so let it be. We want no quarter from 
England ; we shall give none. We shall never ask 
England for mercy; we shall extend no mercy 
to her. England and England alone brought on 
this criminal war out of greed and envy, to crush 
Germany, and now it is death, destruction, and 
annihilation for one or the other of the two na- 
tions. Tell your American people that, and say 
that these words do not come from a fanatic, but 
from a quiet business man who knows the feeling 
of his people and who knows what is at stake in 
this titanic struggle brought on by that criminal 
nation. I tell you that it is a fight to the finish. 
God ! How we hate England and the English, that 
nation of hypocrites and criminals which has 
brought this misery upon us and upon the world. 
And for what? For greed, greed and envy, to 
crush the German nation because she found her- 
self decadent and felt her dominance and dom- 
ineering in the world endangered. For the 



80 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

French there is no feeling in Germany except pity 
and regret. We must fight them, of course, but 
we have no feeling against France. She was 
forced into it. The feeling against Russia is sub- 
siding. But against England there is growing 
among low and high the most fanatical hatred and 
contempt that one nation ever had toward an- 
other. Tell America not to be misled by peace 
talk. There is not going to be any peace — not 
for a long time. We are prepared for three 
years. In the end it will develop into a struggle 
between England and Germany. The English are 
determined to destroy the Fatherland. We have 
accepted the challenge." 

Herr Witting seems to have accurately gaged 
the German national temper in the autumn of 1914. 
To this period belongs the famous popular shib- 
boleth, "Gott strafe England!" At this time 
also Ernst Lissauer wrote his famous "Hymn of 
Hate," with its implacable closing lines: 

"You will we hate with a lasting hate, 
We will never forego our hate. 
Hate by water and hate by land, 
Hate of the head and hate of the hand, 
Hate of the hammer and hate of the crown, 
Hate of seventy millions, choking down. 
We love as one, we hate as one, 
We have one foe, and one alone — 
England!" 

And Lissauer 's hymn was not an isolated phe- 
nomenon. It was merely one of a whole poetic 



GEEMANY 81 

cycle, and was by no means the bitterest in tone, 
as witness this poem by Heinrich Vierordt, enti- 
tled, "Germany, Hate!": 

' ' Oh, Germany ! Hate in cold, in icy blood, 
Kill millions on millions of the devilish brood. 
Let the bodies heap up mountain high 
And the smoke of the flesh ascend to the sky. 

■ ' Oh, Germany ! Hate now, let this be your test — 
The bayonet thrust in the enemy's breast. 
Take no one a prisoner, strike every one dead, 
And draw round the wastelands a girdle of red." 

This wave of hate seems not to have been con- 
fined to the civilian population at home but to 
have also affected the armies at the front. In 
March, 1915, the "Liller Kriegszeitung," a sol- 
diers' paper published in the occupied French city 
of Lille, contained the following article entitled 
"Fire," by Lieutenant-Colonel Kaden: " 'Gott 
strafe England ! ' ' May He punish her ! ' This is 
the greeting that now passes when Germans meet. 
The fire of this righteous hate is all aglow! You 
men of Germany, from East and West, forced to 
shed your blood in the defense of your homeland 
through England's infamous envy and hatred of 
German progress, feed the flame that burns in 
your souls. We have but one war cry — 'Gott 
strafe England!' Hiss this to one another in the 
trenches, in the charge ; hiss as it were the sound 
of licking flames. Behold in every dead comrade 
a sacrifice forced from you by this accursed peo- 



82 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

pie. Take tenfold vengeance for each hero's 
death ! 

"Yon German people at home, feed this fire of 
hate! You mothers, engrave this in the heart of 
the babe at your breast ! You thousands of teach- 
ers, to whom millions of German children look 
up with eyes and hearts, teach HATE ! unquench- 
able HATE ! You homes of German learning, 
pile up the fuel on this fire ! Tell the nation that 
this hate is not un-German, that it is not poison 
for our people. Write in letters of fire the name 
of our bitterest enemy. You guardians of the 
truth, feed this sacred HATE! You German 
fathers, lead your children up to the high hills of 
our homeland, at their feet our dear country 
bathed in sunshine. Your women and children 
shall starve: bestial, devilish conception. Eng- 
land wills it! Surely, all that is in you rises 
against such infamy! Listen to the ceaseless 
song of the German forest, behold the fruitful 
fields like rolling seas : then will your love for this 
wondrous land find the right words : — HATE ! un- 
quenchable HATE! Deutschland, Deutschland 
iiber alles ! ' ' 

Toward France, on the other hand, as Herr Wit- 
ting had remarked, no popular hatred was visible 
in Germany. To be sure, there were numerous 
half-contemptuous quips at France's supposed 
decadence, but there were also many testimonials 
of whole-hearted esteem. "I say it frankly. We 
have and we had no hatred against France," re- 
marked Gerhart Hauptmann in October, 1914. 



GERMANY 83 

"We have idolized the plastic art, sculpture, pic- 
torial art, and the literature of that country. . . . 
It is to be greatly regretted that Germany and 
France could not be political friends. They 
should have been, since they are the adminis- 
trators of the continental productions of the mind, 
and since they are the two great cultured Euro- 
pean master-nations. Eate, however, would not 
have it so." "It is one of the most painful neces- 
sities in the present situation," wrote Professor 
Heinrich Schrors of the Catholic University of 
Bonn in the "Internationale Monatsschrift" of 
October, 1914, "that we have to draw the sword 
against nations such as France, with whom we 
are united by the highest cultural interests, and 
for whose science we have the deepest regard. 
We should greatly deplore the humiliation of 
France or the impairing of its position as a civ- 
ilized nation. If in the present war we could de- 
tect any such object on the part of the German 
Government, even as a secret tendency, we should 
be the first to oppose it." 

Toward Belgium the German public seems at 
first to have felt unmixed pity, but later on Ger- 
man official assertions regarding the Belgian Gov- 
ernment's unneutral conduct before the war and 
its inciting of the Belgian civilian population to a 
franc-tireur warfare against the German troops 
changed German sentiment to one of hostility to- 
ward the Belgian governing class, while reports 
of Belgian civilian atrocities committed on Ger- 
man soldiers tended to broaden this new feeling 



84 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

to include the whole Belgian people. In late 
September, 1914, a manifesto of leading German 
Protestant theologians thus referred to these 
Belgian atrocity charges: "Unnamable horrors 
have been committed against Germans living 
peaceably abroad — against women and children — 
against wounded and physicians — cruelties and 
shamelessness such as many a heathen and Mo- 
hammedan war has not revealed. . . . Even the 
not unnatural excitement of a people whose neu- 
trality — already violated by our adversaries — 
could under the pressure of implacable necessity 
not be respected, affords no excuse for inhumani- 
ties, nor does it lessen the shame that such could 
take place in a land long ago Christianized." 
Regarding the burning of Louvain, the Berlin 
' ' Vossische Zeitung ' ' remarked : ' ' The art treas- 
ures of the old town exist no more. It is true 
that art lovers will grieve, but there was no other 
way of punishing this population, whose devilish 
women poured boiling oil from their windows 
upon the passing German soldiers." And the 
"Lokal Anzeiger" hoped the world would "real- 
ize that the blame for all the suffering of Louvain 
rests with the half -civilized men and women who 
live there." 

Regarding Allied counter-charges of atrocities 
committed by German troops, the German press 
entered a sweeping and indignant general denial. 
' ' ' Teutonic Barbarians ! Vandals ! ' " exclaimed 
the "Kolnische Zeitung" scornfully. "Such are 
the terms which French and English speaking- 



GERMANY 85 

trumpets are shrieking into the ears of the world. 
After lies comes calumnious opprobrium! . . . 
The irony of history, which is now dealing so terri- 
ble a blow to English hopes, will also clear up these 
lying calumnies against the * Teutonic barbarian.' 
. . . Two things speak for us : The German good 
conscience, and — the convincing might of the Ger- 
man fist." The famous manifesto of the German 
intellectuals asserted : * ' Germany will fight to the 
end as a cultured nation, which has the might of 
Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant, who are to it just 
as holy as its hearths and homes. . . . Can any 
one point to an example of our ferocity? But in 
the East the earth has drunk the blood of hosts of 
women and children slain by the Russians. In 
the West dumdum bullets tear open the breasts of 
our warriors. Those who associate with Russians 
and Serbians and offer to the world the spectacle 
of letting loose mongrels and niggers on the white 
race have the least right to call themselves de- 
fenders of European civilization." Gerhart 
Hauptmann remarked in an angry open-letter to 
the French pacifist, Romain Rolland, "The Ger- 
man soldier is unsullied by the loathsome and 
puerile were-wolf tales which your lying French 
press so zealously spreads abroad. . . . Let the 
idle Englishman call us 'Huns'; you may, for all 
I care, characterize the warriors of our splendid 
landwehr as 'sons of Attila.' It is enough for 
us if this landwehr shatters to bits the ring of its 
merciless enemies. Far better that you call us 
'sons of Attila,' cross yourself in fear — and re- 



86 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

main outside our borders, than that you indict 
tender inscriptions upon the tomb of our German 
name, calling us 'the beloved descendants of 
Goethe.' The epithet ' Huns' is coined by people 
who, themselves Huns, find themselves disap- 
pointed in their criminal attacks on the life of a 
sound and valorous race, because this race knows 
how to parry a fearful blow with still more fearful 
force. The impotent take refuge in curses." 

For Allied charges of vandalism at the destruc- 
tion of historical monuments such as the Rheims 
cathedral, the Germans had slight patience. That 
works of art should be destroyed was generally 
deplored, but that Germany should modify her 
campaign because of this was held ridiculous. 
"They call us barbarians. What of it?" wrote 
Major General von Ditfurth in the "Hamburger 
Nachrichten. " "We scorn them and their abuse. 
For my part, I hope that in this war we have 
merited the title of barbarians. War is war, and 
must be waged with severity. The commonest, 
ugliest stone placed to mark the burial-place of a 
German grenadier is a more glorious and vener- 
able monument than all the cathedrals in Europe 
put together. Let neutral peoples and our ene- 
mies cease their empty chatter, which may well be 
compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease 
their talk of the Cathedral of Rheims and of all 
the churches and all the chateaux in France which 
have shared its fate. These things do not interest 
us. Our troops must achieve victory. What else 
matters?" 



GERMANY 87 

Toward the subject of the war in general, most 
Germans, as we have seen, maintained that it was 
a purely defensive struggle forced upon Germany 
by a league of malevolent foes. "Undoubtedly 
this is the most stupid, senseless and unnecessary 
war of modern times," exclaimed the German 
Crown Prince to an American journalist in De- 
cember, 1914. "It is a war not wanted by Ger- 
many, I can assure you, but was forced on us." 
"We are fighting not only for the intellectual 
heritage of our fathers, but we fight for European 
culture, its very existence, and its future," as- 
serted Prince von Bulow to the Norwegian publi- 
cist, Bjorn Bjornson. "Victory for the German 
arms guarantees law and order, prosperity and 
civilization, for Europe and the whole world." 
But here and there a bolder note was heard. In 
November, 1914, Maximilian Harden thus apos- 
trophized German apologists: "Cease your piti- 
ful attempts to excuse Germany's action. No 
longer wail to strangers who do not care to hear, 
telling them how dear to us were the smiles of 
peace we had smeared like rouge upon our lips. 
. . . Because our statesmen failed to discover and 
foil shrewd plans of deception is no reason why 
we may hoist the flag of most pious morality. 
Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken 
the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Be- 
cause we had to wish it and could wish it. May 
the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose 
pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours 
of lofty experience. We do not stand, and shall 



88 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. 
Our might shall create new law in Europe. Ger- 
many strikes. If it conquers new realms for its 
genius, the priesthoods of all the gods will sing 
songs of praise to the good war." 

Even more than in France was emphasis laid 
upon the war's deep regenerative effects. In 
many quarters German materialism and moral 
shortcomings before the war were frankly ac- 
knowledged, but nearly all asserted that the open- 
ing months of the struggle had wrought profound 
changes in the German character. "Gone is all 
the worship of Mammon," exclaimed Professor 
Georg Simmel in the "Internationale Monats- 
schrift" of November, 1914. "Gone is the fetish 
of external success which finds expression only in 
money. The self-seeking of individuals and of 
classes, to whom the collective whole was but a 
chimera, has disappeared. ... To be sure, these 
our failings will reappear in some form or other 
in the future. We shall not be angels. But for 
the present the causes or the results of cynicism 
have been eradicated from German life." "All 
weeping and sorrow, all regret, are swallowed up 
by the mighty stream of a new national life which 
has gushed forth over our German Fatherland," 
wrote Professor Theodor Elsenhans in the "Illus- 
trirte Zeitung" of mid-November, 1914. Dr. Lud- 
wig Schuller, in a sermon preached at Cologne 
early in 1915, said : "Suddenly the lightning fell. 
The war came. The hour of decision for our 
people was at hand. Now it was either into perdi- 



GERMANY 89 

tion or back to the living God. And our people 
have chosen the good part. We bowed under the 
mighty hand of God. The breaking out of the 
war suddenly found a praying people. It was 
such a change in the innermost soul of the Ger- 
man people as we all have never yet experienced. ' ' 
In previous chapters we have already noted the 
optimism which prevailed in France and England 
during the opening months of 1915. It is, there- 
fore, not surprising to discover that the reverse 
was true of their opponents, and that German 
public opinion at that time showed a tendency to- 
ward pessimism. The Germans were abandoning 
their hopes of an early, triumphant peace and 
were settling down to the prospect of a long war. 
Save in extreme Social Democratic circles there 
was, it is true, no hint that Germany would accept 
any peace except one which offered ample guaran- 
tees for future security, but the German press now 
frankly admitted that these guarantees could be 
won only after a prolonged and desperate strug- 
gle. Maximilian Harden, in his organ, "Die 
Zukunft," struck a distinctly pessimistic note 
sharply at variance with his bold optimism of the 
preceding autumn. "Beat us!" he cried in 
February, 1915, "drive us into the sea or into 
the Rhine ! Starve us into submission ! We shall 
die honorably, die standing up with clean arms. 
We do not know whether we shall win, but we do 
know we shall not end unworthily. We are con- 
serving both our confidence and our nourishment 
for a very long struggle ; yet, in a year we may be 



90 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

using thorns and thistles for a time, instead of 
bread. We are quieter than in the first torrent of 
war's enthusiasm, but not more cowardly; nor are 
we to be intimidated. In prayer we are ever joy- 
ful, and we still hark to the German maxim: 
'Rely only on thyself; then wilt thou never de- 
ceive thyself.' " Most press comment was, how- 
ever, more optimistic. In the Berlin "Tageszeit- 
ung, ' ' Count zu Reventlow wrote : ' ' Germans will 
do much more than persevere. They will fight un- 
til everything complies with their will — a will that 
vehemently and without scruple puts all means 
into its service by which it desires to arrive at its 
aim. Any termination of the war except by Ger- 
man victory is unthinkable." 

As may have been inferred from Herr Harden 's 
words, German public opinion was earnestly dis- 
cussing the effects of the Allied naval blockade 
which had practically isolated Germany since the 
beginning of the war. Even before the war this 
matter had been seriously considered, a notable in- 
stance being a controversy between Count von 
Moltke and the economist Karl Ballod carried on 
in the columns of the ' ' Preussische Jahrbiicher" 
of June and July, 1914. Count von Moltke had 
been most optimistic, but Herr Ballod 's reply was 
couched in a frankly pessimistic vein. He as- 
serted that a prolonged dislocation of Germany's 
industrial system would put back her recent eco- 
nomic development two hundred years, and wrote 
in regard to the food question, "It is a terrible 
self-deception to make out that the German people 



GERMANY 91 

could get along eleven months in the year with 
the grain which they themselves raise for bread. ' ' 
Such being the divided state of mind before the 
war, the practical confronting of the test naturally 
evoked sharp divergences of opinion. The official 
view breathed assured self-confidence. "The 
war," wrote Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in the 
"American Eeview of Reviews" for November, 
1914, "will bring out any number of devices — 
processes that have been too expensive so far in 
competition — which will be taken up and made 
more perfect. Products will be turned to use that 
have never been thought of before. Like a good 
housewife who must get along suddenly upon a 
limited stipend per week because some hardship 
has befallen her husband, so a nation convinced of 
its good cause, and fairly successful in the arts up 
to the present, will find its way and be able to buck 
up against the humanitarian English proposal of 
starving it out." And this optimism was shared 
by much unofficial German public opinion. In late 
November, 1914, the well-informed "Frankfurter 
Zeitung" remarked: "We breathe freely and fully 
as ever. Our provision warehouses are filled, and 
in our coffers lie billions of good money which all 
of us have given and which is only a small part 
of what our people are prepared to give and will 
give if the first is spent. Our entire national life 
in our besieged land has become one single great 
organization — an organization of battle, an organ- 
ization of sustenance, of credit, of peaceful work, 
and of providence. ' ' "We are well provided with 



92 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the means of living," wrote the "Vossische Zeit- 
ung' ' in March, 1915, ' ' and our financial and indus- 
trial armor is as sound as ever. . . . We may truly 
say that there is no crisis." And Maximilian 
Harden asserted breezily, "All twaddle, this star- 
vation talk. . . . Female busybodies with an itch 
for notoriety tell us what a delightful morsel can 
be made from the eye and tail of a herring (Gott 
strafe England). Eat your mess yourself, you 
advertising chatterbox. All this twaddle injures 
Germany. Are we in danger of famine? This 
fireband was merely meant to inflame the hatred 
against England. . . . Hundreds of thousands live 
to-day more lavishly than in peace times. They 
live even disgustingly well. In peace times the 
husband drank or loafed. Now he is with the col- 
ors and sends home the pay he cannot use, while 
the landlord and many a creditor must wait for 
their money. . . . Plenty of employment. Food- 
stuffs packed to the ceiling. Cakes enough to 
withstand a siege of children. . . . All the streets 
are bright. All the cafes are full at 4 p.m. Two 
dozen theaters open. Hundreds of movies. Con- 
certs, circus. Spring jackets and ' between-season ' 
hats. Why, the thing is like a fair. And yet Ger- 
man lips prattle about famine ! ' ' 

Here and there, however, less optimistic notes 
were heard. In the late winter of 1914-15, General 
von Blume wrote in the Berlin "Allgemeine Zeit- 
ung " : ' ' Germany is now confronted nationally by 
problems hitherto solved only within the narrow 
limits of besieged fortresses. ... No military 



GERMANY 93 

success will avail to save Germany unless the men- 
ace of starvation is averted." And the "Kol- 
nische Zeitung" remarked, "All depends now on 
the proof of who can hold out longer. In any case 
nothing else remains for us but to defend ourselves 
to the utmost. " ' * The last months before the new 
harvest are upon us," said the " Frankfurter Zeit- 
ung" of late May, 1915; and Professor Harms 
wrote in the "Berliner Tageblatt," "Do not let a 
crumb of bread — that gift of God be wasted. Eat 
only war-bread. Regard the potato as a means 
to assist us to victory. Blush for shame if your 
desire for luxuries tempts you to eat pies and 
pastry. Look with contempt on those who are 
so immoral as to eat cake and so by their greedi- 
ness imperil our supply of flour." 

Germans were practically a unit in believing 
that the only hope of breaking the English block- 
ade was the German submarine fleet. Hence 
their government's declaration of a submarine 
blockade of the British Isles at the beginning of 
1915 aroused general popular enthusiasm. ' ' From 
Great Britain's method of warfare of starving 
Germany," wrote the "Kolnische Zeitung," "we 
must conclude that the entire British people is our 
enemy, and a submarine war against British mer- 
chantmen must be begun and carried through reck- 
lessly. . . . We must try to hit the vital point of 
Great Britain — namely, her merchant fleet." 
"At last," exclaimed the "Hamburger Nach- 
richten," "what we have so long hoped for is being 
done." "Great Britain wants war to the knife," 



94 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

cried the "Kolnische Zeitung" of late Februaf^, 
1915. "She shall have it!" In mid-May, Count 
zu Reventlow wrote in the "Deutsche Tageszeit- 
ung," "The newspapers of our enemies, as well 
as those of neutrals, ought to grasp the simple 
logic that the German Empire and its statesmen 
and its navy would be exposed to the ridicule and 
contempt of the whole world if it did not carry out 
this trade war. ... If this trade war were, out 
of fear for the United States, to become a farce, 
it would smash beyond repair the prestige of the 
German Empire." "Every means that art and 
nature offer to overpower the enemy we shall in- 
exorably and unshakenly use," asserted the 
"Hamburger Korrespondenz. " "It is laughable 
to suppose that we are under any obligation to 
cease our submarine war if England should find it 
to her interests to return to the old paths of inter- 
national law. No compassion for passengers 
should weaken our strong duty." The German 
Government's compromise with the United States 
over the submarine issue was almost universally 
regretted in Germany. 

Italy's entrance into the war on the Allies' side 
naturally provoked a storm of wrath in the Ger- 
man press. Many German writers had never 
ceased to hope that what they held to be the com- 
mon aims of Italy and Germany would keep Italy 
neutral. "Both peoples have the task of breaking 
a path to light and air against the resistance of the 
old, possessing Powers," asserted Dr. E. W. 
Mayer in the "Preussische Jahrbiicher" of April, 



GERMANY 95 

1P15. ' ' There are geographical and historical re- 
lations more potent than ties of institutions or of 
blood. ' ' This helps to explain German bitterness 
at Italy's final decision. "If war with Italy- 
comes, " cried the "Kolnische Zeitung" on the eve 
of the crisis, "Germany's hatred of England will 
be nothing compared with her hatred of Italy. 
Her treacherous conduct is unparalleled in his- 
tory. ' ' The actual rupture evoked not merely fury 
but a spirit of grim determination. ' ' This war by 
Italy against her former allies," exclaimed the 
"Frankfurter Zeitung," "is one of the most abom- 
inable examples of perfidy that history knows. 
We shall now have one more war-zone. Cer- 
tainly, that is no light matter, but it will only in- 
crease our resolution not to allow ourselves to be 
beaten." And the "Vossische Zeitung" wrote: 
' ' On our part, every word forced from our choking 
throats by moral disgust would be too much. Let 
us not utter words of complaint, but grind our 
teeth and use other weapons than words to the new 
enemy." 

After this rather trying period, the uninter- 
rupted series of triumphs for German arms which 
extended through the entire second half of the year 
1915 naturally awakened intense popular enthusi- 
asm and hope. Specific discussion of Germany's 
permanent gains was frowned upon by the authori- 
ties, but popular expectations could readily be 
glimpsed from a reading of the press. 

The optimistic note was strong. After the 
crushing of Serbia in the autumn of 1915, the Ber- 



96 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

lin ' ' Lokal Anzeiger ' ' wrote : ' ' The neutral peo- 
ples would be blind indeed if they did not see over 
whose standards the goddess of victory is moving. 
Nations who, after a fight of fifteen months against 
a world in arms, are able with such great certainty 
to lead, at a moment's notice, a new army to vic- 
tory, cannot be defeated. This is the truth that 
our new victories disclose with absolute clearness 
even to the most incredulous.' ' The Stuttgart 
"Tageblatt" thus expressed its ideas as to the end- 
ing of the European struggle: "He who wishes 
peace, let him make himself feared. True peace is 
only the highest form of war. True peace rests 
on the power of the strong, the mere sight of whom 
is enough to beat the enemy. He is not ready for 
peace who fears war, but only he who has nothing 
to fear from war. It is such a peace we must or- 
ganize; a peace rendered possible by the most 
intense exertion of German strength. ' ' "We may 
see the red of morning follow the blood and mist 
of the twilight," exclaimed Maximilian Harden. 
"If our enemies wish to erect a barrier for all time 
between us and the rest of the world," stated 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in early December, 
"I should not be surprised if we arranged our 
future accordingly." And the usually reserved 
"Vossische Zeitung" wrote, "As we are the su- 
preme people, our duty henceforth is to lead the 
march of humanity itself. ... It would be a sin 
against our mission to spare the peoples who are 
inferior to us." 

The question of future diplomatic alignments be- 



GERMANY 97 

gan to be widely discussed, and among these there 
appeared a certain decrease of hatred against Eng- 
land with a correlative increasing coolness toward 
France. Of course the popular chorus against 
England was still loud and bitter, but in reflective 
circles dissenting voices were occasionally to be 
heard. In that thoughtful periodical, the 
1 'Deutsche Revue" for August, 1915, an anony- 
mous writer handled the question with surprising 
frankness. According to his contention, France 
and Russia were the traditional constants in the 
anti-German coalition, England being only the re- 
cent variable. It was therefore Germany's inter- 
est to come to terms with her temporary enemy 
instead of trying to placate her natural foes. 
1 ' Friendship with England ! " he continued. ' ' The 
word burns German ears and appears impossible 
for all time. Ten times rather an understanding 
with France, say we. But is not that exagger- 
ated? We see to-day only the repellant side of the 
English state system and forget that its inner 
side has many sound elements with which the 
French cannot be compared. We swear the down- 
fall of Britain as the Greeks did that of Ilium, but 
we keep very still about the rottenness of the 
French republic and the dark depths of Russia's 
political immorality; we also keep silence regard- 
ing the weighty fact that the service of Mammon 
is an ill, not of England alone, but of the twenti- 
eth century. In all our present talk there speaks 
more the vengeful wrath of embittered hearts 
than the cool reason of political heads. One thing 



98 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

is certain: Europe can never raise herself once 
more on a heap of ruins. . . . The words 'Anni- 
hilation or Dictatorship,' applied to Great Powers, 
are mere foolishness." 

There were also distinct signs of a revulsion 
against the cult of hate. As early as March, 1915, 
the moderate Socialist Deputy, Haenisch, said in a 
public speech : ' i The firm resolve to hold out and 
to win, which must also live in our children, ought 
not to become wild hate against enemy nations. 
However artistic Lissauer's " Chant of Hate" may 
be, and however valuable as an expression of tem- 
per of the moment, it would nevertheless be deeply 
deplorable if sentiments expressed in it were to 
work themselves into the hearts of our children and 
foster long hatred after the war. Far better were 
it if they were told of the miseries in East Prussia, 
Galicia, Poland, Belgium, and Northern France, 
and were filled with deep sorrow at the destruction 
of so many young and hopeful lives, of so many 
material and ideal values." "Whoever thinks 
that he can help the Fatherland by encouraging 
this sort of German hatred may do so at his own 
risk, ' ' wrote a Catholic theologian in the Hanover 
1 ' Deutsche Volkszeitung ' ' of mid- July, 1915. * l On 
our side, however, we should be guilty of neglect 
if we did not raise a warning voice against it. A 
hatred such as is now being preached is unchris- 
tian and unworthy of the German nation. ' ' Pro- 
fessor Ernst Troeltsch, in the " Frankfurter Zeit- 
ung," asserted: "Hate may at first inspire cour- 
age and energy in attack, but in the long run it is 



GERMANY 99 

bad politics. It leads to a troubled and fantastic 
policy of sentiment which afterward cannot be car- 
ried out. . . . Especially is hate a bad counselor 
in the case of England. It prevents us from ap- 
preciating the position correctly; it leads to an 
underestimation of the enemy's strength, and ren- 
ders difficult the renewed and unavoidable contact 
after the war. But apart from all this, one thing 
is certain: all systematic substitution of our old 
German humanity by simple national egotism, all 
permanent concentration of our feelings upon an- 
tagonism, are dangerous to ourselves." Profes- 
sor Wilhelm Herzog, in "Das Forum" (Munich), 
queried : "Did we, and do we, hate England? Is 
there any such a hate outside the ranks of profes- 
sional lyric poets and other intellectuals of the 
same stamp? We hate neither the English, nor 
the French, nor the Eussian people. We only hate 
those who are responsible for the present war. 
There are everywhere erratic ' idealists ' ; it is they 
who exhaust themselves in sentiments of national 
hostility." And Professor Heinrich Morf, on 
opening his course in French philology, uttered 
this noble tribute to the spirit of scientific truth: 
"You have come together with me here to pursue 
a work of peace. . . . When your teacher has 
mounted this rostrum and the outer doors of this 
auditorium are closed, we must and will compel 
our thoughts to turn aside for an hour from what 
elsewhere daily and nightly oppresses every heart. 
. . . The passions of the day shall not enter here. 
We will leave them without. Science demands of 



100 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

us this act of self-conquest and self-discipline. 
Whoso finds this impossible cannot serve her, and 
can find no intimate communion with her soul. 
Such an one will remain unsatisfied within these 
walls. . . . There will be no change, therefore, in 
the scientific character of these lectures. Now, as 
heretofore, I will try to school your historic think- 
ing to dispassionate conception and judgment of 
the things of the past and of foreign lands. Such 
scientific labor does not sunder — it unites. It 
teaches to perceive, to understand ; not to despise.' ' 
During this period the question of German un- 
popularity in the world at large was also widely 
discussed. The fact of this unpopularity was uni- 
versally admitted, but the reasons assigned for its 
prevalence varied greatly. Some laid it to the 
foreigner's envy of, or inability to comprehend, 
the peculiar character and superiority of German 
Kultur. "We had too little pride and too much 
kindness of heart," asserted "Der Tag," (Berlin), 
in September, 1915. "We gave ourselves without 
reserve and made generous presents from our su- 
perfluous riches. We showed only too plainly our 
appreciation of foreign ways and laid too little 
stress on«our own qualities. This will and must 
be changed. We shall never obtain recognition 
for Germanism except by national pride and cold 
reserve." Others, however, considered Germans 
themselves largely responsible, and dilated upon 
national shortcomings such as tactlessness, bad 
manners, aggressiveness, and the inferior social 
standing of German sojourners abroad. "In his 



GERMANY 101 

personal behavior to strangers, ' ' wrote the ' ' K61- 
nische Zeitung, " " the German gives cause for mis- 
trust and dislike. ... If a German of this kind 
sees a French regiment marching past at a review 
with its normal step and not with the thunder- 
clap of the German parade-march, he laughs, and 
is so amused that he says what he thinks to his 
French neighbor. The same person, when he sees 
an English railroad station, remarks upon the dirt, 
the stuffy waiting-rooms, the mass of vulgar, col- 
ored advertisements, and says to his English com- 
panion that he would like him to see one of the 
great new German stations that are as clean and 
bright as a new pin. ... So the German gets the 
reputation of being a childish braggart." In an 
unusually thoughtful article in the "Preussische 
Jahrbucher" for February, 1915, Felix Stahl, 
while admitting the above failings as contributary 
causes, found the real secret of German unpopu- 
larity in the speeding-up process which German 
efficiency had produced throughout the entire eco- 
nomic world, thus raising the ire of peoples with 
assured prospects and satisfied with a less strenu- 
ous pace. 

All this need not lead to the conclusion that the 
Germans were abandoning themselves to philo- 
sophic speculation. On the contrary, the triumphs 
of 1915, with their conquests of Poland, Courland, 
and Serbia, the winning over of Bulgaria, and the 
opening of the highroad to Turkey and the Moslem 
East, roused an ever-growing discussion concern- 
ing the multitudinous problems of the morrow. 



102 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

We have already noted the less hostile attitude 
toward England which was becoming manifest in 
many quarters. We must now consider the grow- 
ing coolness toward France. At the beginning of 
the war, it will be remembered, no anti-French 
feeling had been visible in Germany. But as time 
passed the implacable temper of the French people 
with its call for the destruction of German unity, 
produced a feeling of exasperation and convinced 
many Germans that this irreconcilable foe must 
be finally crushed. Typical of this new feeling is 
a petition addressed to the imperial chancellor by 
a distinguished gathering of German intellectuals 
at Berlin in the summer of 1915. "After being 
threatened by France for centuries," reads this 
document, "and after hearing the cry of 'Re- 
vanche' from 1815 till 1870, and from 1871 till 
1915, we wish to have done with the French men- 
ace once and for all. All classes of our people are 
imbued with this desire. There must, however, 
be no misplaced attempts at reconciliation, which 
have always been opposed by France with the ut- 
most fanaticism; and as regards this we would 
utter a most urgent warning to Germans not to 
deceive themselves. Even after the terrible les- 
son of this unsuccessful war, France will still 
thirst for revenge in so far as her strength per- 
mits. For the sake of our own existence we must 
ruthlessly weaken her both politically and eco- 
nomically, and we must improve our military and 
strategical position with regard to her. For this 
purpose, in our opinion, it is necessary radically 



GEEMANY 103 

to improve our whole Western front from Belfort 
to the coast." 

The same document gives an insight into Ger- 
man public feeling about Belgium. "On Bel- 
gium," it declares, "on the acquisition of which so 
much of the best German blood has been shed, we 
must keep firm hold, from the political, military, 
and economic standpoints, despite any arguments 
which may be urged to the contrary. On no point 
are the masses more united, for without the slight- 
est possible doubt they consider it a matter of 
honor to hold onto Belgium. ... In time also she 
may entail a considerable addition to our nation, 
if in course of time the Flemish element, which 
is so closely allied to us, becomes emancipated 
from the artificial grip of French culture and re- 
members its Teutonic affinities." The fate of Bel- 
gium had, indeed, greatly interested Germans from 
the first. At the very beginning of the war Pro- 
fessor Hermann Losch had predicted, "The war 
between the three west European Powers will be 
fought not only in Belgium, but for Belgium. ' ' In 
the spring of 1915, Count zu Eeventlow wrote: 
"The absolute and permanent withdrawal of Bel- 
gium from all British and French influence is a 
vital matter for Germany's future. . . . Belgium 
can never again, with the best will in the world, 
become independent. A restoration of Belgium to 
its former political state is a phantom, a Utopia. ' ' 
Annexation of both Belgian and French territory 
was, however, hotly combatted by Social Demo- 
crats of all shades. 



104 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

And this feeling against annexations in western 
Europe was not confined to Socialists; it was 
shared by ardent expansionists as well. Many 
Germans had now become convinced that a com- 
plete Teutonic triumph was impossible. Since 
this was so, these people held that Germany must 
choose her compensations either East or West. 
And while some persons held Western gains the 
more important, a larger number believed that 
Germany's true line of expansion lay toward the 
east. The crushing of Serbia and the opening up 
of the highroad to the Ottoman Empire had at 
last realized the great Teutonic dream, ''Berlin- 
Bagdad," and the maintainance of this connection 
appeared to wide circles of German thought an 
imperative necessity. But the retention of Bel- 
gium obviously involved a finish fight with Eng- 
land. Could Germany hold both Bagdad and Ant- 
werp against the world? Would it not be wiser 
to surrender Antwerp as the price of English 
assent to "Berlin-Bagdad"? This was the opin- 
ion of moderate German imperialists of the 
"Eastern" school. 

Germany's Oriental hopes had been high from 
the first. Turkey's adherence to the Teutonic 
cause in November, 1914, had been enthusiastically 
hailed by every section of the German press. 
"Over there in Turkey," wrote the well-known 
German publicist, Ernst Jackh, in a pamphlet pub- 
lished at that moment, "stretch Anatolia and Mes- 
opotamia: Anatolia, the 'Land of the Sunrise'; 
Mesopotamia, the region of ancient paradise. 



GEEMANY 105 

May these names be to us a sign : may this world- 
war bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and 
the paradise of a new time ; may it confer upon an 
assured Turkey and a Greater Germany the bless- 
ing of a fruitful Turco-Teutonic collaboration in 
peace after a victorious Turco-Teutonic collabora- 
tion in war. ' ' 

German expectations were still further excited 
by the Turkish proclamation of the "Holy War" 
in mid-November, 1914. "The false moves of 
Grey have brought all the Moslems into line," as- 
serted the "Frankfurter Zeitung." "Indians, 
Egyptians, and Persians recognize the English as 
foes. The blows that Grey has rained upon the 
Moslem world have roused it, nolens volens, 
from its deep sleep. The two great Moslem 
sects, the Shiites and the Sunnites have sunk 
their differences and become brothers. No 
power in the world can ever again make Turkey 
and Persia break away from each other. The 
Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, and Africans will en- 
ter into a holy league. The Moslems living in 
the English and French colonies can no longer be 
true to their allegiance, nor can those of the Cau- 
casus, Turkestan, and Transcaucasia remain loyal 
to Russia. If Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Mo- 
rocco, Tunis, and Algeria join themselves to the 
two Moslem Powers, Turkey and Persia, can the 
Triple Entente continue their war against Ger- 
many and Austria?" 

Disappointed at that moment, these hopes re- 
vived a year later after Serbia's fall. "Persia is 



106 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

beginning to shake the shackles of the Anglo- 
Russian treaty," wrote the "Vossische Zeitung" 
in November, 1915. " Persia is beginning to arm 
and defend herself. Afghanistan will never go 
with Russia and England. In Africa the Senussi 
are stirring; their influence extends over Egypt 
and Tripoli, including the Hinterland. In Egypt 
the English have so far been able to repress ten- 
dencies to revolt, but they cannot prevent hostile 
agitation from penetrating like a dynamite car- 
tridge. In Tunis and Morocco also there are ways 
and means of letting the population know of the 
French and English defeats at the Dardanelles. 
We are only at the beginning of the effects of the 
Islamic ferment. ' ' 

The scope of German Asiatic aspirations is re- 
vealed in an article by the learned Orientalist, 
Professor Berhardt Molden, which appeared in 
the "Preussische Jahrbucher" for December, 
1914. Germany's aid to Turkey, contends Profes- 
sor Molden, is only symptomatic of her policy to 
raise the other Asiatic peoples now crushed be- 
neath English and Russian domination. Thus 
Germany will create puissant allies for the u Sec- 
ond Punic War" which England may well wage 
if the present conflict should end in a deadlock. 
Therefore, Germany must strive to solidify that 
great Central Asian block — Turkey, Persia, Af- 
ghanistan, China — all of whose members are men- 
aced by the Anglo-Russo-Japanese robber-league. 
Only Germany can save the threatened, from 
Stockholm to Pekin. Professor Molden urges a 



GERMANY 107 

" Pan- Asian railroad' ' from Stambul to Pekin. 
This would be especially alluring for Afghanistan, 
which would thus become one of the great world- 
pivots of politics and trade. In fine, " Germany 
must free Asia." This is the keynote of all the 
German writings on this point. "To renovate 
the East," such is Germany's mission, wrote 
Friedrich Delitzsch in the "Deutsche Revue" for 
January, 1916. 

To many Germans the great obstacle to Teu- 
tonic ascendancy in the Balkans and Asia was not 
so much England as Russia. In fact, the existence 
of any sort of ' ' Greater Germany ' ' was considered 
menaced by the "Russian Peril." The fear of 
Russia, so prominent at the outbreak of war, had 
been temporarily submerged by the flood of hatred 
against England, but Russian resilience under the 
most shattering blows and Austrian weakness be- 
fore Muscovite assaults gradually brought the 
Russian danger again to the fore. Of course, cer- 
tain reactionary Junkers might regret the old inti- 
macy between the Prussian and Russian courts, 
and the hotter advocates of a finish fight against 
England might recommend generous terms to pur- 
chase a Russian separate peace, but most Ger- 
mans plainly believed that the Russian colossus 
must be definitely broken if Germany were not to 
be overshadowed in course of time. 

"Can Russia remain a European Power in the 
former sense of the word, if our future is to be 
secure?" asks the noted German publicist, Paul 
Rohrbach, at the beginning of his book, "Russland 



108 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

und Wir," published in the summer of 1915. His 
answer is an emphatic "No!" He concludes his 
book as follows: "There you have present-day 
Russia ! ' Scratch a Russian and you find a Tar- 
tar' has long been a true proverb. As soon as the 
superficial veneer of external civilization peels off, 
modern Muscovitism reveals the same wild, bar- 
baric traits as it did centuries ago under Ivan the 
Terrible. ... As in Livonia in 1558, so in East 
Prussia in 1914 and 1915! The Muscovite is a 
Muscovite still. Only he who does not know him 
can imagine that the Muscovite is capable of living 
as a Kultur-nation in lasting communion with the 
European world. He cannot do it, for he has an- 
other soul. . . . With this state it is very difficult 
to conclude a real peace according to the accepted 
canons of international law. Reckless barbarity, 
criminal lust of conquest, and destruction of all 
human culture founded upon freedom are the very 
essence of its being. He who thinks about the 
peace which is to follow this war must first of all 
visualize the inner nature of his Russian opponent. 
. . . He who has any regard for the soul and the 
future of Germanism and human civilization will 
thereupon lay down one inflexible condition: No 
compromise peace with Russia ! ' ' This conclusion 
is heartily endorsed by Otto Hoetsch, Ernst Jackh, 
and other leading German political writers. Karl 
Leuthner, in his recent book, "Russischer Volks- 
imperialismus ' ' (1916), draws a truly alarming 
picture. According to him, the Russian masses 
are taking up the old imperialistic programs of 



GERMANY 109 

Tsars, bureaucrats, and artistic thinkers, and are 
"going them one better," just as the imperialism 
of the French revolution surpassed that of Louis 
XIV. The liberal, democratic, cosmopolitan op- 
position party in Eussia was only a superficial cur- 
rent engendered by the excesses of Autocracy: it 
is fast bowing down to Panslavism's Holy Trinity 
— Tsar, Great-Russian People, Orthodoxy. "We 
Germans," concludes Herr Leuthner, "must look 
this reality in the face. In the whole realm of 
politics there is for us nothing more weighty. Not 
the Russian Tsar alone, whose tyranny we ab- 
horred, but also the Russian people, for whose 
freedom we have waxed enthusiastic, stands with 
all the traditional lust of conquest and subjuga- 
tion upon our borders. Those whom we believed 
spiritually near to us have become our readiest 
and bitterest foes. All illusions, all empty hopes 
of reconciliation, are shattered. We must prepare 
our souls either to undergo the fate involved in 
propinquity to a rapacious world-empire, or re- 
solve to avert that fate by this war. ' ' These Ger- 
man apprehensions have been steadily increased 
by the momentous internal changes which have 
transpired in the Russian Empire. In the * ' Preus- 
sische Jahrbiicher" for November, 1916, Dr. Hans 
Delbriick maintains that Russia's restoration of 
her army after the debacle of 1915, the prohibition 
of vodka, and the construction of the Murman rail- 
way to the Arctic Ocean in the midst of war, are 
such mighty achievements as prove conclusively 
that Russia is to Germany a foe far more menac- 



110 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

ing than England. General von Hindenburg 
seems to have put this feeling in a nutshell when 
he remarked during a recent interview, ''We hate 
the English — the future danger to Germany lies 
in the East." 

All this accounts for the German Government's 
reconstruction of Poland, and for German popu- 
lar demands for similar action in Lithuania, the 
Russian Baltic provinces, and the Ukraine. 

Such were the complex thought-currents which 
first appeared upon the surface of German na- 
tional consciousness during the closing months of 
1915. But, as the new year drew nigh, those prob- 
lems which had engrossed German thought in the 
earlier phases of the war came once more to the 
fore. The Allies steadily refused to make peace 
on a "war-map" basis, while the English blockade 
drew ever tighter around beleaguered Central Eu- 
rope. By the end of 1915, Germany was plainly 
feeling the pinch. "While our troops are fighting 
like the heroes of the classical ages," wrote the 
"Frankfurter Zeitung" in November, "want is 
growing acute at home, where the people are be- 
ginning to interpret the miserable existing condi- 
tions as the defeat of the Empire. We jeered at 
the blockade, but to-day we laugh no longer. The 
sinister aspect of things certainly provides no 
food for laughter." A Socialist memorial to the 
imperial chancellor read: "In Berlin to-day the 
poorer people very rarely see either meat or any 
fat food; that means that they are not receiving 
enough albuminous nourishment to meet their 



GERMANY 111 

needs. The complaints we receive from the fam- 
ilies of mobilized men are fearful. Their position 
is rapidly becoming one of despair.' ' This food 
shortage appears .to have reached its climax just 
before the harvest in the summer of 1916. Since 
then things seem to have been somewhat easier, 
though the situation is still far from ideal and 
complaints are widespread. For example, in 
early January, 1917, the Berlin "Vorwarts" said: 
"We are all reasonable enough to look facts in 
the face and to bear the inevitable with dignity. 
We also know that a German defeat would take 
not only the last scraps of butter from our bread, 
but take the bread also. But apart from a needy 
future after the war, we have only been told that 
we have no improvement of rations to expect, and 
that on the contrary the difficulties will increase, 
especially after Easter." 

Hunger and the Allies ' implacable temper natu- 
rally roused a fresh wave of fury in Germany. 
"We have not yet succeeded in forcing our ene- 
mies to peace," wrote the "Kolnische Zeitung" in 
late 1915. "The hopes of the enemy are still 
strong. They are showing more and more arro- 
gance. Every man and every woman in Germany 
must be impressed by the fact that this war is a 
question of life or death. It would be vain to hope 
for mercy if our enemies succeed in their plans. 
There is nothing left for us but to fight with our 
backs to the wall until such victory be achieved 
that we can force peace on our foes. In this our 
only hope lies — in the grimmest warfare at the 



112 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

front, supported by our resistance at home and 
by our iron will to hold out. To him who can best 
hold his nerves in rein will be the victory. 
Successes we have in plenty. What we have 
left to do is to dictate peace. Deutschland 
iiber Alles!" The latent desire for peace 
showed in comments like that of "Vor- 
warts" at the close of 1916: "If we are going 
to drag this war out indefinitely, all Europe will be 
bled to death, and America and colored people will 
be our heirs. But we want Europe to live. We 
see France bleeding white, but we have never hated 
her. We want peace for Germany, France, Eng- 
land and Russia — peace for the whole blood- 
stained world.' ' 

However, the Allies' uncompromising rejection 
of German peace offers at the opening of 1917 
spurred the entire German people to desperate 
wrath. " Peace talk must now cease," asserted 
the "Tagliche Rundschau"; while the "Kolnische 
Zeitung" exclaimed hotly, "We have now learned 
that our enemies do not want peace, but war to 
the knife; so we must abandon all considerations 
and grasp all the means of war at our disposal." 
Kaiser Wilhelm undoubtedly voiced the feelings 
of his people when he asserted in his proclama- 
tion of late January, 1917: "Our enemies have 
dropped the mask. After refusing with scorn and 
hypocritical words of love for peace and humanity 
our honest peace offer, they have now, in their 
reply to the United States, gone beyond that and 
admitted their lust for conquest, the baseness of 



GERMANY 113 

which is further enhanced by their calumnious as- 
sertions. Their aim is the crushing of Germany, 
the dismemberment of the Powers allied with us, 
and the enslavement of the freedom of Europe and 
the seas under the same yoke that Greece, with 
gnashing teeth, is now enduring. But what they 
could not achieve in thirty months of the bloodiest 
fighting and unscrupulous economic war they will 
also fail to accomplish in the future. . . . Burning 
indignation and holy wrath will redouble the 
strength of every German man and woman, 
whether it be devoted to fighting, to work, or to 
suffering. We are ready for all sacrifices. " 

This iron mood was accompanied by a sharp re- 
crudescence of the former intransigeance against 
England. "The majority of our people still have 
no conception of the consequences which would 
follow if we were defeated, and defeated by such 
an enemy as England," asserted the "Kolnische 
Zeitung." "It is a dangerous mistake to regard 
English speeches as vain boasting. . . . For God's 
sake let us not deceive ourselves about England's 
determination so to force Germany to her knees 
that she must accept England's conditions with- 
out resistance and be wiped out forever as a com- 
petitor in the world's markets. All classes of that 
people are united in this resolve, from the First 
Sea Lord to the humblest dock-laborer at New- 
castle-on-Tyne. It cannot be too firmly insisted 
that such a victory for England would mean an ir- 
reparable catastrophe for the German Empire. 
Not only would the German Empire be dissolved, 



114 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

but our people itself would be seriously threatened 
with extinction, especially in view of the Russian 
torrent pouring in from the east." 

The logical conclusion was that England must 
be crushed, and the advocates of a finish fight 
against Britain asserted that her destruction could 
be accomplished by means of ruthless submarine 
warfare. From the autumn of 1916 on, increasing 
pressure was brought to bear upon the German 
Government to repudiate its compromise with the 
United States and plunge unreservedly into the 
fray. "Down with England!" cried a popular 
pamphlet; "England is not only our most danger- 
ous, but also our most vulnerable, enemy, because 
an island lives and dies with its shipping. Can we 
conquer England on the sea? Yes. The deeds 
and experiences of our navy give a sure guarantee 
of this." "If we are to win a victory," declared 
Dr. von Heydebrand, Conservative leader in the 
Prussian Diet, at the beginning of 1917, "it is ab- 
solutely imperative to use the weapons which give 
us the possibility of winning a victory against the 
toughest and strongest adversary — England. . . . 
The German and Prussian people will be prepared 
to bear the consequences. " And Count von West- 
arp, Conservative leader in the Reichstag, as- 
serted: "Our utmost strength must now be 
thrown into the scales. There is no weapon of 
warfare which we dare withhold." The imperial 
chancellor's announcement of ruthless submarine 
warfare at the beginning of February was hailed 
throughout Germany with a unanimous shout of 



GERMANY 115 

joy. "Now our enemies will learn what the 
U-boat terror really is," cried the Berlin "Lokal 
Anzeiger" ; while the "Borsen Zeitung" exclaimed 
defiantly, "Right or wrong: victory!" The rup- 
ture with America produced no perceptible effect 
in the popular attitude. 

Such is Germany's present war temper. Re- 
garding "after the war" problems, it is not sur- 
prising to find the widest variety of viewpoints. 
In general, we may say that the more bellicose ele- 
ments have always maintained that Germany's fu- 
ture attitude toward foreign peoples must be, in 
case of victory, the haughty aloofness of the con- 
queror for his inferiors; in case of temporary 
stalemate the wrathful aloofness of the master- 
folk bracing itself with the will to conquer. A 
good example of this militaristic thought school is 
an article in the "Liller Kriegszeitung" of late 
1916: "Michel, listen 1 To understand is to for- 
give. But nobody understands, nobody wishes to 
understand, our nature, our ways, our striving to- 
ward good, or our honesty. Hence the irreconcil- 
able hostility of the whole world against every- 
thing German. Give up, therefore, dear Michel, 
the vain and dangerous pursuit of grasping your 
enemies' point of view. Thus only will you suc- 
ceed in acquiring the ruthless temper which is 
necessary in order to attain victory. . . . Every- 
body considers you a ' dirty pig,' dear Michel. 
You cannot alter that. Then have the courage to 
make up your mind about it. . . . It is impossible 
for us to come to any understanding with our ene- 



116 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

mies throughout this and the following genera- 
tion." Among these prophets of evil there runs 
a good deal of pessimism. The noted historian, 
Professor Eduard Meyer, in his book, " Germany 
and England," predicts that the present struggle 
is only the first of a long series of Anglo-German 
" Punic" wars in which modern civilization will 
retrograde to a condition of semi-barbarism. Ger- 
many will be the victor, but a Pyrrhic victor, for 
the colored races, taking advantage of white deca- 
dence, will destroy European supremacy. 

Other Germans, however, including many lead- 
ing intellectuals and the entire Social Democratic 
group, take a much more cheerful view. Dr. Hans 
Delbriick thinks a perpetuation of present hatreds 
impossible. "The various states," he writes, 
"cannot surround themselves with Chinese walls, 
but must resume the exchange of merchandise and 
ideal values. A nation not doing so would only 
harm itself." The Socialist Deputy, Haenisch, 
remarks : ' ' There has even been some talk that in 
future German science and art must lead their 
own life. . . . This is sheer rubbish. After the 
war the nations will be still more dependent upon 
one another than before, and without the fructify- 
ing influence of foreign countries our national cul- 
ture will wither. ' ' 

Between these two extreme viewpoints lies an 
indeterminate mass of public opinion which has 
inclined first to one side and then to the other ac- 
cording to the fortunes of war; intransigeant at 
the start, more conciliatory during the optimistic 



GEEMANY 117 

second half of 1915, hardening again under the 
stress of deferred peace and the rigorous blockade. 

One thing, however, can be said: the German 
people, though prone to passionate outbursts, is 
extremely attentive to the utterances of its politi- 
cal and intellectual leaders. And these leaders 
are to-day generally avowed realists; "Realpoliti- 
ker," as they pride themselves. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that, in the future, Germany will follow a 
policy of sentiment or nurse old grudges where 
nothing practical is to be gained. Of course, a 
humiliating peace would probably inspire a policy 
of "revenge," but the underlying motive for this 
policy would be, not so much rancor at the past 
as confidence in German ability to upset a settle- 
ment dictated by a hostile world. Thus, Ger- 
many's future relations with her present foes 
should depend primarily on the actual course of 
events. Those nations whom German statesmen 
consider a menace to German aims will remain 
popular bugbears. Those with whom accommo- 
dation is deemed desirable will be looked upon 
with popular favor. In all this, sentiment ob- 
viously plays a slight part. 

Of course, the war has drawn Germany and her 
allies increasingly together. For Bulgaria and 
Turkey, Teutonic friendship is not without mental 
reservations, but with Austria-Hungary the bonds 
are extremely close. In this case practical con- 
siderations are reinforced by deep-going ties of 
sentiment and racial affinity, owing to the Ger- 
manic character of the Hapsburg Monarchy and 



118 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the fraternal feelings of the Austrian Teutons. 
Most Germans believe that the alliance between 
the two empires must henceforth be unbreakable, 
and Germany's ablest thinkers are to-day busy 
working out a permanent solution. Typical of 
these efforts is Friedrich Naumann's book, "Mit- 
teleuropa" (" Central Europe"). Naumann pro- 
poses a "Superstate," Austro-German in the first 
instance, yet so federative in character that all 
the minor nations of the Central European zone, 
from Scandinavia to Turkey, may ultimately be 
included. Here again the realistic note is clear. 
With the exception of Austria, sentiment does not 
deeply color German speculation regarding future 
friends. 



CHAPTEE IV 

AUSTRIA-HUNGAEY 

IP German national consciousness may be con- 
sidered a diversified unity, Austria-Hungary's 
appears as a dualized diversity. The theory un- 
derlying Austria-Hungary's "Dualist" Consti- 
tution of 1867 was that the Germans of Austria 
and the Magyars of Hungary should rule their re- 
spective halves of the empire and keep the various 
minor races in due subordination. But this theory 
never worked well in practice. The Germans and 
Magyars, though unquestionably the empire's two 
leading races, are not in a numerical majority. Of 
the twenty-nine million inhabitants of Austria, 
only ten millions are Germans (with two millions 
more in Hungary), while the Magyars constitute 
but ten million of the twenty-one million souls 
which make up Hungary 's total population. As a 
result, German hegemony in Austria broke down 
long ago, while in Hungary Magyar supremacy 
has been maintained only at the cost of increas- 
ingly dangerous protests from the non-Magyar 
nationalities. The last half-century of Austria- 
Hungary's history has, in fact, been the record of 
the struggles of its minor nationalities to attain 
complete self-realization, either by gaining full 
partnership within the empire or by secession to 

119 



120 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

racial kinsmen outside the empire's frontiers. 
The consequence has been chronic race friction 
which has led many observers to predict the em- 
pire's complete dissolution. 

These race problems are of such vital signifi- 
cance for an understanding of Austria- Hungary's 
present condition and future prospects that a brief 
summary of their status in July, 1914, is necessary. 
Despite their complexity, a glance at a race map 
of Austria-Hungary reveals a certain fundamental 
simplicity. Eoughly speaking, the empire divides 
into three great race zones, running east and west : 
to the north, a broad band of Slavs ; to the south, 
a shorter and thicker band of Slavs ; between the 
two, a wide belt of non-Slavs; in the west, Ger- 
mans ; in the center, Magyars ; in the east, a mix- 
ture of Germans, Magyars, and Rumanians. This 
non-Slavic middle zone fills the broad Danubian 
plain and completely severs the Slav belts from 
each other. This central position is one of the 
great reasons why the Germans and Magyars have 
always dominated the empire. 

Another reason for Germano-Magyar predom- 
inance is the extreme disunion which prevails 
among the empire's Slav peoples. Statistically, 
they number nearly half the total population, but 
they are sundered from one another not merely 
geographically but also by a variety of linguistic, 
religious, and cultural barriers which have always 
made united action impossible. 

The northern Slav belt is composed of the Czechs 
of Bohemia and Moravia, the Poles of West Gali- 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 121 

cia, and the Ruthenians of East Galicia and the 
Bukovina. The Czechs, numbering some six and 
one-half millions, are the most solid and progress- 
ive branch of the Slav race. Together with their 
two million Slovak kinsmen in the neighboring 
Carpathian uplands of Northern Hungary, they 
constitute a powerful ethnic group. The five mil- 
lion Poles of West Galicia represent Austria's 
share of the defunct kingdom of Poland. The four 
million " Ruthenians" are merely the western 
vanguard of a race group totaling nearly thirty- 
three million souls — the so-called ' ' Ukrainians " or 
"Little Russians," the bulk of whom live within 
the confines of the adjacent Russian Empire. 

The South Slavs, though racially and linguisti- 
cally much more homogeneous, are deeply divided 
by differences of religion and culture. They oc- 
cupy practically the entire southwest corner of the 
empire, nearly everything south of the river Drave 
being "Yugo-Slav." The great majority of the 
Austro-Hungarian Yugo-Slavs belong to the Croa- 
tian branch of the race, and having been civilized 
and Christianized from the "West, these Croats are 
Roman Catholic in religion and west European in 
culture. In the southern portion of the Yugo-Slav 
belt, however, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
dwell some two million " Serbs"; in blood and 
speech closely akin to the Croats, but Greek Or- 
thodox in faith and with a culture inherited from 
the Byzantine East. The situation is still further 
complicated by the presence in Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina of some seven hundred thousand Mohammed- 



122 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

ans. Bosnia-Herzegovina is indeed a land of re- 
ligious and cultural conflict, the balance of its 
population being made up of eight hundred and 
fifty thousand Orthodox Serbs and four hundred 
and fifty thousand Catholic Croats. A final com- 
plication is added by the thin fringe of Italian 
population which clings to the towns and islands 
of the Adriatic coast, thus partially shutting off 
the Yugo-Slavs from racial access to the sea. 

It is of course universally admitted that the 
spark which ignited the present European confla- 
gration was the Austro-Serbian imbroglio, and it 
is generally recognized that Serbia's defiance of 
her huge neighbor was only a move in the gigantic 
political duel between Austria-Hungary and Rus- 
sia. But few persons realize how bitter and far- 
reaching that Austro-Russian duel was. Its ob- 
jectives were not merely Serbia or even the Bal- 
kans. They embraced both Russian imperialism's 
determination to annex the Galician Ruthenians 
and to erect Czech and Yugo-Slav national states 
on Austria-Hungary's ruins, and Austrian impe- 
rialism's counter-determination to bring all the 
Serbs into a Yugo-Slav block beneath the Haps- 
burg scepter while erecting Polish and Ukrainian 
national states at a mutilated Russia's expense. 
To this Austrian imperialistic school Archduke 
Franz-Ferdinand unquestionably belonged. All 
this explains the unscrupulous ruthlessness of both 
Russian and Austrian policy during the years pre- 
ceding the war. It also accounts for the Arch- 
duke's assassination. 



AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY 123 

The murder of Franz-Ferdinand was generally 
hailed by Austrians as the beginning of the end. 
Serbia's grandiose dreams, incited as these had 
been by Eussia, and the success of the Serbian se- 
cessionist propaganda among the empire's Yugo- 
slav populations, convinced most Austrians that 
this ''Balkan Piedmont" must be crushed at once 
if the empire were not to lose its southwestern 
provinces as it had lost Italy. If war with Eussia 
should ensue, Austrians thought it had better be 
fought now rather than later on when Austria's 
position might have changed infinitely for the 
worse. 

From the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian 
crisis, those natural pillars of the empire, the no- 
bility, the army, the bureaucracy, and the Church, 
together with the German and Magyar popula- 
tions, rallied enthusiastically round the Govern- 
ment and the Hapsburg throne. The almost pas- 
sionate phraseology of the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia, so unusual in a diplomatic document of this 
nature, was an accurate reflection of the popular 
mood. The Viennese press unanimously demand- 
ed decisive measures. "The situation between 
our Government and that of King Peter has 
become intolerable," asserted the "Neue Freie 
Presse." "Our ultimatum has been the natural 
result." The "Eeichspost" urged the Govern- 
ment to take decisive measures against the Serbian 
foe, "who is as implacable and relentless as he is 
dastardly." The formal outbreak of hostilities 
was hailed with jubilation. "When we consider 



124 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the provocations of which Serbia has been guilty 
for so many years," exclaimed the "Tageblatt," 
"the solemn pledges made and broken, the defi- 
ance which we have put up with from an unscru- 
pulous neighbor whom no kindness can appease, 
we experience a sense of relief on this outburst 
of war." 

Hungarian sentiment was even more enthusi- 
astic. "The whole nation joyfully hastens to fol- 
low the call of his Majesty to the flag," cried Pre- 
mier Tisza amid the frantic cheers of the Hun- 
garian deputies. "If we had stood these condi- 
tions any longer," exclaimed Count Albert Ap- 
ponyi, head of the Opposition, "we would have 
reached the point where Europe would have called 
us her second 'Sick Man.' " "It is peace and not 
war that we want ; but a peace which leads to life, 
not to death," asserted the Archbishop of Esz- 
tergom, Roman Catholic primate of Hungary. 
"There are situations in political life," said Count 
Julius Andrassy, "that can be likened only to the 
encircling of Sedan, which demoralizes and van- 
quishes the surrounded foe before the first shot 
is fired. Such would have been our fate if, after 
the continued vexations of years, after the expen- 
diture of many millions, caused by Serbia, we 
should have continued to submit to the invidious 
attacks of Russian-protected Serbia. . . . Had we 
waited longer, our self-esteem, our self-trust, 
would have been torn to shreds, and so would our 
power of resistance, our inner unity, our integ- 
rity." The Magyar press displayed a decidedly 



AUSTEIA-HUNGARY 125 

bitter tone against the enemy. That leading Bud- 
apest paper, the " Pester Lloyd," wrote, "The 
Serbian Government will be shown up as a nest of 
pestilential rats which come from their territory 
over our border to spread death and destruction." 
The broadening of the conflict into a war with 
Russia caused no surprise, since Serbia had from 
the first been considered merely the cat's paw of 
Russian imperialism. "The true cause of the 
war," asserted Count Julius Andrassy, "is the 
Eastern ambition of Russia, which is as old as her 
position as a great Power, and which has long been 
hanging over us like a sword of Damocles." Dr. 
Dumba, Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the 
United States, undoubtedly voiced the prevailing 
Austrian opinion when he wrote in the "North 
American Review" for September, 1914: "The 
war between Austria-Hungary and Russia may 
well be said to be the outcome of conflicting civili- 
zations and conflicting aims. The controversy be- 
tween the Dual Monarchy and the Serbian King- 
dom is only an incident in the greater struggle 
between German civilization as represented by 
Austria-Hungary, and Russian aspirations as rep- 
resented by Serbia, the Russian outpost on the 
southern frontier of the Dual Monarchy. . . . The 
Serbian Kingdom is the torpedo which Russia has 
launched at the body of Austria." Hungarian 
opinion tended to give the war an even broader 
interpretation. " Pan-Russianism, that is the 
word!" exclaimed the "Revue de Hongrie" (Bud- 
apest). "No ! The present war is not, as certain 



126 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

persons assert, a war of Slavism against German- 
ism. It is a war of a great part of civilized Eu- 
rope against Russian autocracy and Serb terror- 
ism. ... If the Triple Entente (in which the em- 
pire of the Tsars holds a preponderant place), 
should win in this war, it would mean the Euro- 
pean sluice-gates open to Muscovite autocracy, to 
Cossack militarism, to all sorts of political and 
religious heresies. The dyke once broken, it 
would be the end of European civilization." 

Such was the temper of the governing classes 
and of the German and Magyar populations. The 
attitude of the minor nationalities varied greatly, 
but on the whole it proved the insight of those ob- 
servers who had maintained that the empire was 
not in the hopeless internal situation asserted by 
the prophets of Austrian dissolution. Unques- 
tionably there was much disloyalty among certain 
racial groups. The Serb element of the Yugo- 
slavs, in particular, appears to have been honey- 
combed with secessionism, and even among the 
Croats many malcontents were discovered. Some 
of these escaped abroad, notably the Croat deputy, 
Hinkovitch, and these exiles presently founded the 
" South Slav Committee" in London, to influence 
Entente public opinion. 

But the bulk of the Croat population remained 
loyal. The Croats, though desirous of Yugo- 
slav unity, generally wished it in the " Austrian" 
sense; i.e., the supremacy of the Croat over the 
Serb element in any future Yugo-Slav state. Such 
a solution had, it was believed, been the dream of 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 127 

Franz-Ferdinand, and the Archduke's murder by- 
Serbian fanatics accordingly roused a wave of 
indignation throughout Croatia. Croat mobs 
marched through the streets crying, " Death to the 
Serbs!" Serb shops were sacked and Serb lead- 
ers roughly handled. The Croat deputy, Dr. Sus- 
tersics, voiced the feelings of the great majority 
of his people when he declared: " Grand Duke 
Francis Ferdinand was bound to come to this end, 
especially as he was the friend of the southern 
Slavs. Imperialistic Serbia saw with alarm the 
rise of this potent personality, this knight 'with- 
out fear and without reproach/ who showed both 
the will and the power to promote peaceful rela- 
tions between the southern Slavs and the Haps- 
burg dynasty. ' ' The Croats thus entered the war 
against their Serbian kindred in a far more loyal 
frame of mind than would have been possible un- 
der any other circumstances. 

Turning now to the northern Slavs : the Czechs 
displayed neither the indignant loyalty nor the 
bitter secessionism of the Yugo-Slav populations. 
The prevailing temper among the Czechs was a 
lukewarm or sullen aloofness. The fierce strug- 
gles which had long raged in Bohemia between the 
Czechs and the large German minority constantly 
protected by Vienna had engendered widespread 
Czech resentment against the Austrian Govern- 
ment. Russian propaganda had of course made 
the most of this golden opportunity, and for some 
years previous to the war a genuine secessionist 
party had existed among the Czechs, with the erec- 



128 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

tion of a Czch-Slovak national state under Russian 
protection as its goal. But these extremists were 
comparatively few in number, and drastic govern- 
ment measures at the outbreak of war quickly 
broke up their party organization. Some of their 
leaders, like Professor Masaryk, escaped abroad; 
others, such as Dr. Kramar, were imprisoned. A 
few were shot for high treason. The most serious 
result of Czech discontent was the poor spirit 
shown by Czech troops, whole regiments surren- 
dering to the enemy with practically no resistance. 
On the other hand, there existed a fairly strong 
loyalist minority which disliked the thought of 
Austrian disruption and feared the results of Rus- 
sian victory. Typical of Czech loyalist press com- 
ment are the words of the "Hlas Naroda" 
(Prague) : "The crime of Serajevo revealed, as 
by a lightning flash, the monarchy's deplorable 
situation. . . . But, at one stroke, all dissension 
disappeared. In vain did the enemy make ad- 
vances to the non-German nationalities." "We 
are all glad to assert the close union of nationali- 
ties. . . . All the nationalities are defending the 
throne and the empire," declared the "Hlasyz 
Hane" of Prossnitz. "We belong voluntarily to 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," said the 
"Cesky Dennin" of Pilsen, "that monarchy be- 
neath whose protection the Czech people has ar- 
rived at its present maturity." 

The attitude of the second north Slavic group, 
the Poles, was not left for a moment in doubt. 
Almost without exception, the Austrian Poles 



AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY 129 

proved loyalist to the core. For many years the 
Poles of Galicia had enjoyed complete local self- 
government and full cultural liberty — a situation 
doubly appreciated by contrast to the depressed 
condition of their kinsmen under Eussian and 
Prussian rule. Galicia was full of Polish refugees 
from Eussian persecution. The Austrian Poles, 
therefore, hailed the war as a crusade for the 
liberation of their race from Eussian domination. 
The exiles at once raised several Polish legions, 
20,000 strong, which, under their gifted leader, 
Josef Pilsudski, fought with fanatical bravery 
against the Eussian troops. 

The attitude of the Austrian Poles comes out 
strongly in the manifesto of the National Polish 
Committee issued at the beginning of the war: 
" Should Eussia keep Eussian Poland, and add 
Galicia and Posen thereto, Europe would be ex- 
posed to the infiltration of Eussian despotism and 
Byzantinism. If, on the other hand, Poland is 
torn from Eussia, it will mean a guarantee for 
the progressive expansion of Western civilization 
toward eastern Europe, as well as protection 
against the introduction of Cossack principles into 
modern life. . . . Let no one accuse the Poles now 
fighting in the legions side by side with the Aus- 
trian armies of being unfaithful to their historic 
traditions. Eussia was Poland's arch-enemy in 
the past, and will be in the future. It is precisely 
their part in Western civilization and the national 
individuality of their country that the Poles are 
now defending against the Eussians, contemners 



130 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

of the one and persecutors of the other." In an 
appeal addressed to Poles throughout the world, 
the noted Polish poet, George Zulawski, wrote: 
"We stand to-day by Austria, and do not doubt 
for a moment her goodwill. Let the Grand Duke 
Nicholas juggle with promises never meant to be 
kept; we know how we are treated here. After 
having lost our liberty we have found in this mon- 
archy, the most liberal in Europe, shelter and pro- 
tection. "We are full-fledged citizens; we enjoy 
here the liberty of autonomy and of our national 
advance. We like to consider past deeds, for they 
are the best securities for the future. . . . To-day, 
God has entrusted the honor of the Polish nation 
to us Polish volunteers,' and we will return it into 
the hands of God alone.'' "The historic mission 
of the Poles throughout the whole course of Polish 
history," wrote Professor Josef Buzek in the 
" Oesterreichische Rundschau" of September, 
1914, "consists in the protection they have af- 
forded as foreposts of the Occident to the Western 
civilization founded upon the principles of the 
Catholic Church, against attack by the Byzantine 
Orient. ... A similar task has been allotted by 
God to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the 
present world- war the Poles will take up once more 
their historic mission in closest union with Austria- 
Hungary. Their struggle will concern the driving 
of the hereditary Russian foe from Polish 
ground. ' ' 

So strong was Polish fear and hatred of Russia 
that the outbreak of war and the example of their 



AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY 131 

Galician kinsmen swept even the Prussian Poles 
into the stream, notwithstanding the bad relations 
which had existed between Poles and Germans for 
many years. Accordingly, most of the Prussian 
Polish leaders endorsed the pastoral letter of 
Monsignor Likowski, archbishop of Gnesen and 
primate of Poland, issued August 9, 1914, which 
accused Eussia of being the provoker of the war 
and the persecutor of the Catholic Church, and ex- 
horted the Poles to fight valiantly for the king of 
Prussia — "for it is he who will free from the yoke 
our oppressed brethren beyond the frontier." 

Almost identical was the attitude of the third 
group of Austria's northern Slavs — the Euthen- 
ians. For many years the Euthenians of East- 
ern Galicia had regarded their province as a 
"Piedmont" — the nucleus of a future Ukrainian 
national state carved out of South Eussia ; much as 
the Serbs had regarded Serbia as the nucleus for 
a future Yugo-Slav state carved out of Southwest 
Austria-Hungary. To the Euthenians, there- 
fore, the war appeared as a golden opportunity, 
and the extent of their hopes can be judged from 
the words of the proclamation issued by the 
Ukrainian National Committee, composed both of 
Euthenians and exiles from the Eussian Ukraine. 
"Unless the Ukrainian provinces are separated 
from Eussia," runs this manifesto, "even the most 
crushing defeat for that country will be but a 
feeble blow, from which Czarism would recover 
in a few years, to take up again its ancient role of 
a disturber of the peace of Europe. Only a free 



132 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Ukraine, which should be supported by the Triple 
Alliance [i.e., the Central Powers], could form, 
with its extensive domain, reaching from the Car- 
pathians to the Don and to the Black Sea, the 
necessary protective wall between Europe and 
Russia, a bulwark that would defeat forever the 
greed for expansion on the part of Czarism, and 
free the Slavic world from the baneful influence of 
Pan-Muscovitism. ' ' 

Such optimistic notes were, however, quickly 
stilled by the crushing series of disasters that now 
overtook the Hapsburg Monarchy. The failures 
in Serbia, the Russian conquest of Eastern Galicia, 
and the destructive Cossack raids into Northern 
Hungary, spread consternation and alarm through- 
out the empire. The disloyal rejoiced, and only 
the severest military repression prevented sedi- 
tious disturbances among the Serbo-Croats of the 
south and in Bohemia. The Entente press was 
full of rumors that Austria-Hungary meditated a 
separate peace, but such rumors seem to have been 
without serious foundation. Undoubtedly the em- 
pire was pessimistic, but it was a pessimism of 
desperate resolution, not of abject despair. The 
Magyars, to whom rumor had assigned the leading 
peace role, breathed, as a matter of fact, only de- 
fiant fury. At the end of 1914, the "Pester 
Lloyd" exclaimed hotly, "Let our opponents un- 
derstand once and for all : We are going to hold 
out to the end, and we have not for a single mo- 
ment meditated a separate peace with any one." 
In the "Revue de Hongrie" for March, 1915, 



AUSTEIA-HUNGAEY 133 

Count Albert Apponyi sketched out various bene- 
fits which victory would confer upon Hungary. 
"But," he added, "these are the problems of to- 
morrow; and for us there will be no to-morrow if 
we do not resolutely accomplish our present task 
— to conquer. All possibilities are open to us if 
we succeed ; all are closed if we succumb. If Mus- 
covite aggression wins, it is the end of our his- 
toric mission ; if it breaks before our energy, it is 
that mission's apotheosis." 

At first sight, one might have thought that 
Italy's declaration of war upon the empire in 
May, 1915, would have greatly accentuated the 
prevailing gloom. As a matter of fact, it did more 
than anything else to solidify patriotic feeling and 
rouse Austria to fresh exertions. The whole em- 
pire quivered with furious wrath and scornful con- 
tempt for Italy, the "traitor" nation. Emperor 
Franz- Joseph's proclamation to his people, with 
its stinging words — "Perfidy whose like history 
does not know" — was an accurate reflection of the 
popular emotion. "If war be indeed only a con- 
tinuation of political policy with different means," 
wrote that leading Austrian publicist, Freiherr von 
Chlumecky, in the "Oesterreichische Rundschau," 
"then Italy can point to the fact that, free from 
all scruples of political faith and morality, she has 
consistently pursued a course in the world war 
which she followed in peace for many years. To 
be at once Austria's ally and her most malignant 
foe — that has for decades been Italy's policy. . . . 
Italy dares the war, not so much for territorial ag- 



134 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

grandizement as for the realization of the aim she 
pursued in peace as well with all the means at her 
command — to hurl Austria from her position of a 
great Power. . . . Against this design, however, 
the whole Empire will rise to defend itself as one 
man. Austrian blood is not easily stirred, but now 
when we are threatened by cowardly brigands with 
a dagger thrust in the back, now will our wrath 
rise to a mighty flame, and all Austria echo the cry, 
' Down with the traitors ! ' Now we know where to 
find our most malignant foe, who wore the mask of 
friendship, and when she had grown great by our 
favor and that of Germany, turned out to be an ac- 
complice of our enemies. No Austrian will ever 
forgive this, no Hungarian will ever forget it. Re- 
venge for a breach of faith unexampled in history 
— that will continue to be the watchword ; and we 
shall not rest, nor our children, or children's chil- 
dren, if that be necessary, until a people devoid of 
all political and moral loyalty shall have paid a 
heavy penalty for the crime committed against our 
sovereign and our country!" 

Hungarian opinion equaled Austrian in its fury. 
1 'We are persuaded," exclaimed the "Revue de 
Hongrie" of June, 1915, "that the Italian Govern- 
ment's breach of plighted faith will be stigmatized 
by posterity, and that without distinction of na- 
tions. But, in awaiting this, we Hungarians, who 
formerly fought for Italian independence under 
Garibaldi, will take care that the infamy of Sa- 
landra and his ilk, who seek to revive the epoch of 
the Borgias, shall not pass unavenged. We shall 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 135 

not wait for history to punish them; we shall 
charge ourselves with that duty." 

Much more significant, however, was the attitude 
of the Slavs. Italy's avowed intention to seize, 
not only Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste, 
but also large tracts of territory inhabited by a 
Serbo-Croat population, roused all the Austrian 
Slavs to wrathful indignation. Even the Czech 
press warmed to unwonted interest and loyalty. 
"The peoples of Austria-Hungary," asserted the 
"Hlas Naroda" of Prague, "prefer war with Italy 
to a boughten peace, precarious and uncertain." 
"Because of the perfidy of Italian policy," wrote 
the "Cech" (Prague), bitterly, "a war to-day 
breaks out which is just another raid of the brig- 
ands of the Abruzzi." And the "Proudy" of 
Olmiitz exclaimed defiantly, "One more or less; 
what does it matter ! ' ' 

It was, however, the Serbo-Croats of the South 
who manifested the hottest indignation. "Not an 
inch of Austro-Hungarian territory to these per- 
fidious 'Allies'!" exclaimed the "Hrvatska" of 
Agram. "The solid fists of the Croats and 
Slovenes will be plenty strong enough to smash 
any Italian attempt to grab our littoral. " " There 
is not a Croat, not a south Slav," asserted the 
"Obzor" (Agram), "who, in this moment when 
Italy falls in arms upon our country, does not 
swear solemnly to defend with his heart's blood 
Croatia and the south Slav territories from 
Italian invasion." "We pray with all our heart 
for the crushing of Italy and the complete failure 



136 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

of its vile speculations," wrote the "Hrvatski 
Pokret" (Agram), "and we are convinced that 
our Croatian and Slovene soldiers will have a good 
big share in bringing this about." 

Very interesting was the attitude of the Austrian 
Italians. These people, numbering about 800,000, 
are divided into three geographically separate 
groups : the Trentino district of South Tyrol ; the 
Istrian region at the head of the Adriatic, center- 
ing about the city of Trieste; and the isolated 
colonies of the islands and port towns of the 
Dalmatian coast. The longing of Italian "Ir- 
redentists" to "redeem" these race brethren by 
incorporating them into the kingdom of Italy was 
undoubtedly shared by a majority of the Austrian 
Italians, and the Austrian military authorities had 
to take sharp measures to check disloyalty. 
Nevertheless, the loyalist minority was larger 
than is generally supposed, and on this occasion 
did not fail to express their sentiments. In 
Trentino, loyalist addresses were signed by lead- 
ing notables, including five Italian members of the 
Tyrolese Provincial Diet, while the "Risveglio" 
of Trent asserted: "No one has ever solicited 
Italy's intervention. This war serves particular 
interests which are absolutely opposed to the in- 
terests of Italian Tyrol." In Istria, Reichsrat 
deputy Bugatto, of Gorizia, wrote, in an address 
entitled, "Italy tramples upon Italian Honor": 
' ' That part of the Italian collectivity which forms 
an independent state, and which therefore ought to 
protect the good name of Italianism, to-day covers 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 137 

this good name with eternal shame. Become blind 
or mad, Italy commits the crime of treason, ex- 
poses herself to the danger of a disastrous war, 
renders inevitable the ruin of Italian citizens, of 
Italian lands. Never had we expected such an 
ignominy ; never was such dolorous injury done our 
national pride. . . . All that we can do is to declare 
in the face of Italy and the world that the Italians 
of Austria condemn and spurn Italy's action. . . . 
Italians of Austria! Let us veil our faces in 
shame!" In Dalmatia, "II Dalmata" of Zara 
wrote: "The Dalmatians of Italian speech de- 
clare in this solemn hour that they will make every 
sacrifice asked of them. . . . Dalmatian fidelity is 
traditional. We have inherited it from our fath- 
ers, and we will give a new proof of it by attesting 
our loyalty both to Emperor Francis Joseph and 
to the institutions of the Austro-Hungarian state. ' ' 

The Italian declaration of war proved to be for 
Austria the traditional darkest hour before the 
dawn. A fortnight later began that great Austro- 
German "drive" against the Russian armies, 
which never slackened till Galicia was reconquered 
and all Russian Poland lay within the Teutonic 
grasp. 

The joy of the Poles can be imagined. After the 
fall of Warsaw, the "Nowa Reforma" of Cracow 
wrote : ' ' That which to-day fills Polish hearts is 
something far beyond the bounds of ordinary 
human delight. Entire generations of Poles have 
not been permitted to experience this sentiment, 
which only a Pole can understand. The solid walls 



138 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

of our prison have crumbled into dust. They have 
been cast down by the mighty breath of civiliza- 
tion." The "Czas" said: "Russia to-day suf- 
fers a hard and merited chastisement. The loss of 
Warsaw is the first step in her downfall." The 
Ruthenian press joined in this chorus of jubila- 
tion, which was further swelled by the voices of 
the loyalist Czechs. The "Hlas Naroda" of 
Briinn wrote: "All the peoples of our monarchy 
are to-day filled with enthusiasm. The Czech na- 
tion turns grateful eyes upon its valorous sons 
who, with the other Austro-Hungarian nations, 
bring liberty to the Polish nation. Not, be it 
noted, the liberty promised by the false friends of 
Slavism at Petersburg, nor the liberty of the 
Chinovniks of Moscow, but a liberty based upon 
civilization, morality, and conscience. The Rus- 
sian despotism reaps the first-fruits of the seeds 
which it has sown." The "Lidone Noviny" re- 
marked: "Under Russian rule, the Poles knew 
only servitude. Equally lamentable is the fate of 
the Ukrainians. Under the pretext of liberating 
the Balkan states, the empire of the Tsars wished 
only to engulf them in its tyranny. It even allies 
itself with the Italians — those declared adversa- 
ries of Slavism — in order jointly to enslave the 
Slovenes and Croats." 

As in Germany, so in Austria-Hungary, the 
second half of the year 1915 saw a flood of discus- 
sion concerning the problems of the morrow. 
Even more than in Germany was the question of 
Austro-German future relations debated, the over- 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 139 

whelming verdict being that the present alliance 
should be made permanent and unbreakable. 
Eminent Austrian writers like the economist 
Eugen von Philippovitch and the historian Dr. 
Friedjung, and Hungarian writers like Eduard 
Palyi, warmly endorsed the "Central Europe" 
idea. Most Austrian-Germans appeared more 
interested in the political than in the economic 
connection. In a public address delivered in 
February, 1916, Prince Alois Liechtenstein said: 
"Austria-Hungary will firmly and forever remain 
faithful to the alliance with the German Empire. 
Leaning upon the German Empire and covered by 
it, our fatherland came into existence and has 
grown great. . . . We German-Austrians are the 
pledge, the indestructible link of the alliance of 
the two states." Dr. Weisskirchner, mayor of 
Vienna, remarked in the autumn of 1915 : ' ' After 
the battles in which the Germans of the empire 
and the sons of the Danubian Monarchy have 
fought side by side, we wish the political alliance 
to become closer, and we desire that an economic 
agreement of the two Central empires should 
facilitate our victory after and in the peace." 
And Cabinet Minister Dr. Franz Klein asserted: 
"A closer union will have to be concluded as a 
guarantee for the security of both states. Those 
citizens of Austria whose sympathies are else- 
where will have to put up with it." 

Hungarian opinion showed some shrinking at 
the prospect of a "Central Europe" so obviously 
under Teutonic hegemony. Nevertheless, the 



140 PEESENT-DAY EUKOPE 

ever-present Slav peril has reconciled most Mag- 
yars to the prospect. The Hungarian Premier, 
Tisza, has formally recognized its necessity, and 
another Magyar leader, Count Andrassy, re- 
marked at the close of 1915, "The natural ally of 
the Hungarians is the German element in Austria, 
and behind them, the German Empire. ' ' In fact, 
the Magyars seem to be even more cordial toward 
the Germans of the Empire than toward the Aus- 
trian-Germans. 

Another much debated question has been the 
future status of Poland. All parties agree that 
no Polish territory must return under Eussian 
domination. "Poland will never be given back 
to the Eussians," asserted the Vienna "Neue 
Freie Presse" in the summer of 1916. "Eussia 
must never again rule in Warsaw; and history 
must not move backwards." Most Austrian 
Poles desire an autonomous Polish state, includ- 
ing both Eussian Poland and Galicia, under the 
Hapsburg scepter. In this, both the Austrian- 
Germans and the Magyars heartily agree. The 
Germans, especially, are utterly opposed to a 
simple incorporation of Eussian Poland within the 
present Austrian political system, since this would 
swing the parliamentary balance definitely in 
favor of the Slav elements. The great reason why 
Galicia was not formally added to the Polish state 
set up by the Austro-Germans in Eussian Poland 
in the autumn of 1916 is the unsettled status of 
the Ukrainian question. It must never be forgot- 
ten that Eastern Galicia is not Polish but Ukrain- 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 141 

ian in nationality, and that if the Austro-German 
armies should overrun Southern Russia as they 
have Russian Poland, the establishment of a 
Ukrainian national state would become a matter of 
practical politics. In that case Galicia would be 
divided on race lines, the western portion falling 
to Poland, the eastern part going to the new 
Ukrainia. Such is evidently the Austrian plan. 
Whether it ever materializes depends upon the 
fortunes of war. 

In Austria-Hungary, as in Germany, the optimis- 
tic wave of later 1915 gradually ebbed during the 
opening months of the ensuing year. The Allied 
blockade hit both empires severely, and in Austria 
especially the food shortage was becoming acute. 
The growing pessimism was sharply accentuated 
by the Russian " drive " which began in June, 1916, 
and popular apprehension reached its climax with 
Rumania 's sudden attack at the beginning of Sep- 
tember. This naturally brought up the question 
of the three million Rumans of Transylvania and 
Eastern Hungary. The Hungarian Government's 
persistent attempts to "Magyarize" these popula- 
tions had made much bad blood, and there can be 
little doubt that a majority of the Hungarian 
Rumans desired annexation to the neighboring 
kingdom of Rumania. At the same time, this se- 
cessionist feeling seems to have been of a rather 
passive character, militant disloyalty being rare. 
It was also partially counteracted by a traditional 
attachment to the Hapsburg dynasty and by wide- 
spread fear of Russia. Many Rumanians felt that 



142 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

they formed the eastern link in the German- 
Magyar-Ruman race-dyke which sundered the two 
halves of the Slav ocean, and dreaded lest a Rus- 
sian victory might mean the drowning of all three 
races beneath the Pan-Slav waves. Typical of 
such apprehensions is the open-letter of the Tran- 
sylvanian Ruman author, Emil Isac, to friends in 
the kingdom of Rumania who wished to join the 
Allies and attack Austria-Hungary. Writing in 
the spring of 1915, M. Isac says : ' ' You reproach 
me with having denied my Latin origin by attack- 
ing Russia. I would have you know that it is pre- 
cisely to defend Latin culture that I act thus. . . . 
We should recognize that Rumania, by its geo- 
graphical situation at the gateway to the Balkans, 
is as great an obstacle to Russia's ambitions as is 
Germany or Austria-Hungary. ... Do you really 
wish us to sign our own death-warrant? ... I de- 
clare to you frankly that I would rather make a 
pact with the devil than an alliance with autocratic 
Russia.' ' Such sentiments probably explain the 
surprisingly lukewarm reception accorded the 
Rumanian armies during their invasion of Tran- 
sylvania in September, 1916. 

The speedy expulsion of these invaders and the 
subsequent overrunning of Rumania itself by the 
Austro-Germans did much to dispel the gloom 
which had fallen upon the empire during the sum- 
mer of 1916. The death of the aged Emperor 
Franz Joseph produced no bad effects upon public 
confidence. His death had long been anticipated, 
and his youthful successor, Charles Francis 



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 143 

Joseph, was generally popular. Of course, Aus- 
tria-Hungary is suffering acutely under the strain 
of war ; far more so, indeed, than its German ally. 
Nevertheless, there is no popular cry for "peace at 
any price, ' ' and Austrian determination to fight to 
the end has been greatly strengthened by the En- 
tente's plan for European reconstruction an- 
nounced early in January, 1917. This program 
involves the practical destruction of Austria-Hun- 
gary, and the Austro-Hungarian press has defi- 
antly stated that such proposals can be answered 
only on the battle-field. 

This threat of national disruption has thrown 
Austria-Hungary more absolutely than ever into 
Germany's arms. It is, therefore, certain that a 
Teutonic victory, and perhaps even more a gen- 
eral stalemate, would see a firmly knit "Central 
Europe," dominating the Balkans and closely al- 
lied to Turkey and Bulgaria. Such is the solution 
dictated by Austria's vital interests, and such the 
outcome especially desired by the Austrian-Ger- 
mans. 

Toward present enemies the Austro-Hungarian 
attitude differs sensibly from the German. In 
Austria-Hungary there is no real hostility against 
either England or France. The wrath of the Aus- 
trian-Germans is concentrated on Italy, while the 
old Magyar hatred of Russia has been still fur- 
ther exacerbated. Neither of these hatreds will be 
easily allayed. They are bound up with conflicts 
of interest, with instinctive racial antipathies, and 
with sentimental considerations— which last sway 



144 PBESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Austro-Hungarians much more than Germans. 

Assuming that Austria-Hungary survives, its 
most pressing problems will undoubtedly be in- 
ternal. We have seen that the empire met war's 
test surprisingly well and that there was much 
more patriotic feeling than most foreign observers 
had imagined. At the same time, the internal 
situation is still serious and the outlook by no 
means rosy. In the preceding pages we have 
shown that there are respectable loyalist minori- 
ties among even the most disloyal of the empire's 
racial elements. But we do not wish to leave the 
impression that disloyalty has been eliminated. 
On the contrary, a majority of the empire 's Serbs, 
Czechs, Eumans, and Italians are still probably 
at least passively disloyal, though voiceless under 
the censorship, while the Croats were converted 
only through hatred of Italy. 

Now all this is well known to the ruling Ger- 
mans and Magyars, who are, therefore, to-day in- 
censed against the "traitors" and predisposed to 
wreak summary vengeance after the war. But 
any wholesale reprisals would sharpen race preju- 
dices, and might drive the present loyalist minori- 
ties into the secessionist camp. In that case, the 
empire 's condition would be worse than before. It 
is plain that much coolness, tact, and judicious 
f orgetfulness will be needed in the years to come. 



CHAPTEE V 

ITALY 

ITALY is, in many respects, a land of violent 
contrasts. This is certainly true of its politi- 
cal life, which resembles one of those curious 
apartment houses of its great cities where wealth 
ostentatiously flaunts itself on the first-floor front 
while poets starve in the garrets above and vicious 
poverty festers in the cellars below. 

In fact, modern Italy shows certain disquieting 
signs of fragility. Italian political unity was ef- 
fected in 1870, but Italian moral unity was not 
thereby completed. The Pope absolutely refused 
to recognize the new state of things, and his de- 
mand for a restoration of the papal state (which 
would of course involve the undoing of Italian un- 
ity), was supported by a minority of pious Cath- 
olics throughout the peninsula. Another irrecon- 
cilable element were the Republicans, who con- 
tinued to dream the dreams of Mazzini, denounced 
the Savoyard Monarchy, and asserted that a re- 
public was the only way to achieve lasting Italian 
unity. Finally, there were the Anarchists, more 
numerous in Italy than in any other European 
country, who condemned all established forms of 
government. 

Up to the last few years, it is true, the Italian 

145 



146 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

political edifice was not seriously endangered. 
The irreconcilable groups were so mutually antag- 
onistic that they could never combine for united 
action, and all political power was in the hands 
of the upper and middle classes, entrenched be- 
hind a limited parliamentary franchise. Had 
these classes used their power wisely, Italian 
moral unity would probably have been long since 
attained. Unfortunately, they employed their 
privileged position to exploit the poverty-stricken 
lower classes, while their parliamentary repre- 
sentatives (a virtual caste of political war horses), 
invented the system of trasformismo, a sublimated 
" pork-barrel" which ate the heart out of Italian 
political life and disgusted everybody with the 
whole existing regime. So angry became the cry 
of discontent that the governing class reluctantly 
granted the popular panacea of universal manhood 
suffrage in the year 1912. 

The first parliamentary elections held under uni- 
versal suffrage in 1913 revealed the extent of the 
latent dangers which menaced the existing political 
and social order. All the extremist parties made 
astonishing gains. And these parties were more 
numerous than of yore. Besides the old irrecon- 
cilable Catholic, Republican, and Anarchist groups, 
two new extreme parties now came to the front : 
the Revolutionary Socialists or " Syndicalists " 
and the ' ' Nationalists " — partizans of a jingo im- 
perialism. Both were recent political phenomena. 
The Syndicalists were a late offshoot of Orthodox 
Marxian Socialism. Repudiating the Marxist doc- 



ITALY 147 

trine of social regeneration by peaceful evolu- 
tionary methods, the Syndicalists preached a vio- 
lent social revolution. Their progress had been 
extremely rapid, and by 1914 they had gained con- 
trol of the great Italian labor organization, the As- 
sociazione Generate del Lavoro. In working alli- 
ance with the older revolutionary groups (the 
Eepublicans and the Anarchists), the Syndicalists 
were to show their power in alarming fashion on 
the very eve of the European war. 

The rise of the Nationalist party had been no 
less meteoric — and startling. Of course there had 
always been a moderate imperialist group known 
as the "Irredentists," whose program had been 
the "redemption" of Italic lands by annexation 
to Italy, especially the Italic districts of Austria- 
Hungary. But about the beginning of the present 
century a school of Italian thinkers evolved a body 
of doctrine which went far beyond the old irre- 
dentist aspirations. This new doctrine called it- 
self "Nationalism," but was in reality a subli- 
mated imperialism. Unlike the Irredentists, who 
had practically limited their hopes to Austrian 
Trentino, Istria, and Dalmatia, the Nationalists 
frankly urged the annexation of French Corsica, 
Savoy, Nice, and Tunis ; English Malta ; and Swiss 
Ticino. And that was not all. Irredentism had 
aspired to Adriatic dominion. A Nationalist 
watchword pronounced: "The Adriatic is bitter: 
the Mediterranean not less bitter!" In fine, the 
Nationalist goal was a revived Eoman Empire 
dominating the entire Mediterranean basin, where- 



148 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

in the half-million surplus Italians now annually 
forced to seek alien lands might transform region 
after region into new Italies. The Tripolitan War 
of 1911 (preeminently a Nationalist undertaking), 
had electrified Italian public opinion, which had 
thereafter been steadily nationalized. The Na- 
tionalists had always been uncompromising in 
their methods. At the time of the Tripolitan War 
they had not hesitated to threaten revolution if 
the Government refused to sanction their impe- 
rialistic designs. 

A final illustration of Italy's unstable political 
equilibrium had been furnished by the famous 
< ' Red Week " of June, 1914. A " General Strike ' ' 
proclaimed by the Syndicalists had terrorized the 
peninsula, and in many districts of Central Italy 
the whole fabric of society had temporarily broken 
down, with the red flag of anarchy waving over 
Ancona and surrounding towns. Students of Ital- 
ian affairs were seriously alarmed, as competent 
a critic as Professor George B. McClellan observ- 
ing, ' ' The strike was a grim warning to the Gov- 
ernment and to the nation that under favorable 
conditions it is quite possible that a minority of 
the people may destroy the whole social and po- 
litical fabric of modern Italy." 

Such was the volcanic state of Italian national 
psychology at the outbreak of the Great War. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that the Italian Gov- 
ernment, despite its alliance with the Teutonic 
Powers, declared Italian neutrality and adopted a 
waiting attitude. The Government was obviously 



ITALY 149 

watching to see not only how the war would go 
but also how Italian public opinion would crys- 
tallize. 

This crystallization was, however, of a most com- 
plicated character. The old constitutional middle- 
class groups which still controlled the parlia- 
mentary machine (" Conservatives," "Liberals," 
"Radicals," etc.), took their cue from the Govern- 
ment and adopted no positive attitude one way 
or the other. 

Of the extremist parties, the Nationalists took 
a similar position. In fact, during the first weeks 
of the war, they inclined toward the Teutonic Pow- 
ers. The Nationalists had always emphasized 
their uncompromising ' ' realism. ' ' A few months 
before the war, the Nationalist leader, Federzoni, 
had stated, ' ' Our party holds a purely realist and 
integral valuation of international relations, in ab- 
solute antithesis to the sentimental tendencies of 
the old Radical and Republican irredentism, which 
looked to the abandonment of the Triplice and the 
rapprochement of Italy with the parliamentary 
Powers of the "West." And at the beginning of 
1914, he stated in an address before the Catholic 
University Circle of Rome: "I observe that the 
Catholics are favorable to the alliance with the 
empires of Central Europe and sympathetic to- 
ward Austria. That is too naive a viewpoint. It 
springs from a superficial and partizan admiration 
for the neighboring monarchy because it is tradi- 
tionalist and hierarchical. For precisely opposite 
reasons, our Democrats are often anti-Triplician 



150 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

and gravitate toward Republican, Masonic, and 
Radical-Socialist France. We repudiate all these 
a priori. Nationalism, in regard to the system of 
alliances, is inspired only by the positive interests 
of Italy, without regard to the preferences which 
its party members may feel for the internal physi- 
ognomy of this or that state. ' ' During the month 
of August, 1914, most Nationalists thought that 
Germany was about to win a sweeping victory. 
Accordingly, they tended plainly to favor active 
aid to the Central Powers in order to earn a claim 
to the Italic possessions of England and Prance. 
After the German check before Paris in early Sep- 
tember, however, and especially after Austria's 
revelation of her military weakness in Galicia, the 
Nationalists rapidly changed front. 

Signor Federzoni 's utterances in early 1914 are 
of peculiar interest. They forecasted accurately 
both the attitude of the Italian Government and 
the lines of cleavage of Italian public opinion dur- 
ing the early stages of the European War. The 
head of the Italian Government, Premier Salan- 
dra, at once announced the line of Italian policy. 
That line was ' ' Sacred Egoism" : In other words, 
a policy of pure realism guided solely by national 
self-interest. The line-up of the various political 
parties also rapidly became clear. The Catholics 
and Conservatives were pro-German and pro- 
Austrian. The Republicans, Radicals, and Syn- 
dicalists were strongly pro-Ally, with the Nation- 
alists plainly veering in the same direction. The 
great Liberal bloc, which controlled the Chamber 



ITALY 151 

of Deputies, was for strict neutrality. This was 
also true of the Marxian or Regular Socialists, 
though a minority tended to become increasingly 
pro- Ally. Since this early line-up is of such vital 
importance for an understanding of succeeding 
events, the party attitudes must be considered in 
detail. 

The Catholics, although avowedly sympathetic 
toward the Central Powers and not disinclined to 
see Italy ranged actively on their side, were for 
temporary neutrality, and their neutralism in- 
creased in fervor as the strength of pro- Ally feel- 
ing in otner parties made any question of an Ital- 
ian attack on the Entente Powers less and less a 
matter of practical politics. This neutralist atti- 
tude was definitely adopted at the party congress 
held at Milan, September 24, 1914. Addressing 
the congress, the Catholic leader, Signor Meda, 
said : "To aid France, we should have to declare 
war on Germany. But what pretext should we 
invoke? How has Germany harmed us? We are 
still her ally. ... To march against Austria, we 
must have something with which to reproach her. 
What ? Austria has not troubled the Balkan equi- 
librium except in so far as her operations against 
Serbia made this necessary. It is not said that 
she wishes, after the war, to keep or occupy posi- 
tions which would displease us. Neither will the 
recalling of past wrongs suffice. If we intend to 
provoke her to march against us and thereby per- 
mit us to conquer Trent and Trieste, that would 
be a disloyal and dangerous war which the great 



152 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

bulk of the country does not want. ' ' And the con- 
gress itself voted the following resolution: "In 
this historic hour Italy's role is to exercise an 
equilibrating mission which all the belligerent Pow- 
ers will appreciate. Indeed, there may be reserved 
for Italy a peace-making mission more lofty and 
glorious than military victory. The Catholics 
decide to adhere with entire confidence to Italy's 
declaration of complete neutrality; they see in it 
the surest means of safeguarding the country's 
interests and those of civilization, amid the politi- 
cal and economic rivalries of the present hour." 
And on November 5, 1914, that leading Catholic 
organ, the "Unita Cattolica," declared that if 
Italy declared war on Austria, the Catholics would 
march "without enthusiasm, without energy, with- 
out being able to say 'God is with us'; but like 
victims to the slaughter." The sentiments of the 
Conservatives were much the same as those of the 
Catholics, though more restrained on account of 
their Government affiliations. 

Besides this definite party feeling there was a 
good deal of loose anti-Ally bias discernible here 
and there in the currents of general public opinion. 
Many imperialists feared France as the main ob- 
stacle to their Mediterranean ambitions. England 
came in for considerable sharp criticism. In the 
"Mattino" of Naples, the well-known Italian jour- 
nalist, Scarf oglio, wrote: "Germany has con- 
quered the commercial markets of the world ; Italy 
the labor markets. What the traveling-salesman 
does for Germany, that the peasant and workman 



ITALY 153 

do for Italy. What a magnificent prospect for 
these two creative nations if they should collabo- 
rate in their work of civilization ! Unfortunately, 
there is in our midst a pro-British prejudice which 
opposes this collaboration. An absurd prejudice, 
for Italy owes nothing to England. Rather has 
she been duped by England, like so many other 
peoples." Early in 1915, another Italian writer, 
Signor Bandini, remarked: "What English Lib- 
eralism aims at, what it will certainly carry out 
if it is successful in the present war, is the com- 
pression of European non-English races within the 
boundaries of Europe; and within those bound- 
aries, the suppression of any nationality which 
might show signs of possessing native energy cap- 
able of breaking through the imposed bonds and 
of endangering English exclusive possession of 
the world at large. Only obstinate, cowardly opti- 
mists can fail to see that the ultimate consequence 
of this English triumph would be the slow death 
of all European non-English nations." And a 
little later, the "Corriere d 'Italia" (Eome), 
wrote: "We write whole books on German mili- 
tarism, but we never think or speak of English na- 
valism. And yet, for us, the latter is much more 
dangerous, because whenever it is a question of 
the Mediterranean, Italy's principal vital inter- 
ests are at once put in jeopardy." 

This anti-Ally and pro-German section of Italian 
public opinion, though influential, was not numer- 
ous. The mass of the Italian people was unques- 
tionably for strict neutrality. The two political 



154 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

exponents of Italian neutralism were of course the 
Liberals and the Regular Socialists. The Liber- 
als represented in the broadest sense the Italian 
middle classes — shopkeepers, factory owners, inde- 
pendent farmers, business men, professional men, 
etc. These classes were keenly responsive to 
economic arguments, and most of such arguments 
made for continued peace. It was obvious that 
Italy was conserving her resources while her neigh- 
bors were wasting theirs in war, and furthermore 
that after the war a neutral Italy, with unimpaired 
capital, untouched factories, and intact working- 
staffs, would have a great advantage in the inevi- 
table scramble for the disorganized markets of the 
world. Typical of this viewpoint is an article in 
that leading Italian periodical, the "Nuova Anto- 
logia," of December, 1914. "Our material inter- 
ests and the lives of our countrymen are not risked 
in the bloody venture of battles," it states with 
evident satisfaction, "and we have reason to hope 
that the indispensable continuity of our national 
labor will not be interrupted. . . . We have no 
lack of laborers to raise and reap our crops, to till 
and sow our fertile fields ; almost all our factories 
are still in operation, and slowly but surely the 
delicate strands of credit, so rudely snapped asun- 
der by the outbreak of the world-war, are being 
re-knit. . . . Neutrality, therefore, has proved an 
effectual defense for our economic interests against 
greater and worse evils, and from a political stand- 
point it has procured for us the signal advantage 
of inducing many foreigners justly to estimate 



ITALY 155 

the worth of Italian friendship and of Italian 
power." And in January, 1915, another writer 
remarked in the same periodical: ''Very few 
among us believe that our land could embark in a 
war without undergoing grave financial and eco- 
nomic disturbances; it is enough for us to reflect 
upon what has already happened, even after our 
wise declaration of neutrality. ' ' 

As for the Regular Socialists, they maintained 
unwavering fidelity to their anti-militarist Marx- 
ian principles. Their party manifesto, dated Sep- 
tember 22, 1914, read: ''Workers! The pre- 
texts with which some are trying to lead you to 
the slaughter are not worth the cost of life and 
treasure which war entails. . . . Proclaim that 
Italy, the only great European Power outside the 
struggle, hereby declares its mission of mediator 
between the belligerents. In the name of the In- 
ternational, in the name of Socialism, Proletari- 
ans of Italy, we invite you to maintain and accen- 
tuate your irreconcilable opposition to war." 

Although the mass of the Italian people was 
thus for neutrality, a large and rapidly growing 
minority had from the first stood squarely for 
intervention in favor of the Allies. That this was 
so was due mostly to widespread sympathy for 
France. To Italian Eepublicans, Radicals, and 
many Socialists, the Anti-Clerical, Radical-Social- 
ist French Republic was a cherished ideal which 
must be supported at all costs if liberty were not 
to give place everywhere to Prussian absolutism. 
The Italian Republicans proved the faith that was 



156 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

in them by promptly raising a large ' ' Garibaldian 
Legion" which fought heroically on the battle- 
fields of France. 

At the same time, these political reasons were 
powerfully reinforced by instinctive promptings 
of racial and cultural solidarity. We have al- 
ready noted the able " Pan-Latin'' propaganda 
waged by French litterateurs and journalists to 
gain Italy to the Allied cause, but one reason why 
it succeeded so widely was the fact that many 
Italians met it half way. As an Italian Radical 
leader, Signor Fera, remarked to a French jour- 
nalist early in 1915: "All Italians recognized 
from the start that the war was in reality a strug- 
gle of two civilizations, of two states of mind. 
Italy could not fight for a civilization antipathetic 
to her own. That is why public sentiment is with 
us so hostile to the Austro-German bloc." At 
about the same date, Professor Giulio Natali drew 
great applause from a Genoese audience when he 
remarked: "In Italy the great majority is Fran- 
cophile. To feel that sentiment is not to forget 
our real interests: it is simply — and our people 
has intuition — to defend our civilization, Latin 
civilization. Rome and Paris are the fatherlands 
of all free and intelligent men. " As early as Sep- 
tember, 1914, the noted Italian poet, Gabriele 
d'Annunzio, had uttered a burning appeal to his 
fellow countrymen, exhorting them to stand by 
the "Latin sister's" side. "Nature herself," he 
cried, "makes Italy one with France. Upon both, 
as upon all the Mediterranean peoples, is laid the 



ITALY 157 

duty of sustaining the supreme struggle against 
an imminent menace of servitude and extinction. ' ' 
And at a banquet held in Paris early in January, 
1915, he said: "I announce to you a certainty, to 
me as inevitable as the coming of spring or the 
sun's entrance into the sign Aries — the certainty 
of our war ; that war which I have preached for 
twenty-five years." At the " Pan-Latin " con- 
gress held at the Paris Sorbonne, February 12, 
1915, the eminent Italian historian, Guglielmo 
Ferrero, remarked: "For us all, children of 
Greece and Rome that we are, and bound to France 
by the sacred ties of language and culture, there 
arises a grave matter of conscience. ... In this 
terrible struggle, blood, sacrifice, long tenacity, 
will be required. Can we let France bear alone 
to the end this terrible and glorious task from 
which the genius of our race will come forth grown 
young once more?" 

As the war went on, anti-German sentiment be- 
came more manifest in Italy. "In the Germanic 
imagination," wrote Guglielmo Ferrero in the 
"Secolo" (Milan), "there is something mon- 
strous, unbalanced, excessive, which recalls the 
Indians, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Babylon- 
ians, and the other Eastern peoples; something 
which leads the Germans to exaggerate to absurd- 
ity every principle however sacred and vital in 
itself." German destruction of works of art in 
Belgium and Northern France evoked angry pro- 
tests throughout Italy, while German methods of 
warfare called forth bitter condemnation. * ' They 



158 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

punish the cathedrals because they are a force; 
the belfries because they are a symbol ; the monu- 
ments because they are not German," exclaimed 
Luigi Barzini in the ' ' Corriere della Sera' ' of mid- 
December, 1914. "Every land which guards jeal- 
ously the treasures of its civilization should trem- 
ble before these proceedings of destruction, be- 
fore this new fashion of making war." "If de- 
cisive events do not occur before long," wrote 
Ettore Janni, "scientific barbarism will be the 
outstanding characteristic of the present war. 
And for this, Germany will be responsible. It 
was she who initiated it. . . . But — how short- 
sighted of Germany! Ordinarily, the aversions 
and even the hatreds engendered by war are of 
short duration. But this time Germany has 
transgressed too far the limits permitted by war's 
necessities; she has shown an absolute contempt 
for all law, for all sentiment of humanity. She 
has glorified as a supreme virtue the fact of re- 
nouncing every virtue. She seems to have nailed 
Jesus anew upon the cross. ... Of the princi- 
ples of civilization, she has made a litter for the 
horses of her Uhlans. All this it will be difficult 
to forget; and, so long as men remember, it will 
be difficult not to act toward Germany in accord- 
ance with these exasperating memories. Germany, 
who, after the war, can have no hope other than 
the dissolution of the present league against her, 
is doing everything possible to cement this league 
for the future. . . . Europe may form a circle of 
hell such as even Dante could not have dreamed. 



ITALY 159 

. . . The blind leaders of Germany are exciting 
the whole world against their country. Those 
who formerly kept pensive silence to-day shout 
the war-cry of assault and extermination. The 
force of hate has banished weariness ; the desire of 
vengeance thrills those who faltered. They have 
given to Europe the terrible soul of a justiciar." 

By the early spring of 1915, Italian sentiment 
had thus undergone a marked change. The mass 
of the nation was still for neutrality, but the ac- 
tive pro-Germans had almost disappeared. They 
were now neutralists, while many who had been 
neutralists at the start of the war had become 
partizans of Italian intervention on the Allies' 
side. A similar shift had been going on inside 
the Italian Cabinet, several neutralists having 
been displaced by men of more pro-Ally com- 
plexion. This was notably true of the new Italian 
minister for foreign affairs, Baron Sydney Son- 
nino, Scotch on the distaff side and of known pro- 
British sympathies. As early as November, 1914, 
the semi-official "Tribuna" (Rome), had re- 
marked editorially: "This is not a war of gov- 
ernments, but of nations — of races. It may last 
for a year or years. Therefore Italian neutrality 
is a transitory condition, due to circumstances 
which may change at any moment. There is thus 
necessity for military, economic, and diplomatic 
preparation on the part of the Government, and 
of moral and political preparation on the part of 
the public." 

Under these altered circumstances it is not 



160 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

strange that the strong imperialistic tendencies 
latent in wide circles of Italian thought crystal- 
lized with extreme rapidity. The old Irredentist 
hatred of Austria and desire to annex the Italic 
regions of the eastern Adriatic littoral flamed up 
hotly in vehement demands for war against the 
"hereditary foe." The Italian public was daily 
reminded that the Adriatic — "Our Sea" — had 
been a Roman and a Venetian lake, that the pres- 
ent opportunity for satisfying Italy's "vital" 
aspirations might never again recur, and that the 
Italians of the East Adriatic shore were so rap- 
idly yielding before the combined pressure of the 
Austrian Government and awakening Slavism 
that quick action was imperative if those lands 
were not to be lost to Italianism forever. "With- 
in fifty years," asserted Guglielmo Ferrero, "the 
Slavic language will be the speech of Trieste and 
the Istrian cities, unless we conquer Istria; and 
every memory of Italy will fade from those lands 
which since the days of Augustus have always 
been Latin. It would be like unmaking the his- 
tory of Italy. ... It is very difficult in these days 
for the Italian language to conquer new terri- 
tories. So much the more is it our duty to see 
that none of the territories in which Italian is 
spoken shall to-day forget it. We shall be over- 
whelmed with shame if we allow the speech of our 
fathers to be corrupted, little by little, by a new 
people." That important Milanese journal, the 
"Corriere della Sera," urged the Government 
"to achieve the unity of our country, to gain pos- 



ITALY 161 

session of frontiers which will permit us to be 
pacific with dignity, to rid our Adriatic of the 
domination of an enemy — an essential and eternal 
enemy; a domination which to-day makes us 
strangers without security in that sea which 
touches most vitally our national life." And in 
February, 1915, the "Popolo d 'Italia" of Milan 
wrote: "We wish the end of maritime Austria. 
Austria has no sea. Neither has Hungary. That 
sea, to-day Austrian, is an Italian sea. Hun- 
gary's Adriatic outlet is a usurpation. . . . Let 
Austria be a great Switzerland ; and just as Swit- 
zerland does not claim Genoa, so let Austria-Hun- 
gary not pretend either to Trieste or Fiume. ' ' 

Of course, most Italians recognized that the 
Italic population of the Eastern Adriatic was con- 
fined to the coast towns and littoral, the hinterland 
being Yugo-Slav. In fact, the Italian element in 
the province of Istria is about 45 per cent., while 
in Dalmatia it is only 3 per cent. But the Italian 
claim was that the whole culture and civilization 
of these regions was Italian; that the Adriatic 
Slavs possessed no true national consciousness of 
their own; and that the apparent national con- 
sciousness of this folk — due to artificial Austrian 
stimulation — would quickly yield to Latinism 
once the Adriatic Slavs were under Italian rule. 
The Serbian claim to these coasts and the possi- 
bility of a Yugo-Slav Empire planted solidly on 
the Adriatic angered and alarmed Italian public 
opinion. English and French approval of Yugo- 
Slav aspirations caused deep consternation, and 



162 PBESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

Italian publicists hastened to lay their side of the 
question before the Allied peoples. In the " Lon- 
don Nation" of April 3, 1915, the well-known Ital- 
ian journalist, Arundel del Be, made light of re- 
cent Slav gains in Istria and about Trieste at the 
expense of the Italian element. "With reference 
to the Slovene advance," he wrote, "the problem 
is due mainly to political causes. Left to them- 
selves, the Slovenes and the Italians would freely 
intermingle, and the former would inevitably be 
absorbed by the latter." Eegarding Dalmatia 
he is even more positive. "I do not know what 
constitutes a claim to nationality," he wrote on 
February 6, 1915, "unless indeed it means the sum 
total of the spirit, the culture, the intellectual and 
artistic manifestations of a people, and the con- 
tinuity of its tradition. On these grounds I can- 
not see how Serbia can lay claim to Dalmatia. 
Not only does it historically belong to Latin civili- 
zation, of which it is the outpost across the Adri- 
atic as well as the national boundary, but the ar- 
chives of the Dalmatian coast towns, their laws, in- 
stitutions, culture, and language are Italian, just 
as much as are those on the other side of the Adri- 
atic. . . . Dalmatia not only is essentially a part 
of Italy, but it is important to her strategically 
if she is to remain mistress of the Adriatic. . . . 
How have the Serbo-Croats acquired a numerical 
advantage in Dalmatia? Merely through a forced 
and unnatural immigration and persecution pro- 
voked deliberately by Austria with the purpose of 
destroying and suffocating the Italian element. 



ITALY 163 

That this has resisted so long, and, though out- 
numbered, still dominates the spirit and the cul- 
ture of Dalmatia, is in itself a proof of its right 
to existence and domination. 

Turning to the Italian press, we find widespread 
condemnation of proposals to be content with the 
acquisition of Istria, either as the result of a 
peaceful agreement with Austria or in conse- 
quence of a successful war. The imperialists 
were a unit in demanding Austria-Hungary's 
whole east Adriatic coast, no matter what the ob- 
jections of the Yugo-Slavs. Particularly signifi- 
cant is the following editorial of the semi-official 
"Giornale d 'Italia": "The result of this system 
would be a slight improvement of our Adriatic 
position, thanks to the acquisition of Trieste and 
Pola, but the general strategic position at sea 
would continue to be difficult for us if that sea 
should belong, not only to us but also to an inde- 
pendent Croatia and to a Greater Serbia — two 
states which would probably be in the orbit of 
Russia. What would happen, then, would be, no 
longer a great Austrian naval power, but two 
small states under the tutelage of a formidable 
naval and military power — Russia. Now, Italy's 
principal objective in the Adriatic is to settle once 
and for all the politico-strategic questions of a sea 
which commands our eastern coast, and such a 
problem can be solved only in one way : by eliminat- 
ing every other navy. From the economic point 
of view Italy desires the greatest liberty and will 
put no difficulties in the way of economic outlets 



164 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

for the populations of the east Adriatic hinter- 
land. But from the military viewpoint, Italy can- 
not give way an inch. In the Adriatic (Austria 
having disappeared), there must be neither port, 
nor submarine, nor torpedo which is not Italian. 
Otherwise, the present difficult situation would be 
perpetuated and would even grow more grave 
with the course of time." That the Italian Gov- 
ernment was preparing for all eventualities was 
definitely shown by its occupation of the Albanian 
port of Valona (Avlona), at the close of 1914. In 
fact, Albania was another region insistently 
claimed by Italian public opinion. 

But these were by no means the limits to Italian 
expansion, as the imperialists saw it. The Na- 
tionalist viewpoint was ably set forth by Deputy 
Giuseppe Bevione in a series of articles printed in 
the great Turin organ, "La Stampa," toward the 
close of 1914. Assuming that Italy must join the 
Allies, Signor Bevione asserted that the war must 
end with the Adriatic wholly an Italian sea. The 
only way to accomplish this was the occupation of 
Albania and the conquest of Austria's Adriatic 
coast, thus forestalling an invasion by the Serbs 
and confronting Europe at the peace congress 
with the logic of an accomplished fact. Other- 
wise, Russia, through her Yugo-Slav tools, would 
gain that Adriatic predominance so vital to Italy. 
But besides all this, Italy must take part with the 
Allies in all future Balkan and Near Eastern oper- 
ations, thus earning permanent possession of 
Rhodes and the Mge&n islands now occupied by 



ITALY 165 

her troops since 1912, as well as a full share of 
Asia Minor in any partition of the Ottoman Em- 
pire. "We trust," said the "Rassegna Nazio- 
nale" (Eome), in the spring of 1915, "that there 
will be reserved for us, in the Mediterranean, in 
the iEgean, and in Asia Minor, a share propor- 
tionate to the requirements of our position." 
And an Italian writer remarked in the English 
"Edinburgh Review," "There is only one land 
wherein Italy can still hope to found colonies of 
Italian laborers, and that is Asiatic Turkey." 

Toward Austria, as might be imagined, the Ital- 
ian press was taking an increasingly menacing 
tone. This first quarter of 1915 was the period of 
the Italian Government's long dicker with the 
Central Powers over cessions of Austria's Italic 
territories, and the Italian semi-official papers in 
particular were not slow to inform the Teutonic 
Powers of what might be expected in case of re- 
fusal to comply with Italy's demands. Early in 
March, the "Giornale d 'Italia" wrote: "The 
time has come to make clear to the people that 
the present state of things cannot last indefinitely. 
Italy cannot emerge from the terrible European 
crisis as she is to-day. She must, therefore, be 
ready, for it would be suicide to let this crisis 
pass without improving her frontiers, realizing 
her aspirations, raising her prestige, and assur- 
ing her future. Action is life." And a month 
later it remarked, "Italy will do what her inter- 
ests counsel, and while we do not take it upon us 
to predict even the near future, we are in a posi- 



166 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

tion to affirm that she will reach her goal at any 
cost." 

When we review such semi-official press utter- 
ances as the above, together with the numberless 
imperialistic incitements to war like those already 
quoted, it is difficult not to believe that the Sa- 
landra Cabinet had already made up its mind on 
intervention, and that it was using the negotia- 
tions with the Teutonic Powers as part of a clever 
combinasione to extract the largest possible con- 
cessions from the Allied Powers with whom par- 
allel negotiations were going on at the same time. 
One thing is certain. On April 25, 1915, a whole 
week before Italy took her first warlike step by 
denouncing the Triple Alliance with Austria and 
Germany, the Salandra Government signed an in- 
strument with the Allied Powers. The exact con- 
tent of this document has never been divulged, 
but the semi-official Italian press has asserted pos- 
itively that it realized Italy's Adriatic aspirations 
while holding open the door in the Near East. 

All this tends to explain the inner significance 
of the great political crisis which preceded Italy's 
entrance into the European War at the end of 
May, 1915. If the Government had indeed deter- 
mined upon war, it was to carry its point only 
after a hard struggle. For, despite the growing 
current of pro-Ally feeling and the rising imper- 
ialistic tide, neutralism was still strong in Italy. 
The commercial and industrial classes, whether 
factory owners, shopkeepers, or business men, 
were generally averse to war, and the same was 



ITALY 167 

true of the Catholics and the Socialistic workmen. 
So strong, in fact, appeared this neutralist bloc 
that as ardent an interventionist as Guglielmo 
Ferrero admitted in the early spring of 1915, 
" Italy hesitates, and while she sides with the 
coalition, while she desires that England, France, 
and Eussia may be victorious, she leans more to 
neutrality and peace than to intervention and war. 
The majority hope and desire that Italy may 
watch the terrible conflict with folded arms, to the 
end." And in his indignant pessimism he con- 
cluded menacingly: "I do not know what may 
happen on that day when, in the midst of a Europe 
rent by war and restless in the face of such ruin, 
the Italian people become persuaded that the mon- 
archy, by the mistakes of its foreign policy, has 
prevented Italy from taking the Italian provinces. 
It is even possible that the monarchy's last hour 
will strike. " 

The neutralists were, however, to show their 
strength in dramatic fashion. The Government's 
denunciation of the Triple Alliance treaty on May 
3 had seemed to assure war, and the interven- 
tionists were already shouting victory. But at 
this eleventh hour there entered the arena Gio- 
litti, the maestro of Peninsular politics, the " Ital- 
ian Clemenceau," who for more than fifteen years 
had held the parliamentary chamber in the hollow 
of his hand and upset cabinets at his will. Gath- 
ering behind him all the varied forces of neutral- 
ity, Giolitti dashed into the lists waving the ban- 
ner of peace. " Italy can have from Austria im- 



168 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

portant and sufficient concessions without making 
war," was his rallying cry. Austria had, indeed, 
just offered Italy the Trentino, the west bank of 
the Isonzo, special privileges and full cultural 
guarantees for all Italians left under Austrian 
rule, and a free hand for Italy in Albania. With 
these Austrian offers Giolitti declared himself 
satisfied, and added that were Italy to conquer all 
those territories to which the war-party aspired, 
their numerous Slav and German inhabitants 
would saddle Italy with "a problem of inverse ir- 
redentism worse even than has been the German 
problem of Alsace-Lorraine." To break with her 
allies of nearly thirty years on such grounds 
would be an act of shameless perfidy which would 
leave Italy diplomatically bankrupt in the alliance 
market of the world. Even if victorious, the 
strain on Italy's finances and the disorganization 
of her industrial life would put back her economic 
progress for a generation. "If Italy goes to 
war," concluded Giolitti, "the results, whatever 
the outcome, are bound to be most sad." These 
were telling arguments, and so powerful was the 
influence of Giolitti 's personality that the Cham- 
ber showed unmistakable signs of bowing once 
more to the maestro' s will. 

But the interventionists, now openly supported 
by the Government, wrought no less desperately 
for war. A host of fervid orators headed by Ga- 
briele d'Annunzio inflamed the public against Aus- 
tria and intoxicated it with memories of imperial 
Rome. Typical of this campaign was d'Annun- 



ITALY 169 

zio's speech from the Garibaldi monument at the 
Quarto, Genoa: "To-day, gentlemen, your vic- 
torious will stands armed and ready for the fray. 
In looking at you and contemplating you, Italy 
reveals herself to me as a virgin land, just as it 
appeared to Achates, and as it was when for the 
first time there rang across the Tyrrhenian Sea 
the rapturous melody of her divine name. To- 
night, before the dawn, many of you will set out 
for the land that shines from afar. Your hearts 
are messengers of faith, ah, pilgrims of love! 
The same fire that kindled youth that night at the 
rock of Quarto flames anew in your breasts. If 
it be true, as I swear it is, that we Italians have 
relighted this fire on the altar of Italy, then take 
fagots from it in your hands and blow upon 
them. Shake them, brandish them wherever you 
go, and, my young companions, thus sow the fire 
of war all about you and be the intrepid firebands 
of Greater Italy. . . . Sow the fire, that by to- 
morrow the souls of all shall be enkindled, and 
the voices of all a clamor of flame for Italy! 
Italy!" 

Equally typical of the war-party's denuncia- 
tions of the neutralists is this speech by d'Annun- 
zio upon his arrival at Eome on the 12th of May : 
"Since three days, I do not know what odor of 
treason begins to suffocate us. No, no ! We will 
not be a museum, a hotel, a winter resort, a 
horizon painted in Prussian blue for international 
honeymoons! . . . Sweep away, sweep away all 
this filth! Cast into the sewers all putrified 



170 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

things! Long live Rome without shame! Long 
live great and pure Italy. ' ' 

The Government was now determined to force 
the issue, for on May 13th the Salandra-Sonnino 
ministry resigned, and immediately thereafter a 
wave of pro-war demonstrations swept over Italy. 
At first these demonstrations merely roused the 
neutralists to scornful or angry contempt. "II 
Mattino" of Naples, one of the leading news- 
papers of Southern Italy, scored "the forty or 
fifty thousand fools or rascals who wish to hurl 
into the abyss the country and the thirty-six mil- 
lion Italians who do not want war, having every- 
thing to lose and nothing to gain from such a 
criminal adventure." The Socialists were es- 
pecially determined. They organized counter- 
demonstrations throughout Northern Italy which 
paraded the streets shouting: "Down with the 
Ministry ! We want no war ! ' ' The chief Social- 
ist organ, the "Avanti," of Milan, exclaimed in a 
vitriolic leader of May 16 : "What signs of deca- 
dence and moral baseness! In Milan we must 
witness callow youths parade in triumph the ex- 
pelled or deserters of all parties. In Rome the 
mob of hirelings fed from the bureaucratic trough 
gets itself drunk on the ear-splitting harangues 
of Gabriele d'Annunzio. And what harangues! 
Incitements to crime in all its forms. D'Annun- 
zio as leader and inspirer of the national con- 
sciousness ! Shame brings the blush hot into the 
cheeks. Truly, the most fearful disillusionments 
are in store. This bacchanalia of the patriots 



ITALY 171 

symbolized by d'Annunzio is only the outward 
sign of long-standing ills. And if now the war 
does come; if sorrow, want, and suffering settle 
down upon our land and aggravate still further 
the sad lot in which our poor working-folk groan ; 
the people will have to bear all the consequences. 
The poet will have long since crossed the Alps 
once more, to enjoy comfortably and carnally 
among foreigners the fruits of that calculated 
frenzy of his which pushed into the blood-bath the 
Italian people. " 

However, after a couple of days of the pro-war 
demonstrations, the peace party began to lose its 
nerve. The Government did nothing to check the 
mobs and afforded the neutralists no assurance of 
police protection. Giolitti, threatened with death, 
hastily left Rome. On May 16 the King invited 
Salandra to resume office. This was decisive. 
The war-party celebrated with frenzied enthusi- 
asm and the neutralist opposition went completely 
to pieces. On May 23, Italy formally declared 
war on Austria-Hungary. 

One of the chief effects of Italy's entrance into 
the war was a further strengthening of Italian im- 
perialistic aspirations. Typical of the wide hori- 
zons now glimpsed by many Italians is the follow- 
ing article by Senator Alessandro Chiappelli 
which appeared in the "Rassegna Nazionale" at 
the close of 1915: ''The sphere of action of a 
great nation like Italy should not be con- 
fined to the difficult and glorious task of 
winning the territory on the Adriatic. The 



172 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

war that is being fought out to-day on the 
European continent will find its realization in 
Africa and in Asia, as well as in the eastern Med- 
iterranean, for the conquest of the trade routes 
and the markets of the world. Neither would 
domination over the Adriatic alone resolve this 
difficult problem for us, because it would open for 
us but few trade routes, even should we conquer 
the whole Dalmatian coast. . . . Our allies would 
in the meanwhile plant their flags on new and ex- 
tensive colonial territory, and would open up for 
their own exclusive advantage new commercial 
outlets, so that when peace has been signed we 
would indeed find ourselves masters of the re- 
deemed districts and in control of the Adriatic, 
but as though imprisoned in a land-locked lake; 
better off, indeed, as to frontiers, but in the midst 
of victorious nations grown stronger through the 
war. And already, as I have said, this has to some 
extent been realized. The German domains in 
Africa and Asia have almost all fallen under the 
sway of England, France, or Japan, thus aug- 
menting their already rich colonial possessions. 
It is small consolation that in the case of England 
and France we have to do with democratic and 
liberal peoples. For, although incontrovertible 
reasons make the civilized world willing to accept 
English maritime supremacy while it would ex- 
clude German supremacy, it is just as true that 
the slave is no less a slave if his master is humane 
instead of brutal and violent." 

Such utterances show that Italy does not see 



ITALY 173 

things quite eye to eye with her allies. The dif- 
ference in viewpoint comes out most sharply in 
the various Balkan problems. To begin with, 
England, France, and Eussia all wish to see a 
powerful Yugo-Slav state possessed of the whole 
Adriatic coast from Istria to southern Albania. 
Italy, however, wishes nothing of the kind, and 
Italian writers have warned their allies frankly 
that Italy will tolerate no such settlement, but 
will hold her partners strictly to their promises 
made at the time of Italy's entrance into the war. 
As the Italian publicist, Antonio Cippico, re- 
marked in the London "Fortnightly Beview" of 
August, 1915, "Dalmatia and Istria have never, 
either in geography or in history, belonged to 
the Balkans. Secluded by nearly impervious 
mountain-chains, they will be, as they have always 
been, the natural bridges between Italy and the 
Balkan peoples, between the Western civilization 
and the East. ' - The ' ' restoration ' ' of these lands 
to Italy, asserts Signor Cippico, "is not territor- 
ial aggrandizement, for Italy is recovering what 
she has been mistress of for twenty centuries." 
And he concludes with this very plain speaking to 
his English readers : "Any further discussion of 
this matter, based on more or less inaccurate in- 
formation, can only be of harm to the united cause 
of the Allies. . . . Anybody daring to discuss or 
proposing to violate the agreement between Italy 
and the Entente, which has brought Italy into the 
war on the side of the Allies — would prove to be an 
enemy not only of Italy, but of his own country." 



174 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

As regards Greece, also, the Italian attitude dif- 
fers from that of the Western Powers. For some 
years previous to the war, Italy and Greece were 
on distinctly bad terms owing to politico-economic 
rivalries in the Balkans and the Near East. 
Greece's failure to join the Allies has given Ital- 
ian publicists full rein to display their anti-Greek 
feelings, and numerous have been the drastic pro- 
posals against the recalcitrant Hellenes. Many 
Italians feel that their troops should at least oc- 
cupy the Greek province of Epirus and the Ionian 
Islands, notably Corfu, which Italian Nationalists 
have long termed "Isola nostra" — "Our Isle." 

Toward Bulgaria, however, Italians refuse to 
entertain the bitter feeling displayed by the other 
Allied Powers since her adhesion to the Teutonic 
cause in the autumn of 1915. Italian writers are 
continually advocating considerate treatment of 
Bulgaria and urge fresh attempts to win her to 
the Allies ' side. 

In fact, what most Italians would apparently 
like would be Italy firmly planted in the Balkans 
from Istria to Albania, joining hands with an en- 
larged and friendly Bulgaria, and thus holding 
both Greece and Serbia firmly in check. This is 
of course diametrically opposed to the intentions 
of her Allies, England, France, and Russia, and 
may yet be the cause of serious complications in 
any attempted Balkan settlement should the Al- 
lies be victorious. 

France is, indeed, the only one of her present 
allies for whom Italy feels any deep-going cor- 



ITALY 175 

diality. Anglo-Italian friendship is not without 
mental reservations on both sides, while toward 
Eussia there is merely an Italian official warmth 
which has no roots in popular sentiment. Against 
the "hereditary foe" Austria, the traditional en- 
mity has waxed greatly during the war, and this 
feeling is enhanced by the knowledge that Austria 
is thirsting for vengeance against "traitorous" 
Italy. Anti-German sentiment has slowly in- 
creased, and since Germany seems irrevocably al- 
lied to Austria, it is difficult to see how the former 
Italo-German good-will can be restored. 

The war-temper of Italy has differed widely 
from that of either England or France. At the 
time of Italy's entrance in the European conflict, 
the nation, as we have seen, was by no means 
unanimous for war, and this division of sentiment 
has persisted to the present day. As soon as the 
die was cast, it is true, active opposition disap- 
peared and all parties tendered the Government 
their formal support. But this support was in 
some cases a regretful bowing to stern necessity. 
Many of the former partiza*ns of neutrality still 
believe that Italy's action was a mistake. The 
Socialist deputies in the chamber have often op- 
posed the Government's measures, the Catholics 
are lukewarm, and the Giolittian press has main- 
tained an attitude of reserved criticism. The bad 
economic conditions prevailing in Italy, including 
financial stringency, industrial depression, high 
food-prices and an acute shortage of coal, have 
caused much suffering and pessimism, while the 



176 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

mediocre success of domestic war-loans shows that 
the moneyed classes are not opening their purse 
strings. 

Another factor tending to dampen popular en- 
thusiasm has been the absence of any striking mili- 
tary or naval success. Despite exceedingly heavy 
losses the Italian armies have not yet broken the 
iron girdle of Austria's land defense, while the 
Italian navy has suffered seriously, with few tan- 
gible results. The irredentist lands are still "un- 
redeemed. ' ' 

All this is not without significance for Italy's 
domestic future. The Government openly advo- 
cated Italian intervention and is primarily re- 
sponsible for the present situation. If the Allies 
win and Italy achieves her desired objectives, well 
and good. The Government will then have justi- 
fied itself and will undoubtedly be accorded gen- 
eral popular approval. But should the war end 
even in a stalemate with no rewards commensu- 
rate to Italian suffering and sacrifice, there will be 
trouble. The irreconcilables, especially the revo- 
lutionists, are still there. The Republicans may 
have entered the war as a crusade for liberty incar- 
nated by France, but the Syndicalists and An- 
archists were animated by very different motives. 
Unlike Marxian Socialism, Syndicalism believes 
in foreign as well as class war. In 1911 the Syn- 
dicalists, much to the scandal of orthodox Social- 
ists, supported the Tripoli expedition on the 
ground that war of any kind tends to quicken 
that spirit of violence indispensable to Syn- 



ITALY 177 

dicalist aspirations. The Syndicalists are to- 
day plainly fishing in troubled waters. Even 
victory would leave Italy impoverished and 
burdened with debt — excellent for Syndicalist 
propaganda, while Italian disappointment or 
disaster would so discredit the ruling regime 
as to offer Syndicalism a golden opportunity. 
The Syndicalists showed their strength in the 
"Bed Week" of June, 1914. If ever their day 
dawns, they will use it — for they have no scruples. 



CHAPTER VI 

KUSSIA 

THE outstanding feature of the decade of Rus- 
sian history lying between the Revolution 
and the European War is the growth of Russian 
imperialism. This movement, whose complex 
character is as yet insufficiently appreciated, is of 
capital importance for an understanding both of 
Russia's present position and of Europe's pros- 
pects in the years to come. 

When the great Revolution broke out in the 
autumn of 1904, Russia stood at a momentous 
crossroads in her history. The disastrous Jap- 
anese war had exposed with terrible clearness the 
shortcomings of the old absolutist, bureaucratic 
regime. Every one was crying for reform, and in 
this universal ferment the Russian Intelligentsia 
sprang forward as self-appointed champions of 
the New. This Intelligentsia occupied a very spe- 
cial position in the semi-Oriental, caste-like hier- 
archy of Russian society. Its ordinary transla- 
tion, "The Intellectuals," would much better be 
rendered, "The Civilized." The Intelligentsia 
was, in fact, the ensemble of those persons 
from all the regular social classes who believed 
themselves "enlightened" in contradistinction to 
"those who do not know." Their creed consisted 

178 



EUSSIA 179 

of two articles: hatred of the ruling regime, and 
boundless faith in their ability to regenerate and 
' ' civilize ' ' their country. 

The Intelligentsia were not very numerous, but 
their political importance in 1904 was out of all 
proportion to their numbers. It was they who 
had hitherto constituted the sole opposition party 
in Eussia. It was their fighting wing, the Nihil- 
ists, which had waged truceless war against the 
bureaucracy in the darkest hours of absolutism. 
Accordingly, now that the whole country was at 
last stirring against absolutism and bureau- 
cracy, the discontented everywhere looked to the 
Intelligentsia as the natural leaders toward the 
better morrow. 

Thus was the Intelligentsia " clothed with a lit- 
tle brief authority." But the Eussian Eevolution 
is the story of the Intelligentsia's lamentable fail- 
ure. They were tried and found wanting. The 
reason was that their program was a purely neg- 
ative and destructive one. A mere ensemble of 
individuals from all classes, they possessed no set- 
tled, positive philosophy, and on their first attempts 
at constructive measures they fell apart like a 
rope of sand. Also, the old regime found a man 
— P. A. Stolypin — whose iron hand bent Eussia 
once more to the yoke of established order and 
authority. In less than three years the Eevolu- 
tion was over. 

Of course, Eussia had not simply returned to 
the old groove. ' devolutions never move back- 
wards" — and Eussia had been through a real rev- 



180 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

olution. Henceforth she was obviously going to 
move both fast and far. The question was, 
whither ? And that question had already been an- 
swered by the Revolution's outcome. If the Intel- 
ligentsia had won, Russia would probably have 
followed a path of external peace and internal lib- 
eral reform. However they might differ over 
details, the Intelligentsia were usually disciples 
of West European culture and believers in West- 
ern institutions. They were also opposed to the 
old bureaucratic centralization and "Russifica- 
tion" of the empire's non-Russian peoples. 
Their ideal, however vague, was a parliamentary, 
federalized Russia, avoiding foreign adventures 
and with internal liberty for all. 

The significance of such a possibility for Rus- 
sia's future becomes doubly apparent when we 
realize that, as a result of the Revolution's uni- 
versal quickening, the great peasant mass was at 
last awakening to political consciousness and pre- 
paring to play its part in the national life. Ob- 
viously, the peasant would adopt as his own the 
dominant political philosophy of the day, and so 
enormous was his mass that his political conversion 
must decide Russia's political Orientation for 
many years to come. If the Intelligentsia had won 
the Revolution they would have converted the peas- 
ants to their political philosophy and Russia would 
have been pledged to internal, Westernizing re- 
form and external peace. But fate willed it oth- 
erwise. The Intelligentsia went down in discred- 
ited failure, and the strong arm of P. A. Stolypin 



RUSSIA 181 

thrust Russia past the crossroads into the path 
of aggressive imperialism. 

Imperialism had of course always been in the 
blood of Russia's rulers and statesmen. It was 
thus that a petty princedom on the banks of the 
Moskva had swelled into a mighty empire cover- 
ing one-seventh of the land surface of the globe. 
To the Muscovite Tsars, "Holy Russia" had for 
centuries been the "third Rome," destined to con- 
quer and absorb the whole earth. As the above 
terms indicate, this imperialistic concept had a 
religious as well as a political complexion, being 
fully shared by the Russian orthodox clergy. It 
was also the faith of the middle classes and most 
of the nobility. Muscovite imperialism is well 
summed up in the words of the late M. Pobiedo- 
nostsev: "Russia is not a state: it is a world!" 

Although Russian imperialists agree in the ulti- 
mate objective of world dominion, they differ as 
to the path they should follow. Russian imper- 
ialism is therefore divided into what is known 
as the "Western" and "Eastern" schools. The 
former maintains that Russia's first duty is to 
free and unite the whole Slav race, seat herself 
at Constantinople ("New Rome"), and thereafter 
purge and absorb the "rotten West." The latter 
holds that Russia's primary duty is toward Asia. 
Herself more than half Asiatic, Russia's immedi- 
ate mission is to awaken Asia from its deathlike 
stupor to a new, Russian life. It is the alternat- 
ing ascendancy of these two imperialistic schools 
which gives the key to Russian foreign policy. 



182 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

At the beginning of the present century the 
Eastern school was at the helm. The persuasive 
teachings of Prince Ukhtomsky, Yushakov, and 
others, had converted Tsar Nicholas II to East- 
ernism. Accordingly, Russian policy looked to- 
ward Asia, while the Balkans were neglected and 
Russia's western borders secured by cultivating 
good relations with her western neighbors, Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary. Then came the Jap- 
anese war, which heartily sickened Russians of 
Eastern adventures, while the ensuing Revolution 
drove all thoughts of foreign policy temporarily 
from men's minds. 

But not for long. By 1907 the Stolypin re- 
action enabled Russia to look abroad once more, 
and her gaze now fixed itself upon the Balkans and 
the Near East. She found the ground well pre- 
pared. In June, 1903, a dynastic revolution in 
Serbia had replaced the Austrophile King Alex- 
ander by the Russophile Peter Karageorgevitch, 
and the Serbians, a people small in numbers but 
with great ambitions, offered themselves as will- 
ing allies in any Russian ' 'forward" policy to- 
ward the West. The Austrian imperialists saw 
what was coming, and their annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in 1908 dashed Serb ambitions and 
defied Russian Pan-Slavism at one and the same 
time. Russia, still weak from her recent misfor- 
tunes, swallowed her wrath but vowed vengeance. 
From that moment the great Austro-Russian duel 
was on, both parties openly preparing for war 
and seeking to undermine the other's position by 



RUSSIA 183 

every means in their power. The most unscrup- 
ulous methods were used, especially as regards 
rival propagandas among disaffected domestic 
elements. 

And the Austrian propaganda found within the 
Russian borders much fertile soil. The rising 
tide of Muscovite imperialism had caused a rapid 
growth of * 'Nationalist" sentiment among the 
" Great Russians." The Great Russians, who 
form the real racial cement of the Russian Em- 
pire, number only seventy millions of the em- 
pire's one hundred and seventy million inhabit- 
ants. Before the Revolution, when the yoke of 
autocracy pressed equally upon all, many Great 
Russians had made common cause with the non- 
Muscovite nationalities, and these latter had ex- 
pected from the Revolution a decentralized fed- 
eralism which should ensure them local autonomy 
and cultural life. But the Great Russians, now 
admitted through the Duma to a share in direct- 
ing the empire's destinies, promptly became Na- 
tionalists and took up the old bureaucratic pro- 
gram of "Russifying" the minor nationalities. 
Furious at this disappointment of their dearest 
hopes, the minor nationalities fell into sullen dis- 
affection. The thirty million "Little Russians" 
of the Ukraine, in particular, lent a willing ear to 
Austrian promptings to sedition and separatism. 

But this merely increased the anger of the Rus- 
sian imperialists, who sharpened their Russifica- 
tion program and pressed their military prepara- 
tions. And these preparations were directed 



184 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

against Germany as well as against Austria- 
Hungary. In 1908 Germany had shown her 
determination to back her Austrian ally to the 
last, and she was now openly rejuvenating Tur- 
key, the ultimate prey of Muscovite Western im- 
perialism. This provoked the bitterest anti- 
German feeling in Russia, and the years preceding 
the European War witnessed a Russo-German 
press campaign of truly extraordinary virulence. 
As the Russian publicist, Paul Mitrofanov warned 
the Germans in June, 1914, "The road to Con- 
stantinople now goes through Berlin. Vienna has 
become a secondary factor." The Russian Gov- 
ernment was preparing feverishly for any eventu- 
ality. The Duma voted huge army increases in 
1913 and a network of new strategic railways was 
begun all along the German border. Russia was 
to be fully prepared by 1916. 

Western imperialism, under the masterful head- 
ship of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, 
thus dominated the councils of the empire, and 
even Intelligentsia leaders like Peter Struve and 
Paul Miliukov were going with the tide. Never- 
theless, the voice of the Eastern school was by no 
means stilled. Just as the Western Pan-Slavists 
had backed the Serbian revolution at the very 
height of the Japanese war, so the Easterners now 
warned against plunging Russia into a European 
Armageddon and urged an understanding with 
the Teutonic Powers and reconcentration toward 
Asia. Such was the theme of Baron Rosen's fa- 
mous " Secret Memoir" of early 1914, such the 



RUSSIA 185 

advice of General Kuropatkin and of publicists 
like Michael Pavlovitch and Prince Kotchubey. 
Throughout the opening months of 1914 there was 
sharp clashing between the two schools. Then 
came Serajevo and the Great War. 

The outbreak of hostilities caused an outburst of 
popular enthusiasm and a general rallying of op- 
position forces round the Government and the 
Tsar. During the early part of 1914 there had 
been a good deal of political discontent and social 
unrest, but most of this disappeared in the wave 
of patriotic loyalty which now swept the country. 
A prominent leader of the Intelligentsia, V. Na- 
bokov, wrote in the Petrogad "Ryetch": "The 
imperial manifesto invites us to forget our in- 
ternal conflict. . . . Uniting with all those to 
whom the life of our country is dear, we do not 
give up a single one of our slogans, do not forget 
a single one of our idealistic problems, do not 
abandon a single one of our positions. . . . But 
we are filled with the consciousness that above 
individual political ideals . . . stands one thing 
. . . the life and greatness of the Fatherland. At 
present it is in danger. And all of us, her sons, 
are needed by her wholly, without reserve. All of 
us, without regard to political faith and sect, each 
one in his place . . . will serve to the full extent of 
our strength and ability." The only discordant 
notes were those of the extremely class-conscious, 
revolutionary Laborites and Social-Democrats, 
who refused to indorse the war and stood sullenly 
aloof. 



186 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Such voices were, however, lost in the thunder- 
ous chorus of loyalty and enthusiasm. The liberal 
"Russkoye Slovo" of Moscow cried: "Rise, ye 
great Russian people ! History is calling you to 
perform a great feat before which all that the 
world has ever seen will pale. . . . The road will 
be difficult, the sacrifices will be heavy, but the 
recompense will be great. ' ' Germany was every- 
where stigmatized as the arch-enemy. The noted 
imperialist organ, "Novoye Vremya," asserted 
furiously: "The breeding-place of international 
violence will be crushed by the gigantic strength 
of the Northern people, the life of nations will 
enter upon the course of justice and humanity. 
. . . In all Europe since the time of Prince Bis- 
marck there has been only one center of militar- 
ism — Berlin." And its brilliant leader-writer, 
Menshikov, pronounced that, as a result of the 
war, all Eastern Germany must become Slav to 
the very gates of Berlin. Among the peasantry 
the war was thoroughly popular. The traditional 
hatred for the Niemetz — the German — flamed up 
hotly, and the peasant reservists marched joyfully 
to crush the " impious " Westerners, "the Devil's 
spawn,' ' who had dared assail "Little Mother 
Russia" in such sacrilegious fashion. 

The early stages of the war did much to con- 
firm this Russian optimism. The disasters in 
East Prussia were forgotten in the glorious tid- 
ings of the Austrian collapse at Lemberg and the 
overrunning of all eastern Galicia by the Russian 
armies. At last that nest of Ukrainian separat- 



RUSSIA 187 

ism which had weighed so intolerably upon Mus- 
covite public confidence was in the Russian grasp ! 
The drastic "Russification" of the Ruthenians 
which now began was but the Government's an- 
swer to insistent popular clamor. Numerous 
plans were sketched out for the summary partition 
of both the Central Empires. "It is highly de- 
sirable for Russia,' ' wrote Menshikov in the 
"Novoye Vremya," "to surround herself with 
buffers, with a network of political organisms, 
harmless to Russia yet capable of opposing re- 
sistance to others' aggressions. If we succeed 
in making Germany and Austria into Balkan-like 
groups of peoplets, then we can at last sleep safe 
o' nights about our western border." 

In Russia, as in other countries during the early 
months of the struggle, great stress was laid upon 
the war's regenerative effects. The good results 
of the Government's prohibition of drink were es- 
pecially emphasized. "Our country is passing 
through an epoch fraught with the greatest sig- 
nificance," wrote K. Voboryov in the Petrogad 
"Ryetch." "The spiritual elevation the people 
have experienced since the declaration of war, 
added to the sobriety that began at the same time, 
has wrought a profound change in the life of the 
country right before our eyes. The stoppage of 
drink has revolutionized the Russians psycholog- 
ically, economically, and socially. The results 
of the change are already apparent throughout the 
empire, especially in the villages. The Russian 
village in this brief period has been so transformed 



188 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

that it is unrecognizable. " ' ' There is great hope, ' ' 
wrote Menshikov in the "Novoye Vremya," ''that 
if the experiment in involuntary temperance con- 
tinues as successfully as in the past months, the 
Government authorities may gather sufficient cour- 
age to put an end to this inveterate public evil. 
Oh, what a great, saving deed that would be ! It 
would be more than throwing off the Tartar yoke, 
or the abolition of serfdom; it would be the de- 
struction of the devil's power over Russia. . . . 
We do not yet know what the Russian nation is 
as a sober nation. . . . From time immemorial has 
alcohol been poisoning our blood. What will our 
future be, then, if our Government shall under- 
take the pious feat and actually sober the 
people?" 

Turkey's entrance into the war on the Teutonic 
side in November, 1914, was greeted by Russia 
with a general shout of glee. Ever since the be- 
ginning of the war influential circles of Russian 
public opinion had demanded that Russia should 
in any event obtain Constantinople and the Straits 
as part of the prize of victory, and Turkey's ac- 
tion was therefore hailed as a welcome means of 
satisfying Russia's age-long aspirations. What 
these aspirations were was readily discernible 
from a survey of the Russian press. Even before 
the formal rupture with Turkey, the "Petrograd 
Bourse Gazette" had, in October, 1914, conducted 
an inquiry on the topic: "The Sick Man is dy- 
ing. What shall be done with his heritage ? " To 
this question a few voices, such as Professor 



RUSSIA 189 

Alexeiev of Moscow, had recommended that the 
Straits be placed under international control, with 
Constantinople a free city. But the great major- 
ity had asserted that Constantinople and the 
Straits must pass entirely under Russian con- 
trol, while many had also asserted that Russia 
must obtain complete Balkan supremacy. For 
example, Professor Kotliarievsky of Moscow con- 
tended, "The Straits must and shall belong to us." 
And the " Bourse Gazette" itself remarked edi- 
torially: "We are the natural heirs of European 
Turkey. We must at last become a Balkan 
Power. The growth of Russia to a Balkan Power 
must be accompanied simultaneously by the con- 
clusion with the other states of the Peninsula of 
a customs union and a military convention on the 
model of that by which Prussia, after 1866, 
founded the Germanic Confederation and later 
transformed it into the German Empire. . . . 
Only such a task is worthy of Russia and of the 
sacrifices which this war will entail." 

These sentiments were naturally intensified by 
Turkey's entrance into the war. The Tsar ac- 
curately reflected the feelings of his subjects when 
he stated in his war manifesto : ' ' Together with 
the whole Russian people, we firmly believe that 
Turkey's insensate intervention in the war will 
hasten the — to her — fatal course of events and 
will open out to Russia a way to the solution of 
those historical problems on the shores of the 
Black Sea bequeathed by our ancestors." And 
the "Novoye Vremya" exclaimed exultantly: 



190 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

1 ' The war with Turkey must be considered desir- 
able, however inconvenient it may be to divert a 
part of our forces from the main front, because it 
gives us the opportunity of settling, with one 
supreme effort, the 'Eastern Question.' . . . 
There has never been in the past, and, may be, 
never in the future will there be, such a happy 
combination of circumstances for the liquidation 
of Turkey, at least as a European Power. This 
occasion must be utilized, no matter how difficult 
and what its cost. If we win, there will spread 
before us the grand prospect of realizing the great- 
est and perhaps the ultimate ideals of the Slav 
races." 

Russian public opinion took Anglo-French ut- 
terances about an internationalization of the 
Straits with very bad grace. In March, 1915, the 
well-known publicist, Prince Eugene Troubetzkoi, 
wrote in the "Russkaya Vyedomosti" of Mos- 
cow: "Our allies, like our enemies, should know 
the Russian popular point of view. There is only- 
one solution of the problem which corresponds to 
our national interests: Constantinople and the 
Straits must become Russian. Any other solu- 
tion is inacceptible for us." And in April, 1915, 
the influential congress of nobles passed the fol- 
lowing emphatic resolution: "The congress, con- 
vinced with the Russian people that the world- 
war will end by the complete victory of Russia 
and her glorious allies, thinks that one of the in- 
evitable results of this victory must be the acquisi- 
tion of Constantinople by the Russian Empire. 



RUSSIA 191 

In the popular conscience there lies profoundly 
rooted the conviction that the Russian Tsar is 
alone predestined by the Will of God to plant the 
Cross on Saint Sophia and restore in its ancient 
splendor the altar of the Universal Orthodox 
Church." "To Russia a free outlet to the Medi- 
terranean is an absolute necessity," asserted the 
"Novoye Vremya," "She has waited for it for 
centuries and she can wait no longer. Constan- 
tinople must be Russian, and it will make no differ- 
ence if England and France are the first in seizing 
it." 

Such was Russia's hopeful mood in the spring 
of 1915. With her armies breasting the Carpa- 
thian mountain crests overlooking the Hungarian 
plain, and her Western Allies hammering at the 
Dardanelles, a happy ending to the war seemed 
almost in sight. One of the few clouds upon the 
popular horizon was a certain disappointment at 
the general loyalty of the Austrian Slavs. Many 
Russians had apparently expected that the Aus- 
trian armies would disintegrate at the mere sight 
of the Russian standards. Accordingly, the stub- 
born Austrian defense on the Carpathians and at 
the Dunajec caused some disagreeable surprise in 
the Russian press. "The Austrian Slavs," wrote 
the "Birzhevia Vyedomosti" ruefully, "have 
fought very well against us, and do so still. The 
cause of their attitude is, in our opinion, very 
simple : they do not wish to be delivered by us Rus- 
sians." But this, after all, was merely the tra- 
ditional fly in the ointment. In the spring of 



192 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

1915, Russian public opinion was thoroughly op- 
timistic and expectant of speedy victory. 

Into this confident optimism broke the great 
Austro-German " drive" which never slackened 
till it had torn Galicia and Russian Poland from 
the Muscovite grasp and had conquered Courland 
and Lithuania as well. The Russian press made 
no attempt to minimize the seriousness of the sit- 
uation. In July, 1915, the "Russkoye Slovo" re- 
marked: "We must not light-heartedly shut our 
eyes to the significance of the successes of our 
stubborn enemy and console ourselves with the 
usual phrases about the losses suffered by them 
and about the worthlessness of the territory lost 
by us. It is much better to weigh the situation 
created and not blind our eyes to the possible con- 
sequences of our ill success.' ' And a month later 
the "Novoye Vremya" wrote: "We must look 
at things soberly. To defeat the Germans is no 
longer a luxury which we could afford to deny 
ourselves if we wished. Under our present condi- 
tions victory is a necessity which we must purchase 
at whatever cost, for without it there will be no 
Russia. The Germans would gladly make peace 
with us in order to protect their rear, but they 
would demand impossible cessions of territory, an 
enormous war-indemnity, and a humiliating com- 
mercial treaty. Such a peace would place in serf- 
dom an empire of one hundred and eighty million 
Russian people." 

But the deepest causes of discouragement 



RUSSIA 193 

sprang from within. The Russian people knew 
that German genius was not the sole reason for 
Russian failure. There were ugly charges of gov- 
ernment inefficiency, wastefulness, graft, and 
downright treason. These charges involved the 
highest quarters. The very minister of war, 
Soukhomlinov, was presently put on trial and dis- 
graced. 

And this was not all. Many Russians felt that 
the ruling regime was deliberately using the war 
to rivet unrelieved autocracy upon the empire 
once more. Even before the war all the liberal 
elements had been protesting against the Govern- 
ment's increasingly arbitrary measures, and these 
liberal protests had been steadily sharpened by 
the subsequent course of events. At the outbreak 
of hostilities the Government had, it is true, issued 
a ringing proclamation urging forgetfulness of 
domestic issues in the common cause of the threat- 
ened Fatherland. But the Government's subse- 
quent actions had shown that it, at least, did not 
propose to forget. Almost its first move had been 
to gag the entire Russian radical press, while all 
non-Russian newspapers throughout the empire 
except a few Conservative Polish organs had been 
suppressed at a blow. In regions like Finland and 
the Ukraine, "Russification" was speeded up in 
the most ruthless fashion, the last local liberties 
being relentlessly swept away. Revolutionists 
like Vladimir Bourtzev, hastening home from exile 
in response to their country's call, were thrown 



194 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

into prison, while the entire gronp of labor 
deputies in the Duma was incontinently shipped 
off to Siberia. 

All this naturally evoked a rising wave of angry 
discontent. Of course the iron censorship long 
checked even the faintest mutterings in the Rus- 
sian home press, but Russian papers printed 
abroad told startling tales. Most significant of 
the growing unrest was the movement known as 
the "Dread of Victory." Just as in the Japanese 
war, many radicals began to fear that a Russian 
triumph would rivet the chains of despotism for- 
ever upon their country. As early as October, 
1914, the Russian Socialist leader Lenin wrote in 
the "Sotzial Demokrat" of Geneva, Switzerland: 
"In the actual state of affairs it is impossible, 
from the point of view of the international pro- 
letariat, to say which would be the lesser evil 
for Socialism — an Austro-German defeat, or a 
Franco-Russo-English defeat. But for us, Rus- 
sian Social-Democrats, there can be no doubt that, 
from the point of view of the toiling masses of all 
the Russian peoples, the lesser evil would be a 
defeat of the Tsarist monarchy, which is the most 
reactionary and the most barbarous of govern- 
ments, and which oppresses the largest number of 
nationalities and the largest mass of population 
in Europe and Asia." And in February, 1915, he 
wrote : l ' We say : Yes, we hope for the defeat of 
Russia because it will facilitate the internal vic- 
tory of Russia — the abolition of her slavery, her 
liberation from the chains of Tsarism. ' ' The Rus- 



EUSSIA 195 

sian Social Democrats certainly proved the faith 
that was in them. There was continual shirking, 
striking and sabotage in Eussian munitions fac- 
tories, and it was notorious that many town regi- 
ments did not fight well. 

It is true that this positively seditious attitude 
was confined to the working-folk of the towns. 
Most of the Intelligentsia were for the war, while 
the great peasant mass was heartily in favor of 
the struggle against the German. Nevertheless, 
the Government's internal policy caused wide- 
spread dissatisfaction and pessimism. In April, 
1915, the "Novy Mir," a radical paper published 
in New York city, which possessed good sources 
of information, painted a decidedly gloomy pic- 
ture of political conditions within the Eussian Em- 
pire. "When the war was declared," it wrote, 
"voices were heard from all sides urging the ne- 
cessity of 'ceasing the strife.' 'United Eussia' — 
such was the slogan. It still remains the slogan 
even now, but its falseness is already felt by many. 
The point is, the strife has been ceased by one 
side, but the other does not even think of stop- 
ping ; on the contrary, it is on its guard more than 
ever. . . . Meanwhile, the oppression is quite 
merciless. One thing is clear — the enthusiasm is 
rapidly declining. ' ' 

If such was the situation in the spring of 1915, 
it is easy to imagine the effect of the summer's 
disasters upon public opinion. Indeed, so loud be- 
came the cry of discontent that the Duma was con- 
voked at the beginning of August. But Liberal 



196 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

demands for sweeping investigation and reform so 
alarmed the ruling regime that in mid-September 
the Duma was hastily dissolved and the Govern- 
ment reorganized in more reactionary fashion than 
before. "Victory first: reform after!" was the 
official slogan; a sentiment heartily endorsed by 
the reactionary press. The "Petrogradskiya 
Vyedomosti" wrote: "The legislative chamber 
has adopted utterly unacceptable slogans which 
have nothing to do with the problems of the 
quicker and better mobilization of the country for 
the achievement of victory, which undermine the 
confidence in the authorities appointed by the 
Tsar, and create among the population restlessness 
and mental anarchy. As in the days of the revolu- 
tionary Dumas, the representatives in this one be- 
gan to threaten the Government and public order 
with street demonstrations. Political passions are 
being aroused and . . . the unity so necessary to 
the country is being destroyed. The Government, 
which has manifested extreme benevolence toward 
the participation of all political parties in the 
work of victory . . . cannot remain indifferent 
and nonresistant to the destructive program in 
which the so-called 'progressive forces' have en- 
gaged. " And the Clerical "Kolokol" (Petro- 
grad), after vigorously condemning any reform 
agitation, asserted, "In the higher governmental 
spheres . . . there is not the least thought of giv- 
ing 'radical' concessions." 

By wide circles of Russian thought, however, the 
dismissal of the Duma was keenly felt. Despite 



RUSSIA 197 

the iron censorship, expressions of dissatisfac- 
tion could not entirely be restrained. "The pro- 
rogation of the Duma," wrote the "Russkoye 
Slovo," "cannot but produce a most painful im- 
pression.' ' The Conservative "Kievlanin" re- 
marked pessimistically : ' l And so, those who have 
remained indifferent, who saw nothing and heard 
nothing, have pushed aside those who have been 
so responsive to the needs of the army, whose 
hearts bled for it. . . . Nothing can be added to 
this. The Government has assumed a terrible re- 
sponsibility. God grant that it may never regret 
this step." 

Russian papers printed abroad were much more 
outspoken. "This means," wrote the New York 
"Novy Mir," "that the Russian Government will 
continue to rule as hitherto, with the nagaika and 
the knout, disregarding the people's representa- 
tives and the demands of the various Russian or- 
ganizations and societies. As until now, the Gov- 
ernment will continue to kill every manifestation 
of popular self -activity. ... As hitherto, it will 
imprison or send to Siberia all those who dare 
to express dissatisfaction. It will continue to per- 
secute the Poles and the Armenians, and to stir 
up the dark, ignorant masses against the Jews. 
It will continue its policy of fanning the flame of 
race hatred by pitting one nation of the empire 
against another." 

Whether caused by the prevailing pessimism or 
due to other factors, the wave of social regenera- 
tion so pronounced at the beginning of the war 



198 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

was now obviously on the wane. This was par- 
ticularly true of the drink question. Although 
the sale of intoxicants was legally forbidden, the 
illegal distilling and sale of spirituous liquors 
was spreading at a prodigious rate. Most of this 
"moonshine" liquor was of distinctly inferior 
quality, and its consumption, together with crude 
substitutes like furniture polish, flavoring ex- 
tracts, and even wood alcohol, was seriously im- 
pairing the health of the people. Delirium tre- 
mens, deaths from alcoholic poisoning, and kindred 
ills, were shown by official reports to be rapidly 
increasing. In the spring of 1915, Dr. Novoselski 
wrote in the "Russki Vratch" (Petrograd) : 
i ' The constant rise in the mortality figures, which 
bears testimony to the growing numbers of con- 
sumers of different substitutes for vodka, shows 
that these are used, not only by confirmed drunk- 
ards, but generally by those classes who, before the 
prohibition law, used to drink moderately." A 
writer in the "Petrograd Ryetch" painted this de- 
cidedly gloomy picture of conditions in Western 
Russia: "The sun of sobriety has set before it 
reached the zenith. The first two months, drunk- 
enness was not really noticeable. In the villages 
the fact that the law came into force at the busy 
season contributed largely toward abstinence from 
drink. In the cities isolated cases of the use of 
poisonous imitations of alcoholic beverages ended 
so deplorably that there was a fair prospect of get- 
ting rid of incurable drunkards. But here the field 
work came to an end, the organism partly adapted it- 



RUSSIA 199 

self to the harmful imitations, partly adapted them 
to itself, and 'life entered upon its normal course.' 
The village folk had hardly time to wear out the 
boots in which they marched after the coffin of 
'the monopoly' when tens of thousands of illicit 
liquor distilleries, factories of all kinds of strong 
drinks, came into existence. It must be said that 
the fight against the producers of such drinks is 
being waged energetically. . . . But, in the place 
of those suppressed, new ones spring into exist- 
ence, and, besides, the manufacture of alcoholic 
beverages is being practised in private dwellings. 
. . . There also come reports that the village folk 
are becoming addicted to gambling, and that a 
passion for it is seizing the whole mass of peas- 
antry. In short, everything points to the fact that 
the sobering of the people cannot be accomplished 
by the simple discontinuance of the traffic in 
liquor. ' ' 

In the upper classes also, the stern enthusiasm 
of the early days seemed to have yielded to a less 
Spartan mood. Writing in the Petrograd "Lye- 
topsis ' ' in the summer of 1916, the noted Russian 
author, Maxim Gorky, remarked caustically upon 
the current wave of extravagance and high living. 
"Making big fortunes without any effort," he 
wrote, "these rogues display an almost patholog- 
ical yearning for pleasure and dissipation. The 
theaters and restaurants are full to overflowing. 
The jewelers are doing a roaring trade. There 
are some people who console themselves by the 
reflection that a similar orgy reigns both in the 



200 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

countries of our enemies and in those of our 
friends. These people should remember the wise 
Russian saying: 'A fool in a strange family is 
good fun; a fool in your own — a disgrace.' " 

It was during the period of depression and dis- 
content at the close of 1915 that voices began to 
be heard calling for peace. Outside of Russia, this 
peace movement has been usually termed " pro- 
German." That, however, is a very inadequate 
explanation. Unquestionably there are zealous 
pro-Germans in Russia, especially at the imperial 
court and among officials of Baltic Province Ger- 
man extraction. But these ' 'hyphenates' ' are in- 
fluential only because their feelings happen to 
coincide with the aims of powerful circles of genu- 
ine Russian opinion. 

These Russian peace advocates fall into several 
distinct categories. In the first place, most Re- 
actionaries and many Conservatives have never 
liked their country's alliance with liberal England 
and Radical-Socialist France. These people are 
not generally "pro- German." As a matter of 
fact, many of them hold Germans in personal 
detestation. Nevertheless, they have long believed 
that an understanding with the conservative Teu- 
tonic Powers would be Russia's best safeguard 
against a "Red" revolution which might plunge 
the backward, polyglot empire into hopeless chaos 
and disintegration. The rising tide of popular 
discontent which we have already noted simply 
confirmed both their fears and their convictions. 
Accordingly, they began boldly to speak their 



RUSSIA 201 

minds. A good example of this plain speaking is 
an utterance of M. Maklakov (minister of the in- 
terior at the outbreak of the war), before the con- 
gress of the "Right" (Conservative party), at 
Nizhni Novgorod in December, 1915. On that oc- 
casion M. Maklakov declared amid loud applause : 
"I am quite at a loss to understand why Russia 
ever went to war with Germany. Both states de- 
pend upon each other, and their historical de- 
velopment shows that they must live in close 
friendly relations." 

Another powerful element favoring a speedy 
end of the war is Russian "big business" — the 
great financial and industrial magnates of the em- 
pire. Russia's industries are recent, hot-house 
growths, created by Count Witte 's protective sys- 
tem and dependent upon high tariff walls for con- 
tinued existence. Furthermore, the Russian home 
market is still too backward to absorb even their 
present output. In order to ensure its present 
prosperity and future development, therefore, 
Russian industry feels that it must secure fresh 
protected markets and believes that such mark- 
ets are to be gained only by acquiring new pro- 
tectorates and "spheres of influence" in Asia. 
Once such Asiatic fields are safely inside the Mus- 
covite tariff wall, Russian industrial magnates 
see priceless markets for their output, while Rus- 
sian finance sees limitless profits in government 
contracts and concessions for the development of 
vast untouched natural resources. The regions 
especially desired for exploitation are Persia, 



202 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Mongolia, and Interior China. Toward the ac- 
quisition of Persia and Mongolia, the Russian Gov- 
ernment had, in fact, already taken long strides 
shortly before the outbreak of the European War. 
It is thus easy to realize the anger of Russian 
"big business" at the spectacle of national en- 
ergies lavished on a Western war which an un- 
derstanding with Germany would have conserved 
for the conquest of the fabulous East. 

Russian "big business" therefore forms one 
wing of the Eastern school of Russian imperial- 
ism. We have already seen how insistent the 
Easterners were becoming on the eve of the Eu- 
ropean War. The disastrous course of the strug- 
gle naturally gave them a splendid chance to say, 
"I told you so," and they were not slow to take 
advantage of their opportunity. Henceforth, the 
Russian peace party was to form a constant fac- 
tor in the background of contemporary Russian 
life, thus far unable seriously to influence the 
course of events but ready under favorable cir- 
cumstances to play a leading part. Their most 
notable achievement was the Russo-Japanese 
agreement of July 3, 1916. 

Meanwhile, the Western imperialists, most of 
the Intelligentsia, and the middle classes and peas- 
ants, remained zealous for war. But fresh disap- 
pointments were in store. By September, 1915, 
it is true, the great Austro-German "drive" into 
Russia was obviously at an end. Yet the victori- 
ous Teutonic legions were already massing for 
another campaign — a supreme effort to blast 



RUSSIA 203 

through Serbia and open a road to Turkey and 
the Near East. For Russia this was an alarm- 
ing prospect. It was primarily for the Balkans 
and Constantinople that she had entered the war. 
With both these points firmly in the Teutonic 
grasp, her hopes might be indefinitely postponed. 
At the beginning of the European War, Russia's 
Balkan hopes had run high. Serbia was of 
course with her from the first. Greece and Ru- 
mania both seemed ready to fall into line. It 
looked almost like a new " Balkan League" bring- 
ing a million fresh bayonets to the Allies and deal- 
ing death-blows to Turkey and Austria-Hungary. 
So, at any rate it appeared to Russian eyes. In 
the optimistic spring of 1915 M. Sazonov, minister 
of foreign affairs, had thus mirrored the Russian 
point of view: "A most happy day will dawn 
for us when the Balkan League is reestablished, 
the League of the Orthodox Balkan States. Rus- 
sian diplomacy is bending all its efforts to con- 
vince the Balkan nations of the necessity of mak- 
ing certain sacrifices for the sake of a higher aim. 
The Balkan nations must not forget the burdens 
which Russia has always borne and is bearing for 
their good. We are participating in this war in 
the name of the well-being and existence of one 
of the Balkan nations. Therefore sacrifices must 
be made by the Balkan peoples, too. No matter 
how painful that may be to them now, the results 
will compensate a hundredfold for all the sacri- 
fices, and will yield ample fruit for their common 
good." 



204 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Yet time passed, and the Balkan League did not 
materialize. The stumbling-block was obviously 
Bulgaria. Furious at her recent humiliation in 
the Second Balkan War of 1913 and inconsolable 
over lost Macedonia, Bulgaria refused to move an 
inch unless her national aspirations were first sat- 
isfied — a thing which her Serbian, Greek, and 
Ruman despoilers unanimously declared impossi- 
ble. Russia sharply reminded Bulgaria of her 
''duty to Slavism," but this Turanian cuckoo in 
the Slavonic nest merely answered tartly, as she 
had on previous occasions, that she did not care a 
fig for Slavism except in so far as Slavism co- 
incided with Bulgarian national interest. 

Thereupon adjuration gave place to threats, 
and Bulgaria was given plainly to understand how 
a victorious Russia would deal with a "Slav" na- 
tion which should be guilty of "race-treason." 
"I have begotten thee: I will kill thee!" ex- 
claimed the "Novoye Vremya," quoting the words 
of the Tolstoyan hero. And a little later it wrote : 
"Bulgaria cannot remain neutral at a moment 
when the * ancient oppressor of the Christian faith 
and all Slav peoples' has dared to raise a hand 
against the liberator. . . . The guilt of Bulgaria 
before Russia is great, but Russia will not remem- 
ber evil; she will even forget everything if the 
rulers of Bulgaria will now, even at this late hour, 
lead their people on the only road which lies be- 
fore them. But should Bulgaria commit such a 
hideous deed as to side with the Turk, her political 
existence would cease after the victorious conclu- 



RUSSIA 205 

sion of the war by Russia. Bulgaria is now given 
a last opportunity to realize her national hopes." 
Equally menacing was the attitude of the 
"Ryetch," which wrote: "Turkey is the enemy 
of Russia. Greece, like Serbia, may any day be- 
come the ally of Russia. If Bulgaria will continue 
to consider herself a friend of Turkey and an 
enemy of Greece and Serbia, what will she be 
with regard to Russia? . . . Upon the answer to 
this question — and a prompt answer at that — de- 
pends Bulgaria's whole future and national as- 
pirations." 

Bulgaria's answer was not long in coming, but it 
was of a nature quite the opposite of that awaited 
by the Muscovite press. Among this stubborn 
Bulgar folk, smarting under past wrongs and 
fanatically resolved to risk life itself in the at- 
tainment of national hopes, Russian threats 
merely awakened defiant fury. Accordingly, the 
Austro-German - drive" into Serbia in the 
autumn of 1915 saw Bulgaria throw off her neu- 
trality and link her destinies with those of the 
Teutonic Powers. There followed the utter ship- 
wreck of Russia's Balkan expectations. Greece 
refused to stir, Rumania did not move, and Ser- 
bia, abandoned to her fate, fell prostrate in the 
dust. Before the menace of Teutonic howitzers, 
the Anglo-French armies abandoned their precari- 
ous foothold at Gallipoli. Russia's dream of a 
speedy entry into Constantinople had vanished 
into thin air. 

The closing months of 1915 witnessed the nadir 



206 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

of Russian dejection. The brilliant capture of 
Erzerum in February, 1916, and the subsequent 
seizure of Trebizond, did much to restore self-con- 
fidence and hope. With all Turkish Armenia 
firmly in Muscovite hands, the Russian press began 
to talk of a speedy mastery of the Near East. 
After the capture of Trebizond, the "Petrograd- 
skiya Vyedomosti" asserted confidently: "We 
may consider one of our enemies finished. The 
taking of Trebizond has so disorganized the Turk- 
ish defensive that all that remains for her is to lay 
down her arms and ask for mercy. . . . Turkey's 
hour has struck, and it is not improbable that she 
will in the near future entirely disappear from 
the map. ' ' 

The extent of Russian hopes in the Near East 
may be judged from the claims now put forth in the 
Russian semi-official press to virtually all Asiatic 
Turkey, most of Persia, and an outlet to the In- 
dian Ocean on the Persian coast. This was obvi- 
ously an attempt to reconcile the Eastern imperial- 
ist school to a continuance of the war, since the 
acquisition of Asiatic Turkey and Persia might 
well induce the Easterners to forego their Mon- 
golian and Chinese aspirations. The Persian 
question, in particular, had long been actively dis- 
cussed in the Russian press. As early as the 
spring of 1915, the Petrograd "Novoye Zveno" 
had asserted: "The Persian question must be 
solved simultaneously with the French. The 
name of Russia and the sacred right of her clients 
must be sacred and inviolable in Iran. This must 



EUSSIA 207 

be established not on paper but in reality. If the 
Persians are not capable of understanding it them- 
selves, the fate of Turkey must overtake them." 
A year late, this rather vague talk had hardened 
into definite demands. In the early summer of 
1916, that leading Eussian economic thinker, Pro- 
fessor Miguline, wrote in the "Novy Ekonomist" : 
"Eussia must secure corresponding material com- 
pensations for the losses which she has incurred. 
It is time to give up finally her quixotic policy. 
Eussia has lost enough power and blood for for- 
eign interests and for foreign freedom. There is 
still a great deal too much talk to-day about the 
liberation of oppressed nationalities as the chief 
object. . . . But where can Eussia obtain corre- 
sponding compensations? Not on the Western 
frontier. Eussia must, therefore, have an outlet 
in Southern waters. She must secure the freedom 
of the Dardanelles, and an access to the Mediter- 
ranean not only by sea but by land. We must 
come to an arrangement with Great Britain to 
have an outlet to the Persian Gulf. England and 
Eussia must act together in Asia as in Europe. 
There must be no more talk of any 'area of con- 
flict' between the two countries. Asia Minor, 
Mesopotamia, Northern Persia, and the neutral 
zone of Persia must all be ceded to Eussia. When 
Eussia occupies the Dardanelles, Alexandretta, 
and the Persian Gulf, she will protect for England 
the way to India and to Egypt instead of threaten- 
ing it. ' ' Such utterances, of which Professor Mig- 
uline 's is merely typical, are symptomatic of the 



208 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

distinct cooling of Anglo-Russian cordiality which 
has been taking place for the past year. 

It must not be thought that Russian public opin- 
ion was centering its interest exclusively upon the 
Near East. Russia's Western problems were also 
much discussed, particularly the problem of Po- 
land. For some years previous to the war the 
Western imperialists had been striving to effect a 
Russo-Polish reconciliation on a Pan-Slav basis, 
and many Conservatives in Russian Poland, 
headed by the Polish thinker, Roman Dmowski, 
had met them half way, offering to give up the 
dream of Polish independence and accept local 
autonomy under the Tsar if Russia would agree 
to effect the annexation of Austria's and Prussia's 
Polish provinces to Russian Poland. To Roman 
Dmowski and his followers Germanism was the 
great stumbling-block to Polish reunion, and it was 
to them that the Grand Duke Nicholas 's proclama- 
tion of August 14, 1914, was especially addressed. 
The Polish Conservatives reciprocated in the most 
cordial fashion, their party manifesto expressing 
the hope "that the blood shed by the sons of Rus- 
sia in the struggle against the common enemy will 
cement the friendship of the two Slav races." 
And the Polish Conservative group in the Russian 
Duma stated: "Please God, Slavism, under the 
supremacy of Russia, will deal the Teutons such a 
blow as was dealt them at Griinwald five hundred 
years ago by Poland and Lithuania. May the 
blood we shall spill and the horrors of a war which 
for us is fratricidal lead to the reunion of the 



RUSSIA 209 

three portions of the sundered Polish people." 
The intensity of anti-German feeling among Polish 
Conservatives may be judged from the following 
open-letter of Professor Wincenty Lutoslawski: 
"The Prussians are Germanized Slavs, the mor- 
ally worst of their race, who have denied their 
ancestors through fear of force and have now 
themselves become the exponents of force. 
Gurkhas are noble troops of an ancient race who 
are glad to fight with such barbarians. . . . The 
Prussians are Northern Janizaries and are filled 
with the spirit of Islam — fury of destruction, 
predatory greed, breach of faith. . . . The parti- 
tion of Poland will be annulled after the war — 
we shall obtain not only all our lands that we 
possessed in 1771, but also Silesia and Pomerania 
and East Prussia. These we shall righteously 
govern, and in a single generation all the Ger- 
manized Poles who dwell therein shall reawake to 
their national consciousness." By this party the 
loyalism of the Galician Poles was severely repro- 
bated, and they were accused of treason to the 
cause of true Polonism. 

But the other Polish parties showed no such 
enthusiasm for the Eussian side. The popular 
groups were especially cool. They greeted the 
Grand Duke 's proclamation with eloquent silence, 
and later on even ventured to issue a manifesto 
declaring that in their opinion Nicholas's procla- 
mation was merely a strategic document, and that 
there was no other solution for the Polish question 
than the erection of Poland into a neutral buffer 



210 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

state. This was apparently the opinion of many 
Polish Conservatives as well. Count Charles 
Potulicki, president of the "Pro Polonia" Com- 
mittee, issued a statement maintaining that for the 
future peace of Europe there must be an inde- 
pendent Polish state as a barrier between Pan- 
Slavism and Pan-Germanism. "Placed between 
Russia and Prussia — those two incarnations of ex- 
pansive, aggressive nations," he wrote, "the Poles 
have always been, and always will remain, refrac- 
tory alike to the blandishments of Pan-Slavism and 
the threats of Pan-Germanism." 

The effect of Poland's attitude upon Russian 
public opinion was a varied one. At first, the 
strong Pan-Slav and anti-German statements of 
the Polish Conservatives were taken to represent 
the sentiments of the whole Polish people and 
naturally evoked great enthusiasm. Popular sub- 
scriptions were started throughout Russia to aid 
the numerous Polish refugees fleeing before the 
early Teutonic invasions of Russian Poland, and 
the Russian press asserted that these were but the 
outward tokens of lasting Russo-Polish fraterni- 
zation. "When we saw how all classes of Polish 
society united for the defense of our common wel- 
fare," wrote the Petrograd "Ryetch"; "when we 
saw with how firm a belief in the coming of the 
promised future our Polish brothers advanced to 
meet it, we could not help feeling that that some- 
thing so dismal and fatal which has separated us 
for so long is now melting, that the misunderstand- 
ings and prejudices of the past are disappearing, 



RUSSIA 211 

and that we are becoming nearer and dearer to 
each other, not only in thought, but also in feel- 
ing." 

In Russian Poland, however, this Muscovite en- 
thusiasm aroused a certain amount of uneasiness. 
Many Poles feared lest the Russians were misread- 
into Polish approval of the struggle against Ger- 
manism an abandonment of Polish ideals and a 
readiness to be absorbed into the stream of Rus- 
sian life. Such persons did not fail to disabuse 
the Russians of their error. For example, the 
Warsaw "Dziennik Polski" remarked warningly: 
1 ' Old sins cannot be blotted out by an outburst of 
compassion nor by the most generous financial as- 
sistance. Russian patriots take too superficial a 
view of our sympathy with the Russian army if 
they see in it a proof of our union with the Rus- 
sian people. . . . The Poles are fighting for Rus- 
sia in this war, but they have not changed their 
fatherland. A Russian victory would be in the 
interest of Poland, and the present conduct of the 
Polish nation is influenced by the hope of future 
autonomy. Russian publicists must not see in it 
any proof of a desire for-tinion with Russia." 

Such utterances, especially when coupled with 
the bitterly anti-Russian attitude of the Austrian 
Poles, rapidly cooled the warmth of Russian en- 
thusiasm for their Polish relatives. Meanwhile, 
in Poland, a corresponding process of disillusion- 
ment was going on. In his proclamation of 
August, 1914, the Grand Duke Nicholas had made 
many promises such as, "A United Poland under 
the scepter of the Russian Tsar, . . . free in her 



212 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

religion, free in her language, and free in her self- 
government. ' ' But as month after month passed 
by and no modification of the existing oppressive 
regime materialized, the Poles began to clamor 
for a redemption of the Russian promises, recit- 
ing their heavy sacrifices and asserting that these 
merited an immediate reward. But all that the 
Russian authorities could be induced to grant was 
a restricted measure of municipal self-government, 
while the Russian imperialist press told the Poles 
that this concession — which was not to take effect 
till 1916 — was all that Poland could expect in the 
immediate future. "About further reforms,' ' 
wrote the "Novoye Vremya" in the spring of 
1915, "it will be time enough to speak in the days 
when the general hopes of victory over the com- 
mon enemy are crowned with complete success.'' 
Among the Poles this produced lively dissatisfac- 
tion and pessimism. One of the Polish deputies 
to the Duma wrote dejectedly in the Petrograd 
1 ' Ryetch " : * ' The Duma in general has not shown 
any interest in the Poles. But what individual 
political groups have expressed augurs little good. 
In September they framed a project of a real 
political union ; in October they spoke about Polish 
autonomy with legislative chambers; in Novem- 
ber about the possibility of administrative self- 
government ; and in December they already found 
that 'more or less' self-government must suffice." 
So things stood when, in the summer of 1915, 
the Austro-German armies expelled the Russians 
from Poland and took possession of the country. 



EUSSIA 213 

Under the circumstances, it was scarcely surpris- 
ing that the invaders met with little popular op- 
position and were even greeted with some sporadic 
enthusiasm. The Teutons' strenuous endeavors 
to reorganize Poland and their wide concessions to 
Polish national feeling, culminating in their formal 
establishment of a Polish state in the autumn of 
1916, aroused much uneasy comment in Eussia. 
In the summer of 1916 the Moscow "Eusskoye 
Slovo" admitted frankly: "In the Polish cities 
self-government has been introduced; the Polish 
language is used in the courts to a very great ex- 
tent; Polish children are studying under a na- 
tional educational system, at the head of which is 
the University of Warsaw; Polish cultural and 
educational institutions which had been closed by 
the Eussian authorities have renewed their activi- 
ties. The Germans are trying by every means to 
win the Poles over to their side, and they have 
chosen the right course for it." After the Aus- 
tro-German proclamation of a restored Polish 
state the noted Eussian Liberal, V. A. Maklakov, 
wrote in the Petrograd "Eyetch": "I know not 
how the Poles will regard the new act. But, in 
any event, it will be hard for us to blame them. 
. . . We must recognize that we are guilty of 
much, that we ourselves helped the Germans to 
deceive the Poles. Our guilt is in the fact that 
after the Grand Duke's manifesto we behaved as 
if desiring to show that it should not have been 
taken seriously. We not only did not begin to 
elaborate the plans for the future restoration of 



214 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Poland, but even forbade the use of the word 
autonomy in this connection. We covered our- 
selves with eternal shame by our administration 
of the region. We allowed an opportunity to pass 
us which can not be returned." Other Russians, 
however, did not display such broad generosity. 
A second writer in the same journal sternly warned 
the Poles of the consequences of * l treason." 
"Those Poles," he wrote, "who from the very be- 
ginning of the war banded themselves together of 
their own free will into Polish legions and fought 
side by side with the Germans against the French, 
English, Belgian, Serbian, and Russian soldiers, 
are traitors to the cause of democracy and human- 
ity. And should Poland's independence be 
bought, in the case of German victory, at the price 
of such treason, then — finis Polonice!" 

So stands the Polish question at this present 
hour. The solution of the thorny problem obvi- 
ously depends primarily upon the fortunes of 
war. 

This Russian uneasiness over the Polish ques- 
tion was only one phase of the gathering cloud of 
gloom and pessimism which overshadowed the em- 
pire toward the close of 1916. The hopeful feel- 
ings evoked by the conquest of Turkish Armenia 
in the spring, reinforced by the successful Galician 
"drive" in June, and still further strengthened by 
Rumania's adhesion to the Allies at the beginning 
of September, were rudely dissipated by Ru- 
mania's rapid collapse under the powerful Teuton 
counter stroke. Public confidence was still further 



RUSSIA 215 

undermined by the internal situation. The Intel- 
ligentsia and the workingmen of the towns were 
increasingly exasperated by the Government's re- 
actionary measures, while the war-party was 
alarmed by the growing activity displayed by the 
partizans of a separate peace, especially during 
the premiership of Boris Stunner. 

So loud grew the cry of discontent that the 
Duma was again summoned, and after stormy 
scenes Premier Sturmer was forced to resign at 
the end of November, 1916. How serious was the 
crisis may be judged from Russian press comment 
which not even the censorship was able wholly to 
keep down. For example, the Moscow "Russkiya 
Vyedomosti ' ' wrote : ' ' We do not live in a time of 
political crisis in the ordinary sense of the word, 
but in a time much more serious — a crisis which 
touches the whole life of the empire. . . . The 
Government does not believe in the same measures 
as do the people. In this lies the greatest internal 
danger. This cannot go on longer. Without 
harmony between the Government and the country 
we cannot be victorious or preserve our internal 
life from disorder. Only a public-spirited and 
responsible ministry will be able to hold back the 
empire from the precipice. ' ' 

The fall of Premier Sturmer was unquestionably 
a Liberal victory. But the tragi-comedy of the 
year before was soon repeated. Encouraged by 
their success, the Liberal groups in the Duma pro- 
ceeded to further attacks on the ruling regime, 
while terrorism also made its appearance, notably 



216 PEESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

in the assassination of the mystic reactionary 
Gregor Rasputin. The political weakness of 
Russian Liberalism was now, however, again 
shown. The Conservatives and Reactionaries 
quickly closed ranks and without encountering 
any effective opposition installed a new cabinet 
under Prince Golytzin, a reactionary of the purest 
water. The present Government is apparently 
the most reactionary in years. Its probable policy 
may be gaged from the oft-quoted saying of Pre- 
mier Golytzin: "The Duma will keep quiet as 
soon as it gets a beating." How Russian Liberal- 
ism regards the new Government is shown by the 
caustic comments of the New York "Novy Mir." 
Toward the end of January, 1917, this radical or- 
gan wrote : "It seems to us that the appointment 
of Golytzin is the end of all attempts at deception. 
By this act the ruling Russia threw a challenge 
to the popular masses. A notorious reactionary, 
an open enemy of the people and of any progres- 
sive movement, Golytzin will not be able to put on 
even temporarily a mask of virtue. He will be 
from the first day an enemy with whom the people 
will have to struggle fiercely. That this will be 
so, his first declaration shows: 'Everything for 
the war, everything for victory. We cannot now 
think of internal reforms. ' Clear and outspoken ! 
No hope for the alleviation of the condition of the 
one hundred and seventy millions of Russia's pop- 
ulation which is groaning under the yoke of con- 
stables, district police captains, governors, and 
plain untitled but dread personalities. As before, 



RUSSIA 217 

the people will be robbed; as before, the people 
will helplessly starve. ' ' 

Such is the state of affairs in Eussia to-day — a 
situation obviously uncertain and capable of vio- 
lent fluctuations. For the world at large, the mat- 
ter of immediate importance is the question of a 
separate peace. Here, however, party lines are 
much mixed. The Imperialists, who include 
nearly all the upper and middle classes besides 
such special categories as the army, the bureau- 
cracy, and the Church, continue to be sharply 
divided into the Western and Eastern imperialist 
schools : the predominant Westerners resolved on 
war to the knife, the powerful Eastern opposition 
urging withdrawal from the war and an under- 
standing with the Teutonic Powers. The Intel- 
ligentsia, embracing most Liberals and a few Rev- 
olutionists, are strongly for continued war, both 
out of hatred of Prussianism and liking for the al- 
liance with the Liberal Western Powers. The 
revolutionary workingmen of the towns are 
divided, some following the Intelligentsia, others 
desiring peace in order to start an immediate rev- 
olution and dreading lest a Russian victory might 
so increase the Government's prestige that a suc- 
cessful revolution would be thenceforth impossible. 
The peasants are still mostly for war through 
hatred of the Niemetz (the German) and fanatical 
hopes of gaining Constantinople, the Orthodox 
"Holy City." Under these tangled circum- 
stances, prediction is impossible. Very likely the 
outcome will depend upon the course of the pend- 



218 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

ing military operations. Allied successes in the 
coming campaign would naturally entrench the 
war-party in its hold upon the Government and 
keep Russia in the European struggle. Allied dis- 
asters might so strengthen the peace-party that 
they would come to power and engineer a Russian 
withdrawal from the war. 

Assuming that Russia escapes revolution and 
emerges from the war without serious territorial 
losses, what will be the Russian popular temper 
toward foreign nations'? This also is a complex 
question. The Intelligentsia are, and will con- 
tinue, warmly cordial toward England and France. 
But the Intelligentsia form only a fraction of the 
Russian people, and the prevailing popular senti- 
ment is an increasing dislike of all foreigners. 
France, to be sure, is regarded with a slightly 
patronizing sympathy, "Poor little France" being 
a common phrase. But pro-English feeling, never 
widespread in Russia, is rapidly decreasing all the 
time. The great imperialist classes unite in dis- 
like and distrust of Britain. The Westerners feel 
that she will certainly oppose those acquisitions 
of Asiatic Turkey, Persia, and an outlet on the 
Indian Ocean on which they have set their hearts 
fully as much as upon Constantinople; the East- 
erners know she will try to block that partition of 
China foreshadowed by the recent treaty with 
Japan. Hence, Britain is regarded as a future 
enemy. 

The current English cult of things Russian is 
viewed with cynical amusement. Toward the 



RUSSIA 219 

close of 1916 the noted Russian journalist, M, 
Zhukovski, wrote in the "Russkoye Slovo": 
"Once again the deluge has come; all England is 
flooded with books about Russia. It has rained 
not 40, but 440 days, and the downpour still goes 
on ; and who shall say what will happen if this phe- 
nomenon continues? Here, for instance, we read 
of 'Glorious Russia'; in another book about 'Con- 
temporary Russia'; elsewhere of 'Armed Russia'; 
here is 'Friendly Russia,' and so on they go. No 
one in the world has ever been so infatuated with 
us as the English are at present. ' ' 

Regarding future relations with Germany, it all 
depends upon whether one takes the long or the 
short view. To-day, many influential sections of 
Russian opinion desire peace and understanding 
with the Teutonic Powers. But any lasting Russo- 
German friendship is impossible. The two peo- 
ples are utterly unsympathetic by nature and re- 
gard each other with mutual hatred and contempt. 
Those very Easterners now so ardently working 
for a Russo-German entente wish it solely in order 
to safeguard their western border, keep down do- 
mestic disaffection, and thus concentrate Russia's 
energies for the mastering of Asia. That done, 
they would eagerly join their imperialist comrades 
against the "Rotten West." Upon the brow of 
Russian imperialism burns ever Pobiedonostsev's 
trenchant dictum: "Russia is not a State: it is a 
World!" 



CHAPTER VII 

THE BALKANS 

THE Balkan peoples are victims of a com- 
mon mania, the "Great Idea." The "Great 
Idea" means the "reunion" of all the members of 
a particular Balkan race into a single state, and 
since these races are widely scattered and inter- 
mingled, the political union of any one of them 
would imply the erection of a powerful ' ' empire, ' ' 
dwarfing all the others to a position of hopeless 
inferiority. The realization of this fact makes 
all the Balkan peoples ready to fight each other's 
imperialistic aspirations to the death. 

The driving power behind these aspirations 
comes from the peculiar circumstances of Balkan 
history. In the Middle Ages the Balkan peoples 
fought one another much as they do to-day, and 
during this long period each of them gained a 
transient Balkan supremacy. Then came the 
Turkish conquest, which involved them all in a 
common ruin. For centuries they lay helpless 
beneath the Turkish yoke. But Turkish dominion 
bore within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. 
Most terrible of conquerors, the Turks were the 
poorest of assimilators. They remained a mere 
Asiatic army camped on European soil and never 
succeeded in Ottomanizing or Islamizing their 

220 



THE BALKANS 221 

Christian subjects. Therefore, when the Turkish 
flood began to recede from the Balkans about a 
century ago, the old landmarks reappeared virtu- 
ally unchanged and the Christian Balkan peoples 
resumed their old national lives once more. 

They "resumed" their national lives. Note 
that well. It is the key to the whole story. The 
Balkan peoples are not "young," as most Western 
observers think. They are very old; in fact, so 
many Rip Van Winkles aroused from a long sleep 
with all their medieval racial characteristics and 
national aspirations virtually unchanged. For 
them the last five centuries have been a dream — 
or a nightmare. One thing only do they remember 
— their glorious pasts; and they are each deter- 
mined that their special past shall live again. Of 
course they clothe their thoughts in modern speech 
— " rights of nationalities," "race unity," etc.; 
but the basic ideas are those of the medieval long 
ago. This comes out clearly in their rival claims 
to Balkan dominion. Because a province belonged 
to a certain medieval Balkan empire it must go 
to the particular state which to-day bears the 
same name, and since some districts have belonged 
to all those empires in turn, the rival claims form 
a veritable Grordian knot severable only by the 
sword of war. Truly, among these peoples "a 
thousand years is but a day ' ' ! 

The arrested development of the Balkan races 
shows not only in their national aspirations but 
also in the whole popular temper. Among the 
educated elite, to be sure, there are as cultured 



222 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

gentlemen as any in the world, but the popular 
masses are thinly veneered barbarians with the 
virtues and vices belonging to that stage of human 
evolution. Generally good-natured, honest and 
hospitable in peace times, these primitive natures 
are yet capable of volcanic outbursts of boundless 
fanaticism and savage cruelty. Also, these trans- 
formations occur with a suddenness and intensity 
unknown among more developed peoples. 

All this gives the key to the inner significance of 
the great Balkan upheaval of 1912-13. In 1912 the 
Christian Balkan states at last succeeded in com- 
bining against the hereditary Turkish enemy. But 
no sooner was the battle won than the victors quar- 
reled hopelessly over the spoils. There followed 
the Second Balkan War — a ferocious race-struggle 
which resulted in the despoiling and humiliation 
of Bulgaria, hitherto the leading Balkan nation, by 
the other Balkan peoples. The Treaty of Bucha- 
rest which put an end to the war was an attempt 
permanently to kill Bulgaria's aspirations and 
to surround her with a ring of aggrandized and 
watchful enemies. To this end, Serbia, Rumania, 
and Greece concluded an anti-Bulgarian entente, 
while Greece and Serbia signed a special treaty 
mutually guaranteeing each other's Macedonian 
possessions against Bulgarian attack. 

The so-called " Peace" of Bucharest was thus no 
peace. It was merely a whetting of knives. In 
anticipation of the next war, all parties began to 
consolidate their recent territorial gains by the 
process known as "extirpation." This process 



THE BALKANS 223 

consisted in the rooting out of hostile racial minori- 
ties from the freshly conquered territories, thus 
attempting to make race lines correspond to politi- 
cal frontiers and to assure the fanatical loyalty 
of the whole future population within any given 
state border. The ruthlessness with which these 
readjustments were conducted scandalized the out- 
side world and enormously envenomed Balkan 
race hatreds. The wretched victims of ' * extirpa- 
tion" streamed into their respective motherlands 
by the hundred thousand and there sowed broad- 
cast the seeds of fury and revenge. Each Balkan 
people swore to crush the accursed foe and erect 
its special "Great Idea" upon his ruin. 

Such was the miasma of unslaked hatreds and 
gnawing desires which poisoned the Balkan pen- 
insula at the outbreak of the European War. 
Since these terrible conditions were so largely re- 
sponsible for the occurrence and course of Arma- 
geddon, it will be necessary to examine the various 
Balkan peoples in detail. 

A. SERBIA 

Serbia is emphatically a land of great expecta- 
tions. Its people, a primitive race of swineherds 
and small yeomen, do not appear exactly "empire- 
builders" to the casual eye. Yet the Serbs are a 
most curious compound: they are pig-raisers and 
poets at one and the same time. Preeminently do 
they possess the "Slav" temperament — mystic, 
dreamy, rather inefficient under normal circum- 
stances yet capable of fanatical energy beneath the 



224 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

spur of an idea. And the Serb idea — the inevitable 
" Great Idea" of a Balkan people — is certainly- 
grandiose enough. Its kernel is that " Empire of 
Stephen Dushan" which bowed the Balkans be- 
neath Serb hegemony five hundred years ago. 
But, like kindred Balkan aspirations, the Serb 
Great Idea clothes itself in the modern doctrine of 
nationality. And the Serb sees his race brethren 
both widely scattered through the Balkan penin- 
sula and occupying the whole southwest portion 
of Austria-Hungary as well. Hence, the Serb 
great idea is a Pan-Serb or "Yugo-Slav" Empire 
which shall not only revive the Balkan hegemony 
of Stephen Dushan but shall also absorb all those 
Serb, Croat, and Slovene populations of Austria- 
Hungary which never knew Dushan 's sway. 

Such has long been Serbia's ambitious dream. 
But, like their Russian cousins, the Serb imperial- 
ists although united on the ultimate end, disagreed 
as to the means. The hope of absorbing Austria- 
Hungary's Yugo-Slav provinces was so remote 
that many Serbs believed in cultivating the good- 
will of their mighty northern neighbor and thus 
gaining Austria 's assent to possible Balkan acqui- 
sitions at the expense of the declining Ottoman 
Empire. This was the "Austrophile" doctrine 
which inspired Serbia's foreign policy under the 
Obrenovitch kings, Milan and Alexander, down to 
1903. 

In 1903, however, this Austrophile policy came 
to a dramatic end. King Alexander then fell be- 
fore a military conspiracy which placed upon the 



THE BALKANS 225 

throne Peter, head of that rival Karageorgevitch 
dynasty which had struggled for supremacy with 
the Obrenovitch throughout modern Serbia's 
troubled history. And Peter represented the sec- 
ond school of Serb imperialism which looked to 
Russia as Serbia's protector and hoped for the 
speedy realization of a Pan-Serb Empire built 
upon Austria-Hungary's ruins. This school's im- 
mediate inspiration of course came from the Rus- 
sian Pan-Slavists, who saw in Serbia the chosen 
instrument of Russia's Balkan supremacy. The 
1903 revolution had Russian backing, and the ap- 
pointment of M. Hartwig, the stormy petrel of 
Muscovite diplomacy, as Russian minister to Bel- 
grade, betokened what might be expected in the 
near future. 

Alarmed at the prospect, Austria did everything 
possible to break Serbia's rising spirit, but this 
merely intensified anti-Austrian feeling and drove 
the Serbs still closer into Russia's arms. There- 
upon Austria threw down the gauntlet by annexing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the treasured "first step" 
of Serb imperialism. Serbia was wild with dis- 
appointed fury, but beneath the German ultimatum 
Russia had to counsel submission. Henceforth, 
however, the Austro-Serbian feud was avowedly to 
the death. The Serbs made no concealment of 
their determination to disrupt Austria for the 
erection of a Pan-Serb Empire, while Austria but 
waited the chance to destroy her irreconcilable foe. 
The seditious Pan-Serb propaganda carried on in 
Austria's Yugo-Slav provinces became an increas- 



226 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

ing menace to Austria's future, and it was a fa- 
natical Pan-Serb secret society, the ' ' Narodna Od- 
brana," which encompassed Archduke Franz- 
Ferdinand's assassination at Serajevo. 

The frenzied condition of Serbian public opinion 
during the years preceding the European "War 
becomes clear from Serbian press-comment and 
utterances of representative Serbians at that time. 
On October 8, 1910, the second anniversary of Aus- 
tria 's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Belgrade "Politika" wrote, "Europe must take 
note that the Serbian people still thirst for re- 
venge/' And the "Mali Journal" exclaimed be- 
tween black mourning borders : ' ' The day of ven- 
geance must arrive ! The feverish efforts of Ser- 
bia to organize her army are a token of this 
accounting to come, as is the hatred of the Serbian 
people for the neighboring monarchy. ' ' In April, 
1911, the "Politika" wrote: "The annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered 
even the semblance of friendship between Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary. This every Serbian feels. ' ' 
In this same year M. Protitch, a prominent Serb 
politician, declared in the Serbian parliament: 
"Peace and good relations will never exist between 
Serbia and Austria-Hungary until the latter shall 
have renounced all pretensions of being a great 
Power and shall have resigned itself to being the 
Switzerland of the East. " While a little later the 
noted Serbian diplomat, Chedo Mijatovitch, de- 
clared: "The national Serbian program, to the 
realization of which all parties in Serbia are work- 



THE BALKANS 227 

ing, comprises the annexation of all territories in- 
habited by Serbians, whether belonging at this 
moment to Austria or to Turkey." 

Serbia's double triumph in the Balkan wars 
naturally roused Serbian ambitions against Aus- 
tria to an even higher degree. In the spring of 
1913, the "Balkan" (Belgrade) wrote: "War be- 
tween Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. 
We have dismembered the Turkish Empire; we 
shall likewise rend Austria asunder." And in 
October, 1913, the "Piemont" exclaimed: "Ser- 
bian soldiers have vowed that they will proceed 
in a similar way against the 'Second Turkey' as 
they have by God 's help dealt with the Turkey of 
the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident that 
the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey 
has disappeared. The good God of Serbia will 
grant that the 'Second Turkey' shall also disap- 
pear." "Serbia incites the Austro-Hungarian 
Serbs to revolution," admitted the "Zastava" of 
April, 1914; "Austria has lost all rights of exist- 
ence," asserted the "Pravda" of the same date; 
while in their Easter issues, most Serbian papers 
joined in expressing the common hope that their 
"unliberated, conquered, and oppressed brethren 
may soon celebrate a glad resurrection." 

Very instructive in this connection is the testi- 
mony of the celebrated English traveler, Mary E. 
Durham. Writing in the "London Nation" of 
April 10, 1915, Miss Durham, who probably knows 
Serb lands more intimately than any other West- 
ern observer, writes thus of her experiences in 



228 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Serbia and its twin Montenegro during the Balkan 
wars: "They (the Montenegrin officials) cer- 
tainly most explicitly stated that it was the inten- 
tion of the Serb peoples to set Europe on fire, and 
that they should begin in Bosnia. But this was not 
an isolated case. Peter Plamenatz, minister of 
foreign affairs, told me frequently that the Serbs 
made a great mistake in not fighting Austria in 
1908. It was a common boast that Cattaro could 
be taken in twenty-four hours. The assault by the 
Serbs on the Austrian consul at Prizren was at 
the time represented to me as a direct attack on 
Austria, and Austria was greatly jeered at for 
being afraid to go to war then. Serb as well as 
Montenegrin officers talked freely about their next 
war (which was to be with Austria). Marching 
to Vienna and setting Europe on fire were some of 
their favorite topics of conversation. ' ' 

Such being the desperate and fanatical state of 
Serbian public opinion, the effect of the Serajevo 
tragedy can be imagined. To be sure, the Ser- 
bian Government prohibited the use of violent 
language, but Serbian press comment teemed with 
thinly veiled exultation and covert sneers at Aus- 
tria 's ' ' hopeless ' ' plight. It is also not surprising 
that Serbia, backed up by Eussia, rejected Aus- 
tria's ultimatum. 

The long-expected war with Austria excited gen- 
eral enthusiasm. The only regret, expressed in 
certain circles, was that the war could not have 
been temporarily postponed. "We Serbians," 
wrote Chedo Mijatovitch in a message to the Eng- 



THE BALKANS 229 

lish public in late August, 1914, "did not wish for 
this war at present. After two bloody wars we 
wanted peace and rest to recuperate : time to or- 
ganize newly annexed countries, to create and 
train an army of 600,000 soldiers. We wanted at 
least five years. ' ' To most Serbians, however, the 
presence of Eussia, England, and France as their 
allies presaged certain and speedy victory. 

Serbia was still further heartened by the striking 
failures of the Austrian invasions during the au- 
tumn of 1914. Curiously enough, their first ap- 
prehensions arose, not from the menace of their 
foes, but from the conduct of their allies. The 
Entente 's negotiations with Italy in the spring of 
1915 and Italian demands for Austria-Hungary's 
Adriatic coast aroused anger and alarm in Serbia. 
The Serbian Government conceded Istria to Italy, 
despite the Slovene hinterland of Trieste, but Ser- 
bian public opinion unanimously demanded all the 
remaining Austro-Hungarian coast, both as essen- 
tially Yugo-Slav country and as the indispensable 
sea-frontage for the projected Pan-Serb Empire. 
Italian claims to Dalmatia were scouted with es- 
pecial indignation. The Allies' secret agreement 
of April 25 with Italy, concluded without Serbia's 
knowledge or assent, evoked ill-suppressed wrath. 
On June 20, 1915, the Serb Premier Pashitch de- 
clared in parliament that "the question of Dal- 
matia would be settled after the war," thus serving 
formal notice that his government did not pro- 
pose to give the April agreement its assent. M. 
Pashitch 's utterance acquired added significance 



230 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

from an article published in the official Serbian 
organ " Samouprava ' ' about this same time. 
"Dalmatia," stated this obviously inspired ar- 
ticle, "is not Italian. It is geologically, historic- 
ally, and ethnologically Serbo-Croatian. If Italy 
wishes to share fraternally with Serbia the Adri- 
atic Sea on the shores of which live 700,000 Slavs 
as against 18,000 Italians, Serbia will be greatly 
pleased and will not fail to cultivate what the 
ancient Italian civilization shall have left behind 
as a heritage. But Serbia will not consent to hav- 
ing this Slav land pass from Austrian domination 
to another domination — that of Italy. ' ' 

The tone of non-official journals was even more 
emphatic. "Italy has decided to make traffic of 
her sympathies and sell her warlike cooperation," 
wrote the Belgrade "Politika" acidly. "The cry, 
'What am I offered V alone inspires Italian policy. 
. . . The saddest thing in this whole business is 
that we are to serve as the object of the bargaining. 
England and France, who, in the name of the 
Triple Entente, carried on the negotiations with 
Italy, consent to concessions at the expense of Ser- 
bia and of South Slavism. Serbia asks no aid of 
Italy. She does not need to. All the more is she 
not ready to cede an inch of Yugo-Slav territory. 
If the Triple Entente is reduced to calling for 
Italian assistance, let it pay the necessary price 
out of its own pocket. It possesses territories 
enough of which it can dispose. Let it not violate 
others' rights. Savoy, Corsica, Malta, Tunis, Al- 
geria, Asia Minor, and Egypt could serve perfectly 



THE BALKANS 231 

well as compensation for Italy. We are perfectly 
convinced that this Italian policy of extortion is 
not in the least agreeable to the Triple Entente and 
that the latter would agree only against its will to 
such compensations extorted by force. We are 
also persuaded that Italy would one day bitterly 
regret it. But it is only right and just that he who 
believes that he must grant compensations should 
take them out of his own property. We have no 
need of Italy. Consequently, we wish to make no 
sacrifice for an assistance that we do not request. 
Istria and the Dalmatian coasts are Slav and will 
remain Slav. Any attempt to upset the estab- 
lished order might give rise to new complications 
and new conflicts of incalculable extent. Let the 
Triple Entente and Italy take that for certain!" 
This categorical refusal to yield Italy even Trieste 
represented a powerful body of Serbian public 
opinion, and did much to still further envenom 
Serbo-Italian relations. 

The dispute with Italy was by no means settled 
when Serbia's sensibilities were still further ruf- 
fled by another move of her allies. The summer of 
1915 witnessed the Entente's persistent attempt 
to win Bulgaria to its side, but Bulgaria at once 
answered that the price for her aid would have 
to be that supremely desired land of Macedonia for 
which Bulgaria had fought the Balkan wars and of 
which she considered herself foully robbed at the 
Peace of Bucharest. The Bulgarian thesis was 
that the Macedonians were thoroughly Bulgar in 
blood and speech, and that Bulgaria could never 



232 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

rest until these race brethren were reunited to the 
motherland. The justice of this contention was ac- 
knowledged by influential sections of British and 
French public opinion which urged their Govern- 
ments to put pressure on their Serb ally to sat- 
isfy Bulgaria's aspirations and thus assure a re- 
constituted Balkan League which would ensure 
Austria's speedy collapse and thereby richly re- 
ward Serbia's sacrifice by giving her all southwest 
Austria-Hungary. 

This line of reasoning, however, did not in the 
least appeal to Serbian predilections. Serbia 
flatly denied that the Macedonians were Bulgars, 
asserting that they were true Serbs, temporarily 
misled by Bulgarian propaganda but now fast be- 
coming good Serbs under Serbian rule. Further- 
more, most Serbians claimed that Macedonia was 
vital to the political and economic future of their 
country. In fact, they believed that all Mace- 
donia should have gone to Serbia right down to 
Salonika and the ^Egean Sea, and only the feud 
with Bulgaria had prevented a quarrel with the 
Greeks over the possession of Salonika and the 
lower Vardar Valley. The full extent of Serbian 
aspirations came out clearly in the arguments 
which Serb writers now adduced in the foreign 
press to convince their Western allies of the jus- 
tice of their contentions. In the Paris "Revue 
Hebdomadaire" of April 10, 1915, the Serb pub- 
licist, J. Cvijic, asserted: "Our country is com- 
posed of two great valleys, the Morava and the 
Vardar, which cut across the Balkans from north 



THE BALKANS 233 

to south, from Belgrade to Salonika, without any- 
distinct partition line. This gives to Serbia the 
seal of an almost perfect geographical unity.' ' 
And a little later, a prominent Serb politician, 
Costa Stoyanovitch, wrote in the "Nuova Anto- 
logia" (Rome): "Macedonia does not even be- 
long to Bulgaria geographically, while with Serbia 
it forms a geographical unity. The valley of the 
Vardar, the principal Macedonian river, is only the 
continuation of the Serbian valley of the Morava. 
Thus it is the main line of communication between 
the Danube and Salonika. . . . Hence, for Serbia, 
the cession of Macedonia is not equivalent to part- 
ing with a contiguous province, without the pos- 
session of which she could continue undisturbed 
her national life. ... In fact, this province, not 
only because of its resources and its economic 
value, but also because of its geographic position, 
is the most important Serbian province." 

Despite these Serbian contentions, the Entente 
Powers did urge Serbia to promise Bulgaria, not 
all Macedonia but the districts west of the Vardar 
River. However, even this relatively slight con- 
cession aroused bitter opposition in the Serbian 
press. The "Novosti" (Belgrade) exclaimed de- 
fiantly: "Serbia prefers to disappear as a state 
rather than accept such a renunciation of its lands. 
That is what the Government should declare to the 
Entente instead of convoking the Skupshtina ! ' ' 

The Serbs were, however, not called upon to 
make this sacrifice. Bulgaria rejected the pro- 
posed compromise as utterly inadequate, and when 



234 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

in September, 1915, the Austro-Germans began 
their great Balkan ''drive" Bulgaria joined the 
Teutonic Powers and struck savagely at the hated 
Serb foe. The Serbians resisted with the cour- 
age of despair, but the odds were too great and the 
struggle was soon over. The flower of the Serbian 
people fell in battle or perished during the awful 
retreat across the snow-clad Albanian Mountains. 
Only a hardy remnant reached the waiting Entente 
ships on the Adriatic shore and were carried away 
into exile. Before the year was out tiny Montene- 
gro also fell, and the Serb states had disappeared 
from the roster of the world's nations. 

Whether they will reappear depends upon the 
fortunes of war. Should the Teutonic Powers 
maintain their present Balkan grip, it is unlikely 
that an independent Serbia will ever be restored. 
The most probable outcome at this writing appears 
to be a straight partition between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria, Bulgaria taking the mixed 
Serbo-Bulgar populations of Macedonia and south- 
ern Serbia, Austria-Hungary taking the pure 
Serb populations of the north. In that case, with 
forbearance and constructive statesmanship, the 
still plastic Serb stock would in all probability ulti- 
mately fuse with the closely kindred Bulgarian and 
Croatian cultures. 

Of course all this is cruel tragedy for the Serbs 
— but it is the way of the world. For many years 
Serbia frankly aspired to be the "Balkan Pied- 
mont" and worked to disrupt Austria-Hungary in 
order to build from its ruins a great Yugo-Slav 



THE BALKANS 235 

Empire. For both states the issue was thence- 
forth one of life and death, and in such implacable 
duels the loser must pay the ultimate forfeit. 

B. BTJLGABIA 

Modern Bulgaria is one of the most extraor- 
dinary phenomena of human history. Although 
the Bulgarians played a leading part in Balkan 
politics during the Middle Ages, building up two 
powerful empires, the Turkish conquest of the Pen- 
insula bore harder upon the Bulgars than upon any 
other Balkan people. So thoroughly was the na- 
tional organization destroyed that forty years ago 
the Bulgarians were an obscure population of 
wretched serfs, exploited to the limit of human 
endurance, whom the world had so completely 
forgotten that many Western travelers passed 
through their land without becoming aware of their 
existence. 

The Eusso-Turkish War of 1877 freed the Bul- 
gars from the Turkish yoke and restored their 
national entity. In less than ten years Bulgaria 
was the most powerful Christian Balkan state, and 
this primacy she steadily increased down to the 
late Balkan wars. 

This almost miraculous creation of something 
out of nothing implies a very unusual national 
character, and a brief study of Bulgarian national 
psychology reveals the secret of Bulgarian success. 
One thing is clear from the first: the Bulgarians 
are not true Slavs. Your typical Slav, whether 
he dwell on the Russian plains or the Serbian hills, 



236 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

is an idealist, prone to lose sight of hard facts 
in day dreams. Capable of great accomplishments 
when under the stimuli of his enthusiasms, in or- 
dinary times the Slav is an easy-going, improvi- 
dent, open-handed person, essentially likable, but 
lacking that practical characteristic — efficiency. 
How different the Bulgarian ! Restrained, sober, 
dour; with occasional outbursts of passion, but 
usually taking even his pleasures sadly ; intensely 
practical and hard-headed ; without a trace of mys- 
ticism ; frugal to the point of avarice ; so solicitous 
about the future that this frequently becomes an 
obsession; above all, possessed of a dogged, plod- 
ding, almost ferocious energy translating itself 
normally into unremitting labor — such is the folk. 
"The Bulgar on his ox-cart," says the national 
proverb, "pursues the hare — and overtakes it." 

This individual character-sketch omits one trait 
possessed by Bulgarians in preeminently high de- 
gree — capacity for sustained team-play. Now im- 
agine this people fired by the typical Balkan Great 
Idea, and you begin to understand how Bulgaria 
rose from nothing to Balkan primacy in less than 
ten years. 

And that Great Idea? It was, first, the reunion 
of the whole Bulgarian race from the Black Sea to 
the Albanian Mountains, and from the Danube to 
the iEgean. Then, invincible in its dominant cen- 
tral position, this "Big Bulgaria" would force the 
other Balkan peoples to acknowledge its hegemony. 
Finally, a united Balkan Christendom would expel 
the Turk from Europe and seat a new Bulgarian 



THE BALKANS 237 

Empire at Constantinople, always significantly- 
known to Bulgarians as ' ' Tzarigrad, ' ' the ' ' City of 
the Tsars. " Grandiose almost to absurdity ap- 
peared this ideal of the devastated little peasant 
state created in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin. 
But, if Bulgaria's dreams were great, her waking 
hours were long, and all were given up to strenu- 
ous endeavor and rigid self-denial. These high 
hopes became part of the national consciousness. 
They braced every Bulgar to gigantic efforts. The 
way Bulgaria pinched and starved herself for 
near forty years to create proportionately the 
greatest war-machine in the world showed this 
folk to be possessed of a somber power and fero- 
cious energy which made the goal seem less im- 
practicable. 

Then at last the hour seemed to have struck. In 
the Balkan wars Bulgaria cast the die — and lost. 
Not from lack of courage or fighting ability, but 
through a league of all her Balkan neighbors egged 
on by her traditional friends, Bussia and France. 
The moral effect was terrible. The foreigner can 
hardly realize the half -insane fury which then set- 
tled down in those morose, half-savage hearts. 
Forced to sit idly by and watch the hated Serb 
root out Macedonian Bulgarism by one of the 
most ruthless persecutions known to history, their 
strong-man's agony grew, and grew, and knew no 
rest. How the Serb was regarded is shown by this 
popular Bulgarian war-song composed just after 
the Peace of Bucharest: "We took your hands 
as brothers, but hell lurked in your hearts ! Invet- 



238 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

erate brigands, who have trampled under foot 
honor, altar, and good-name; you have despoiled 
us without shame ! You have soiled the temple of 
our country! Inhuman demons, hiding crime in 
your souls; you are the creatures of wickedness 
and fury! We remember all, and savagely shall 
we avenge your satanic plans, your accursed 
envy!" 

"Vengeance !" That was the watchword. 
"Vengeance and victory !" From Tsar Ferdi- 
nand down to the humblest peasant boy, the Bul- 
garian people made no secret of their determina- 
tion to tear up the Bucharest treaty and seize 
Macedonia at the first opportunity, or die in the 
attempt. The first step was a reconciliation with 
the hereditary Turkish foe. Before the year 1913 
was out, a close Turco-Bulgarian entente had 
cleared the way for future action. 

Then came the European War. How Bulgarian 
popular sympathies would go was perfectly clear 
from the first. Serbia, the arch-enemy, was fight- 
ing the Entente 's battles. Greece, the well-hated, 
and Eumania, the abhorred, were Entente sympa- 
thizers. Russia and France, the false friends, 
made up two of the three Entente Powers. How, 
then, could Bulgarian patriots wish for Entente 
success I Russian talk of ' ' Pan-Slavism ' ' and ap- 
peals to the "Little Brothers of the South" were 
laughed to scorn. The Bulgarians knew well who 
was Serbia's sponsor, and knew equally well who 
had egged on Rumania to stab them in the back 
in the Second Balkan War. Long before the Eu- 



THE BALKANS 239 

ropean struggle, most Bulgarians had renounced 
not only Eussia but their very Slavism as well. 
"Call us Huns, Turks, Tartars, but not Slavs!" 
cried a prominent Bulgarian shortly after the 
Peace of Bucharest. And in November, 1913, the 
great patriotic organization "Narodni Savetz," 
headed by Premier Eadoslavov, had passed this 
resolution: "The Bulgarian people must break 
with this ideal, so false and fatal for us — the ideal 
of Slav fraternity." Many Bulgarians recalled 
with pride their partial descent from Finno-Turk- 
ish nomads who had conquered the primitive Bul- 
garian Slavs more than a thousand years before, 
and the famous Bulgarian poet, Cyril Khristov, 
had set the fashion by calling himself a "Tartaro- 
Bulgar." Therefore, when the European War 
broke out, Eussian advances were rejected with de- 
fiance. "Slavism is a fatal barrier to our power 
and our national enthusiasm," stated Dr. Ghen- 
nadiev 's organ i i Volia ' ' in late August, 1914. ' ' It 
is high time for us to shed that error and stop 
preaching such a lie. ' ' 

Bulgarian resentment likewise leaped up hotly 
against France. France had shown herself more 
hostile to Bulgaria than had Eussia during the 
Second Balkan War, and it was an open secret that 
M. Delcasse, French minister of foreign affairs, 
had advocated the permanent ruin and partition of 
Bulgaria in order to erect a more powerful Serbia 
and Eumania against Austria and a Greater 
Greece against the Levantine aspirations of Italy. 
All this the Bulgarians remembered, and their 



240 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

anti-French feeling expressed itself in strictures 
like that indited by Professor Petkov of Sofia Uni- 
versity in the early autumn of 1914. In this bro- 
chure, Professor Petkov wrote: "An heroic 
struggle is unfolding before our eyes : the healthy 
and powerful German culture battles with the rot- 
ten French culture which, condemned to death, 
tries to drag down with it all the peoples of Eu- 
rope. Present-day France is nothing but a dis- 
gusting sewer which taints the air of Europe. The 
healthy German culture has revolted against her, 
for Germany wishes to conquer a free field for its 
development. On the other side, German culture 
has to struggle energetically against Russian bar- 
barism which, for ten centuries, has tended solely 
to become the powerful despot and oppressor, as 
well by its own peculiar development as by the 
progressive development of others. At the pres- 
ent hour, France, intellectually degenerate and 
depopulated, struggling against the powerful Ger- 
man culture, has for ally Russia, barbarous and 
benighted. ' ' 

The strong pro-German sentiments expressed in 
Professor Petkov 's pamphlet were typical of the 
great mass of the Bulgarian people. Tsar Ferdi- 
nand and the Bulgarian Government, to be sure, 
maintained an attitude of even-handed neutrality, 
but Bulgarian public opinion made scant conceal- 
ment of its sympathies. At the outbreak of the 
war, the noted Bulgarian poet, Cyril Khristov, ded- 
icated an impassioned ode "To Germania, ,, end- 
ing : " Ah ! How I love to see thee march victo- 



THE BALKANS 241 

riously forward to the conquest of that place in 
the world which is thy due !" "For us, one thing 
is certain," exclaimed the Sofia "Trgowinski 
Vjestnik" exultantly in the autumn of 1914, "the 
two powerful allies, Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary, are invincible!" In the Christmas, 1914, 
number of the Vienna "Reichspost," M. Momt- 
chilov, Vice-President of the Bulgarian Parlia- 
ment, wrote: "A strong Bulgaria is indispensa- 
ble for Austria-Hungary. Every Bulgarian knows 
that Eussia, in seeking to occupy the Dardanelles, 
becomes thereby, ipso facto y the enemy of Bulgaria. 
At this critical hour the Bulgarian Government is 
energetically sustained by the people, which ac- 
claims with enthusiasm the Austrian and German 
victories and sees in them the hope of its own 
existence. The Bulgarian people to-day desires an 
unconditional rapprochement with the great Cen- 
tral Powers, it thirsts for their high 'Kultur,' and 
sincerely desires the harmonizing of their political 
and economic interests. Russia's efforts to gain 
us by her rubles has failed. The Pan-Slavist com- 
edy may still serve the gentlemen at Petrograd as 
an excuse for sumptuous banquets, but for us it 
has gone out of fashion. If, notwithstanding, 
Russian policy should dare to violate our neutral- 
ity, then Russia would run upon our bayonets." 

Russia's determination to get Constantinople 
roused deep anger and alarm throughout Bulgaria. 
Most Bulgarian papers asserted that this would 
mean the death of Bulgarian independence, and 
a prominent Bulgarian politician wrote boldly to 



242 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the Petrograd "Novoye Vremya": "Sazonov's 
declarations on the subject of the Straits and Con- 
stantinople have profoundly agitated all Bulgarian 
patriots. Each of us would sacrifice his life rather 
than permit Russia to seize Constantinople. All 
Bulgaria would resist as one man this scheme of 
Russian chauvinism. In fact, we consider that our 
duty is to range ourselves on the side of the Turks 
to defend Constantinople against the expansionist 
ambitions of Russia." 

Under these circumstances, Russian menaces, 
instead of cowing Bulgaria, merely fanned the ex- 
isting Russophobia to even fiercer flames. The 
great Austro-German "drive" against Russia 
which began in June, 1915, roused the undisguised 
jubilation of the Sofia press. The semi-official 
"Kambana," usually so moderate in tone, wrote: 
"Russia, which longs to extend her domination 
over Constantinople and the Straits, cannot permit 
a big Bulgaria to arise in the Balkans. She in- 
tends to make Bulgaria a Russian province. For 
this reason we denounce as high treason the at- 
tempts made by certain persons among us to favor 
Russian influence. Russia must take her hands off 
the Balkans and devote her energies to Asia. It is 
to this end that the German and Austro-Hungarian 
armies are fighting to-day. Therefore, let us hail 
their efforts with enthusiasm and wish them a 
decisive victory. The hour is propitious for con- 
juring forever the Russian peril which threatens 
our existence. ' ' And after the fall of Warsaw the 
famous Bulgarian military critic, Vasili Angelov, 



THE BALKANS 243 

wrote: " Every true Bulgarian must rejoice in 
the collapse of the Eussian armies. The joy we 
now feel is as keen as was our grief when, two 
years ago, Orthodox Russia treacherously loosed 
against Bulgaria a pack of wolves to rend us. 
May God aid the brave Austro-Hungarian and 
German hosts to beat the Russian armies into the 
dust and hurl them into their own swamps, so that 
they may never again disquiet Europe and the 
Balkans by their savage and rapacious instincts. ' ' 

Such being the state of Bulgarian public opin- 
ion, it is not strange that Entente efforts to win 
Bulgaria to the Allied cause ended in failure. In 
fact, it is probable that the Bulgarian Government 
had already decided upon its future course of ac- 
tion, though it cleverly maintained its neutrality 
until the proper moment for action arrived. That 
moment came when the Austro-German ''drive" 
into Serbia began in September, 1915. There- 
upon Bulgaria threw off the mask, leagued herself 
with the Teutonic Powers, and struck Serbia down. 

The great bulk of the Bulgarian people greeted 
their Government's decision with frank satisfac- 
tion. "Since the interests of Bulgaria coincide 
with the interests of the Central Powers," wrote 
the "Kambana," "the enemies of Austria and 
Germany are the enemies of Bulgaria also. An 
alliance between Bulgaria and the Central Powers 
will realize our aspirations more than any other 
alliance. We are too weak to fight the Great Pow- 
ers. But with the diplomatic and military aid of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary we can very easily 



244 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

and successfully fight against the little states 
which have so criminally robbed us." This popu- 
lar satisfaction was greatly enhanced by the sub- 
sequent course of events. A few short autumn 
weeks saw Macedonia, the promised land, wholly 
in Bulgaria's grasp, saw the hated Serb prostrate 
in the dust, saw Bulgarian armies pouring through 
the Albanian hills and halting only on the distant 
shores of the Adriatic Sea. Such triumphs this 
sober folk had fashioned only in its wildest 
dreams. And still further Bulgarian triumphs 
were in store. Rumania's adhesion to the Allies 
in September, 1916, enabled Bulgaria to settle ac- 
counts with another one of her Balkan enemies. 
The Silistrian province, filched away in 1913, was 
swiftly reconquered, and Bulgarian regiments tri- 
umphantly entered the Rumanian capital, Bucha- 
rest. 

These things have all tended to draw Bulgaria 
still closer to her allies. In the summer of 1916, 
the President of the Bulgarian Parliament thus 
elucidated the deep-going roots of Teuton-Bulgar 
solidarity: "Our evolution against Russian in- 
fluence would in all probability have come to ma- 
turity earlier if Germany had paid more heed to 
us and less to Turkey. But she at last discerned 
where her interest lay and became our close friend. 
Austria has never ceased to be that. We, the di- 
rectors of Bulgaria 's policy, were well aware, when 
the great war broke out, that we would take a 
hand in it. But we had to wait, because we were 
not ready, and because we were exhausted by the 



THE BALKANS 245 

Second Balkan War. Besides, we were so foolish 
as to wait and see what the results of the first 
campaign would be, although it was certain that, 
be they what they might, we would never take 
sides with the Entente. If the fortune of war had 
decided otherwise than it did, we would simply 
have waited for Germany's revenge to take part 
in it by her side with all our strength." 

Bulgarian public opinion heartily favors the 
Teutonic plan of ' ' Central Europe. ' ' In the early 
autumn of 1916, the "Narodni Prava" (Sofia) 
wrote: "This scheme interests Bulgarians very 
particularly. During the Eussophil phase they 
made an attempt to ally themselves economically 
with the Entente Powers, but they soon perceived 
that they were on the wrong track and that their 
interests linked them naturally to the Central Em- 
pires. For the Eussians have no industries, and 
our raw stuffs can find no markets in their coun- 
try, whereas we have German industry at our 
doors, which can absorb all our produce and work 
for us cheaply. It is probable that the Sobranje 
will shortly be called upon to vote a law depriving 
for all time the subjects of the Entente states 
from access to Bulgarian markets." 

All this shows how irrevocably Bulgaria has 
linked her destinies with those of the Central Pow- 
ers. For her there is, indeed, no turning back. 
With the exception of Italy, the Entente nations 
have vowed vengeance, and an Entente triumph 
would spell Bulgaria's reduction to permanent 
impotence if not her complete annihilation. But 



246 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

even supposing the Allies willing to leave Bulgaria 
her frontiers of 1913, this would mean the relin- 
quishment of Macedonia to a restored and power- 
ful Serbia. It would also mean Bulgarian ac- 
quiescence in a Russian annexation of Constanti- 
nople, with the consequent nipping of Bulgaria 
between these two aggrandized and vengeful Slav 
Powers. To Bulgaria, at present enjoying the re- 
alization of her dearest hopes, such a future would 
be worse than death. Respecting Macedonia, es- 
pecially, Bulgaria's attitude is exactly that of a 
she-bear standing over her newly rescued cubs. 
She will face national death rather than abandon 
her Macedonian children. This hard, dour, indom- 
itable folk has deliberately chosen the path of tri- 
umph or downfall. 

C. GREECE 

Greece is preeminently the home of the ''Great 
Idea." The aspirations of the other Balkan peo- 
ples never stray much beyond the Peninsula, but 
the Hellenic hope is truly imperial in its far-flung 
horizons. Heir to perhaps the most glorious of 
human pasts, the modern Greek burns to emulate 
his ancestors and fervently awaits the advent of 
a mighty morrow. 

The Hellenic Great Idea is a revival of the glor- 
ies of ancient Hellas and the medieval Byzantine 
Empire, incarnated in a new Greek Empire seated 
at Constantinople which shall embrace the Balkans 
and Asia Minor and win back the whole Near East 
to Hellenism. The intensity of these Greek aspi- 



THE BALKANS 247 

rations has been strikingly portrayed by Professor 
Andreades of the University of Athens. Writing 
of the Greek longing for Constantinople, he says : 
"For the Greeks, Constantinople is the 'Polis,' 
'Urbs/ "The City,' which, from Constantine the 
Great to Constantine XI (A J). 323-1453), unit- 
ing the Hellenic cities and provinces into a nation, 
permitted them alone to survive among all the na- 
tions of Antiquity. It is the true historical cap- 
ital of Hellenism." 

In 1914 the hopes of the Greeks flamed high. So 
extraordinary had been their successes in the pre- 
ceding years that further steps toward the reali- 
zation of the Great Idea seemed reasonably as- 
sured. Of all the parties to the late Balkan wars, 
Greece had come off the best. With a minimum 
of loss, Hellas had doubled its territory and had 
almost doubled its population. Salonika and Ka- 
valla, after Constantinople the richest of Balkan 
prizes, were in Hellenic hands, and the "Great 
Greek Island," Crete, had been finally reunited 
to the motherland. The internal situation also 
promised well. Greek finance was at last upon a 
sound footing, while factionalism, that historic 
curse of the folk, had been at least temporarily 
subdued. Under the twin guidance of a popular 
monarch and an able statesman, the Greek people 
looked unitedly forward to a happy future. 

True, the horizon was not entirely free from 
clouds. The very amplitude of Hellenic interests 
involved corresponding perplexities. To the 
north lay the dark lower of the Bulgar, brooding 



248 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

over his wrongs and dreaming of revenge. To the 
east simmered a chronic feud with the Turk, re- 
calcitrant at the loss of his ^Egean isles and 
alarmed at the aspirations of his numerous Greek 
subjects in Asia Minor for reunion with the Hel- 
lenic homeland. Even the Greco-Serbian alliance 
was a mariage de raison, concluded through fear 
of the common Bulgar foe and capable of tragic 
dissolution if ever Serb yearnings for Salonika 
should get the upper hand. With two of the great 
European Powers, also, Greece was not upon the 
best of terms. Russian designs upon Constanti- 
nople imperiled the ultimate goal of the Hellenic 
Great Idea, while even more troublesome for the 
immediate future was the state of Greek relations 
toward Italy. Ever since Italy's seizure of 
Rhodes and the iEgean Archipelago of the Dode- 
kanese in 1912, Greco-Italian relations had been 
strained, and since this was but one phase of a 
rivalry which extended over both the southern 
Adriatic and the whole Levant, Greco-Italian rela- 
tions showed every prospect of becoming worse in 
the years to come. Still, Greece's hopes so out- 
weighed her anxieties that the summer of 1914 
found Hellas in an optimistic mood. 

The outbreak of the European War evoked a 
wave of pro-Ally feeling throughout Greece. For 
Russia there was naturally but little sympathy, 
but for the other two Entente Powers, France and 
England, the Greek people felt an almost filial 
veneration, the traditional Philhellenism of the 
Western Powers having laid the Greeks under a 



THE BALKANS 249 

deep debt of gratitude. Furthermore, their Serb 
ally was fighting on the Entente side. Toward 
Germany there was no antipathy and some liking, 
but Austria had never been Greece 's friend, while 
Turkey and Bulgaria, obviously potential allies of 
the Teutonic Powers, were Greece's bitterest foes. 
For all these reasons, therefore, the hearts of the 
overwhelming majority of the Greek people were 
with the Allies, and the popular enthusiasm was 
patently shared by the powerful Greek Premier, 
Eleutherios Venizelos. 

Until February, 1915, Greece was little affected 
by the war. In that month, however, the Anglo- 
French fleet began its bombardment of the Dar- 
danelles, and the Allies, confident in their hold 
upon Greek sympathies, asked the Hellenic Gov- 
ernment to furnish an army to supplement the 
naval attack. Premier Venizelos and a majority 
of the Greek people favored compliance with the 
Allies' demands, especially since these were 
coupled with glowing if rather indefinite promises 
of territorial rewards in Asia Minor. King Con- 
stantine, however, together with most of the Greek 
generals and statesmen, declared that the sending 
of an adequate army to the Dardanelles would so 
weaken Greece's northern border as to invite a 
Bulgarian invasion, and accordingly refused to 
grant the Allies' request. 

This refusal w T as a great shock to Allied antici- 
pations. The Entente Powers had counted upon 
Greek assistance almost as a matter of course, 
and this unexpected upset to their plans aroused 



250 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

both astonishment and indignation. In France 
and England the Greeks were accused of base 
ingratitude and even of pro-Germanism. This 
greatly alarmed the Greeks. To many Hellenes, 
the favor of the Western sea-powers was for 
Greece literally a matter of life and death which 
must on no account be lost. Therefore these per- 
sons, including Venizelos, asserted that Greece 
must throw herself unreservedly into the sea-pow- 
ers ' arms, trusting to their gratitude to reward 
her devotion and chancing temporary risks. To 
others, however, notably the King and the army 
leaders, the possibilities of a Turco-Bulgarian in- 
vasion were so terrible that they considered that 
war must at all costs be avoided unless the Allies 
should transport to the Balkans an army adequate 
for the protection of Greece. Should Greece now 
throw in her lot with the Allies and then be left 
unsupported at the crucial hour, her doom was 
sealed. 

This difference of opinion rapidly split the 
Greek people into two increasingly hostile fac- 
tions, one headed by Venizelos, in favor of join- 
ing the Allies; the other, headed by the King, 
clinging to neutrality. Matters were rendered 
still worse by the fact that the lines of cleavage 
ran sharply according to geographical situation 
and economic interest. The islands and port 
towns, which were prospering greatly by the war, 
yet whose prosperity was of course entirely at 
the mercy of the sea-powers, were for Venizelos 
and war. The peasantry everywhere showed it- 



THE BALKANS 251 

self averse to fighting and supported the King in 
his neutralist policy. Macedonia in particular, 
exposed as it was to the full brunt of all possible 
foreign complications, was almost solid for peace. 
Thus the Greek people divided, not by individuals 
but by communities, and the old Greek spirit 
of local faction soon did the rest. Before long 
Hellenic solidarity had vanished in bitter partisan 
strife. 

These dissensions were still further envenomed 
by the conduct of the Allies. Greece's failure to 
live up to their expectations had made the En- 
tente Powers all the more anxious to win over 
Bulgaria, and in early August, 1915, the Allies 
went so far as to offer Bulgaria certain Macedon- 
ian districts belonging, not only to Serbia but to 
Greece as well. This astounding diplomatic action 
aroused mingled terror and anger in Greece. All 
Greeks, without distinction of party, maintained 
that the integrity of both the Greek and Serbian 
frontiers of Macedonia was an absolute necessity if 
Salonika was to be safeguarded against the Bul- 
garian peril. Yet here were the Allies, without 
so much as a "by your leave," offering Bulgaria 
the very things which Greece considered vital to 
her existence ; territories of which, so far as Greek 
Macedonia was concerned, they had not the slight- 
est right to dispose. However, the two Greek par- 
ties construed the matter in very different fash- 
ions. The Venizelists asserted that this was only 
one more proof of what Greece had to expect by 
defying the Entente Powers and urged instant 



252 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

junction with the Allies to avert worse misfor- 
tunes. The Royalists, on the other hand, main- 
tained that this was convincing evidence that the 
Allies regarded Greece as a mere tool to be used 
and then thrown aside, and concluded that Greece 
could on no account trust herself blindly to such 
unscrupulous Powers. So great was their de- 
spairing rage that many Royalists began to look 
toward Germany as a possible savior, and Greek 
newspapers commenced to use language which 
would have been unthinkable a year before. ' ' The 
English are despots, despite their pretended love 
of liberty!" cried the "Nea Himera" of Athens. 
"This infernal plot against the territorial integ- 
rity of Greece: behold the work of England!" 
exclaimed the "Embros." "While the "Nea 
Alithia" of Salonika wrote: "After Serbia, it is 
the turn of Greece. Now that Russia and Italy 
have sufficiently proved their voracious appetites 
to the detriment of our interests, it seems to us that 
it is high time to ask ourselves if Greece really 
ought to seek a place among the Entente Powers. 
Frankly, no: for where the wolves gather, there 
lambs who wish to live had better stay away. The 
small nations, particularly Greece, should there- 
fore turn their eyes toward Germany, the enemy 
of Russia and Italy, those two implacable foes of 
Hellenism. ' ' 

The Austro-German "drive" into Serbia in Sep- 
tember, 1915, brought the Greek internal crisis 
to a head. Premier Venizelos prepared to stand 
by Serbia, but King Constantine, declaring that 



THE BALKANS 253 

in the absence of adequate Allied support Greece 
would thereby merely share Serbia's inevitable 
fate, refused to enter the war. Venizelos resigned, 
and the King thereafter dissolved the Venizelist 
Parliament and appointed a neutralist ministry to 
take charge of the country. 

Things now went rapidly from bad to worse. 
The Allies, realizing that they had nothing to hope 
from the Royalist Government, proceeded to vio- 
late Greek neutrality at will, seizing the greater 
part of Greek Macedonia and using the Greek 
islands precisely like Allied territory. The Royal- 
ist Government, sinking into furious despair, be- 
came more and more Germanophile, actually turn- 
ing over a Macedonian border fortress to the Ger- 
mans in May, 1916. The domestic schism ended 
in civil war, Venizelos fleeing from Athens in the 
autumn of 1916 and establishing a revolutionary 
government at Salonika under the Allies' protec- 
tion. The Greek islands mostly declared for 
Venizelos, and Greek Macedonia, being under Al- 
lied rule, naturally followed suit, but continental 
Greece stood by the King. 

This, however, meant that the Venizelist revolu- 
tion had failed, and since the embittered Royalists 
were now frankly looking to the Germans, the 
Allies regarded them as open enemies, to be dealt 
with as such. The Teutonic conquest of Rumania, 
however, made the crushing of the Royalists a dan- 
gerous matter. The Allies therefore attempted to 
accomplish their purpose by a gradual disarma- 
ment of the Greek forces, backing up their de- 



254 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

mands by a naval blockade of Greece which threat- 
ened that sterile land with starvation. Such is 
the situation which still persists after several 
months of the blockade. Formal war between 
Greece and the Allies has been avoided, although 
severe armed clashes have taken place. Greece 
is reduced to the direst extremity, many persons 
having actually died of hunger. Nevertheless, 
King Constantine still refuses to disarm, and the 
mainland Greeks continue to support their sov- 
ereign. How the crisis shall end it is at present 
impossible to foretell, nor for the general Eu- 
ropean situation does it greatly matter, Greece 
having ceased to be of any considerable political 
or military importance. 

But, however matters turn out, and however 
the war shall end, the plight of unhappy Greece 
remains deplorable. The future of Hellenism, so 
bright a scant three years ago, is to-day en- 
shrouded in impenetrable gloom. To-day, Greece 
has virtually ceased to exist as an independent, 
self-sustaining nation. Half her territory is in 
foreign hands, and, what is even worse, her sons 
are split into irreconcilable factions whose fanat- 
ical hatreds inhibit national solidarity and may 
yet forfeit the entire Hellenic race-heritage. 

D. BUMANTA 

In many ways Rumania differs fundamentally 
from the other Balkan states. Serbia and Bul- 
garia are basically peasant democracies, with no 
large cities or industrial centers and with prac- 



THE BALKANS 255 

tically no social stratification. They are thns na- 
tions of small yeomen, intensely self -conscious and 
able to make their voices heard in the management 
of their respective countries. Greece, though so- 
cially more complex, is politically much the same. 
All Greeks, whether townsmen, sailors, fisherfolk, 
or peasants, are keenly alive to the questions of 
the day and determined to have their say in the 
guidance of Hellas ' destinies. 

In Eumania, however, this is far from being the 
case. Eumania is socially still in the Middle Ages. 
Its scheme of life is positively feudal in character. 
At the apex of the social pyramid stands a class 
of high-born landed proprietors, known as 
"Boyars"; beneath lies a great peasant mass, 
poor, uneducated, often mere landless agricultural 
serfs upon the great Boyar estates. A middle 
class hardly exists. What in Eumania passes by 
that name consists of a recent mushroom-growth 
of officials, professional men, and numerous as- 
pirants for those coveted posts and preferments. 

In the economic life of their country the native 
Eumanians take little part. Merchants, manu- 
facturers, bankers, shopkeepers, even the skilled 
artisans, are nearly all foreigners of various kinds. 
As in the medieval Europe, the numerous Jews 
form a caste apart, largely parasitic in character, 
persecuted and despised. 

Another peculiarity of Eumania is the extraordi- 
nary role played by its capital city. It used to be 
said that Paris was France. It is certainly true 
that in most things Bucharest is Eumania. Large 



256 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

as all Rumania's other towns put together, 
Bucharest, with its 350,000 people, prides itself 
upon being a center of light and leading in an ocean 
of benighted rusticity — "The Paris of the East." 
Here live the great aristocratic families, people of 
the highest refinement, who prefer the gay, mod- 
ern life of the capital to the monotony of their 
huge estates, abandoned to foreign or Jewish over- 
seers. Hither flock all the bright young men who 
wish to carve out a career in the political, profes- 
sional, or literary worlds. 

Under these circumstances we must be very 
careful to understand what is meant by Rumanian 
"public opinion." Especially in foreign politics, 
this means the opinion of the landed aristocracy 
and the educated elite of the towns, particularly 
Bucharest. Here the Rumanian peasant simply 
does not count. Accustomed from time immemo- 
rial to do the Boyars' bidding, he leaves such ab- 
struse matters to the birth and brains of Bucharest. 
Only one thing vitally interests him — land. He 
wants land for himself and his extremely large 
family; he wants to be freed from his oppressive 
dependence upon the Boyar and his harsh foreign 
overseer; he wants to get out of the clutches of 
the Greek, Jew, and Armenian peddler-usurers 
who infest the countryside and suck his very life- 
blood whenever his improvident habits lure him 
into debt. Only ten years ago a terrible peasant 
rising threatened Rumania with social dissolution. 

High above this volcanic discontent, Bucharest 
plays the game of politics with temperamental 
passion and artistic abandon. There are more 



THE BALKANS 257 

politics to the square inch at Bucharest than in 
any other city in the world — which is saying a 
great deal. Also, Eumanian politicians have 
palms unusually receptive to concrete ''argu- 
ments ' ' — which is saying even more. Altogether, 
it is safe to say that Eumania's actions are de- 
termined more by " politics" and less by popular 
feeling than any other country in Europe. 

Examining the viewpoint of the one portion of 
the nation whose opinion does carry any weight 
with the ruling politicians — the educated elite of 
Bucharest, we find its attitude singularly complex. 
The educated Eumanian is inspired by the normal 
Balkan ''Great Idea" — the reunion of the entire 
race into a "Greater Eumania," hegemon of the 
Balkans and arbiter of its destinies. The idea is 
far-reaching, for the population of the present 
kingdom of Eumania numbers less than eight mil- 
lion souls, whereas the Euman race totals fully 
fourteen millions. The union of this extremely 
prolific folk within the bounds of a single state 
organism would make Greater Eumanian almost a 
first-class Power. 

But the path of Greater Eumania is beset by 
formidable difficulties. Very few of the "unre- 
deemed" Eumans dwell in the small Balkan states 
to the south ; the vast majority live under the rule 
of Eumania's mighty neighbors to east and west 
— two millions in the Eussian province of Bes- 
sarabia, three and one-half millions in the Austro- 
Hungarian provinces of Bukovina and Transyl- 
vania. Since neither Austria-Hungary nor Eussia 



258 PEESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

would voluntarily surrender these provinces, 
Rumania's sole chance is to seize territory from 
one or the other during a moment of Austrian or 
Russian weakness. Furthermore, little Rumania 
would obviously have to ally herself with one of 
her giant neighbors in order to dismember the 
other. 

For this reason the European War, which so 
aroused Rumanian irredentist hopes, divided 
Rumanian imperialists into two camps, one urg- 
ing a Russian alliance, the other a league with Aus- 
tria-Hungary. The problem was, however, com- 
plicated by the disagreeable fact that should 
Rumania be so unlucky as to pick the losing side, 
the winner would probably overrun even the pres- 
ent Rumania and do away with it altogether. 

Thus torn between their hopes and fears, the 
Rumanian imperialists promptly split into a vio- 
lent pro-Ally faction under the leadership of M. 
Take Jonescu, and an equally violent pro-Teutonic 
faction headed by MM. Carp and Marghiloman, 
which factions long battled to sweep Rumania into 
the war on their particular side. 

Rumanian propagandist literature is both copi- 
ous and picturesque, but to quote from it would 
serve no useful purpose because it does not repre- 
sent ultimate realities. Rumania's decision was 
determined, not by the pressure of public opinion 
but by the secret machinations of great nobles and 
prominent politicians, and the activity of these 
Rumanian leaders was, in turn, largely determined 
by clandestine pressure from the rival Great 



THE BALKANS 259 

Powers, including the wholesale use of bribery and 
corruption. 

The inside story of Rumania 's entrance into the 
war cannot now, if ever, be told. The important 
point to be noted is that the conduct of her armies 
after intervention revealed with ominous clearness 
the unhealthy bases of Eumanian national life. 
The Rumanian military machine creaked badly 
from the start and ultimately went to pieces. The 
officers' corps, loaded down with political generals, 
could not lead ; the commissariat was full of graft ; 
and the peasant soldiers, poverty-stricken and in- 
terested only in land reform, fought without en- 
thusiasm. 

However the war shall end, Rumanian imperial- 
ism has been dealt a blow from which it may never 
recover. During his long reign the late King 
Carol, by his diplomatic ability and dynastic con- 
nections, gave Rumania a political importance not 
warranted by intrinsic facts. The bubble of 
Rumanian prestige has now been pricked by the 
sharp sword of war. Should she recover full in- 
dependence, Rumania will have to rebuild her shat- 
tered state edifice upon far sounder and healthier 
foundations if she ever aspires to attain the posi- 
tion which she claims as her just due. 



CHAPTER VIII 

TUBKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 

FOR many years competent observers have 
noted the awakening of the Moslem world. 
Like all serious movements the roots of this revival 
go deep into the past, a few keen eyes having dis- 
cerned the first stirrings half a century ago. But 
the tide began running swiftly only after the 
Russo-Japanese War. The indirect consequences 
of this triumph of a non-European people over a 
first-class European Power have already been pro- 
digious and are still by no means at an end. 

The moral quickening of the Japanese victories 
was felt in every part of Asia and Africa, but the 
stimulus to the Moslem world was particularly 
great. For Islam was already in full ferment. 
In part this was due to profound regenerative 
causes too complex for brief analysis, but in still 
larger measure it was caused by the hostile pres- 
sure of the conquering West which had long been 
subjecting ever new domains of Islam to its im- 
perious will. Fear of Christian Europe was the 
basis of that "Pan-Islamic" propaganda which 
threatened the West with a ' ' Holy War. ' ' 

The decade between the Russo-Japanese conflict 
and the European War greatly increased the ten- 
sion between the Moslem and Christian worlds. 

260 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 261 

Just at the moment when Lslam was thrilled with 
new self-confidence and hope, Christendom re- 
doubled its aggression upon Islam. In that dec- 
ade, two out of* the four remaining Mohammedan 
states — Morocco and Persia — were devoured by 
the insatiable West. Only remote Afghanistan 
and Turkey survived, and Turkey emerged battle- 
scarred and mutilated by the loss of its Balkan 
provinces and Tripoli. 

The downfall of Persia evoked especially bitter 
lamentation in Islam. For Persia is of much 
deeper import to Islam than might at first sight 
appear. The broad belt of the Moslem world, 
stretching from Morocco to China, here narrows 
to relatively slender proportions, and most Mos- 
lems hold the Iran Plateau between Caspian Sea 
and Persian Gulf to be the vital bridge joining 
the two halves of Islam. It is true that the Per- 
sians are Shiite heretics, but the old bitterness be- 
tween Sunnite orthodoxy and Shiism has been 
much softened of late by the growing feeling of 
Moslem solidarity against the European peril. 

Although Islam included all Europeans within 
the compass of its dislike, its anger was especially 
focused against those nations which formed the 
"Triple Entente" during the years preceding the 
great war. Eussia had always been considered 
Islam's arch-enemy. France, the conqueror of 
Moslem North Africa, was Russia's close ally. 
England, once popular throughout Islam, had been 
suspect ever since the seizure of Egypt, and had 
become widely hated through her eyitente with 



262 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Russia and the Anglo-Russian strangling of Per- 
sia. Germany, on the other hand, had shown con- 
sistent friendliness toward Islam. Alone among 
the European Great Powers, Germany owned no 
Moslem territory. The German Kaiser had on 
several occasions solemnly declared himself the 
friend and protector of the Moslem world. 
Lastly, for over twenty years German soldiers 
and engineers had been laboring to endow Turkey 
with the modern technical equipment and organi- 
zation necessary for her survival. 

It is therefore not surprising that when the 
European War broke out Moslem sympathies, par- 
ticularly in Turkey, tended toward Germany. 
These sympathies were, to be sure, quite relative. 
The first natural impulse was a grim satisfaction 
at this death-grapple of Europe, which Moslems 
were inclined to consider a judgment of Allah 
upon European arrogance and greed. Thus, the 
Constantinople "Tanine," the most serious Turk- 
ish newspaper, remarked concerning the Euro- 
pean Powers : ' * They would not look at the evils 
in their own countries or elsewhere, but interfered 
at the slightest incident in our borders; every day 
they would gnaw at some part of our rights and 
our sovereignty; they would perform vivisection 
on our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of 
it. And we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of 
rebellion in our hearts and with clenched but pow- 
erless fists, silent and depressed, would murmur 
as the fire burned within : 'Oh, that they might fall 
out with one another! Oh, that they might eat 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 263 

one another up ! ' And lo ! to-day they are eating 
each other up, just as the Turk wished they 
would. Whatever people may say, there is in the 
nature of things an essential justice that will at 
last come to light. To the benighted and the vic- 
tims of injustice it brings a smile on the face and 
a joyous lightening of the heart." 

Notwithstanding this impartial undercurrent of 
sentiment against all Europeans, most Turks felt 
that their one chance of survival lay in seizing 
this golden opportunity of Europe's schism by 
striking in on the Teutons' side. They knew that 
the Entente Powers had long since condemned 
Turkey, like Persia, to death. Entente guaran- 
tees of Ottoman " integrity" in return for Otto- 
man neutrality were greeted with jeering scorn. 
What had such " guarantees" meant to Morocco 
or Persia? What had Europe's solemn pledge 
of Ottoman "integrity" availed Turkey two years 
before at the opening of the Balkan wars ? Were 
not Eussian newspapers even then openly dis- 
cussing the inevitable partition of the "Sick 
Man's" heritage? To Jehannum with the per- 
jured Giaour's lying words! 

Not that the Teuton was trusted overmuch. 
The Teuton was a Giaour like the rest. But an 
intact Turkey was to the Teuton's interest. The 
Teuton wished to maintain Turkish unity in order 
to develop and exploit it all. After Turkey should 
be reorganized and strong, perhaps the Sons of 
Othman, like the Japanese, could show the Euro- 
pean the door. In any case, that was the only 



264 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

chance. The other way lay certain and speedy 
death. So, at the beginning of November, 1914, 
Turkey took the plunge, defied the Entente Pow- 
ers, and entered the great war. 

This decision excited the wild enthusiasm of the 
Constantinople press. "To arms for the mighty 
conflict ! ' ' cried the ' ' Ikdam. " " We shall march 
gloriously onward, sure of our purpose and con- 
fident of its achievement. While we know that 
all Moslems, far and near, are with us, yet we 
Moslems are not alone. We have other friends, 
friends who are already champions and victori- 
ous in war. With them we fight side by side." 

The Entente Powers were each the object 
of separate condemnation. Regarding Russia's 
longing for Constantinople, the "Ikdam" re- 
marked: "This Russian dream is no new thing; 
it is a plan carefully concocted years ago. While 
the best way to treat so absurd a hope is to laugh, 
it is impossible for a Turk not to be irritated by it. 
Yet we need not worry ourselves about Russia's 
designs. Turkey, relying on the help of God, on 
the strength of her army and navy, on the devo- 
tion and self-sacrifice of her people, will render 
impossible the realization of any such dream." 

Britain was also handled without gloves. In 
an article entitled "Hypocritical England," the 
"Tanine" wrote: "Ever since the Balkan war, 
in dealing with the Moslem world, England has 
covered her face with a veil of hypocrisy. To- 
day the mask has fallen from the face of our 
enemy; we know where we stand. . . . England 



TUEKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 265 

pretends that we are taking up arms under pres- 
sure from Germany, instead of recognizing the 
fact that we are fighting to avenge all Moslems 
for the oppression that England has imposed upon 
them. Away with hypocrisy! God is with the 
good. We shall, we must, win. ' ' 

Neither did France escape Turkish condemna- 
tion. "This war," asserted the "Tanine," "has 
opened a chasm between Turkey and France which 
can never he filled, and for this we have small 
regret. Turkey and France will remain enemies 
when the war is ended. For we now know that the 
ideas we have had concerning French civilization 
were wrong. We now see that French civilization 
is destitute of vigor, sincerity, and justice; that 
it is noisy and assuming, but inefficient; that on 
such a civilization a nation cannot build its hopes 
for a prosperous future. We have learned this 
in the present war, and any hope the French may 
cherish of a renewal of friendship with us is vain. 
We shall remain enemies." 

Germany was of course warmly praised. Sheik 
Abdul- Aziz Tchawisch, rector of Saladin Univer- 
sity, Medina, explained the bases of Moslem pro- 
Germanism when he wrote in the "Deutsche Ee- 
vue ' ' : " For many years I and my friends have 
pondered over the problems of Islam, and we have 
realized how sorely we have had to suffer under 
the domination of the Latin, Anglo-Saxon, and 
Slavic races. It was therefore necessary for us to 
ally ourselves with a people on a high plane of cul- 
ture whose political and economic interests ran 



266 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

parallel to our own. To this end we could choose 
no better people than the Germans, for their 
friends are our friends, their foes the foes of 
Islam. Hence it comes about that Germans and 
Moslems mutually supplement each other." 

The proclamation of the "Holy War" in mid- 
November, 1914, swelled the tide of Turkish en- 
thusiasm to its flood. A general rising of the 
whole Moslem world was confidently expected, 
and the Entente Powers were represented as reel- 
ing under their death-blow. "The help of the 
illustrious Prophet," cried the Sultan in a public 
announcement, "will certainly ensure our success 
and the utter overthrow of our enemies." 

These confident hopes were, however, not des- 
tined to be realized. The proclamation of the 
Holy War did undoubtedly excite a certain degree 
of unrest throughout the Mohammedan world. In 
Egypt the already smoldering discontent against 
British rule was fanned to a still more dangerous 
heat, and certain wild regions, such as the Indian 
northwest frontier and remote corners of the 
north African Sudan, broke into open war. But 
the great mass of orthodox Moslems outside of 
the Ottoman Empire refused to heed the call. The 
fact that the Commander of the Faithful was in 
close alliance with two Christian Powers chilled 
their ardor and invested the "Holy War" with 
altogether too political a complexion. The sixty 
million Indian Moslems, from whom such great 
things had been expected in Stambul, turned out 
to be indifferent or even hostile. A leading Indian 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 267 

Mohammedan, the Aga Khan, declared : ' ' This is 
not the free will of the Sultan, but the will of the 
German officers and other non-Moslems who have 
forced him to do their bidding. If Germany suc- 
ceeds, Turkey will be a vassal of Germany. The 
Kaiser's resident will be the real ruler and will 
control the holy cities.' ' And that influential 
Moslem organ, the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" (Cal- 
cutta), asserted: "In view of the present aspect of 
war in Europe, let it be generally known that at 
this critical juncture it is the bounden duty of the 
Mohammedans of India to adhere firmly to their old 
and tried loyalty to the British Raj. ' ' The Ameer 
of Afghanistan maintained a strict neutrality, 
even assisting the British in quieting the insurgent 
tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier. There has 
undoubtedly been grave unrest in India since the 
beginning of the war, but it has been caused, not 
so much by Moslems as by Hindu terrorists whose 
revolutionary activities had disturbed India for 
years previous to the European struggle. 

The failure of the "Jahadd" caused keen dis- 
appointment among the Turks. At first they 
maintained their faith in its ultimate success. 
"Of course," argued the Constantinople "Tasfiri 
Efkyar," "an instant general response to the call 
of service in the Jahadd could not be expected. 
Time must be allowed for the call to reach dis- 
tant places and for the reply to come back. The 
message of the Khalif has to cross deserts and to 
find entrance into the hearts and innermost 
thoughts of the faithful. Some cheering echoes 



268 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

are coming back already. The call has to find its 
way from mosque to mosque, from village to vil- 
lage; the people are scattered, and to unite them 
in a great enterprise takes time. If patience is 
needed for a response from distant parts of the 
Ottoman dominions, how much more of patient 
waiting is demanded for the full effect of the call 
to be realized all through the Moslem world? Our 
enemies may exult over this delay and build their 
hopes upon it. How delusive those hopes are the 
near future will amply prove." This prophecy, 
however, remained unfulfilled. In Tripoli, to be 
sure, the Sennussi dervishes from the Sahara 
did excite a general insurrection which drove the 
Italians back upon the coast, but elsewhere the 
rigorous precautions of the European authori- 
ties sufficed to keep the fanatical minority in 
check. 

Disappointed in their expectations of a general 
uprising of the Moslem world, the Turks centered 
their hopes upon Egypt and Persia. In both 
these lands there was indeed reason to expect 
serious trouble. Egypt had always been restive 
under British rule. The Islamic fanaticism of the 
people was powerfully supplemented by a strong 
"Nationalist" independence movement among 
the intellectuals which had filled Egypt with 
chronic unrest and had recently required the iron 
hand of Lord Kitchener to keep down. Further- 
more, the ruling Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, was 
frankly Anglophobe, and, finding himself at Con- 
stantinople at the outbreak of the European War, 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 269 

he refused to return to Egypt and threw in his lot 
with the Turks. 

England was frankly alarmed at the situation. 
The Suez Canal was a vital link in Britain's chain 
of empire, and most Englishmen admitted that 
should a Turkish army enter Egypt, the country 
would be in a blaze. The Copts or native Chris- 
tians, to be sure, were zealously loyal to British 
rule and a loyalist minority existed among the 
Mohammedans, many of whom dreaded a return 
to the corrupt old Turkish regime. England acted 
quickly, replacing the absent Khedive by his 
cousin, Hussein Kamel, who was proclaimed an 
independent sultan under British protection. The 
Egyptian loyalists received these drastic measures 
with apparent satisfaction. Their leading organ, 
" Al Mokattam" (Cairo), wrote at the end of 1914: 
"The Egyptian nation, at this juncture, receives 
the change in the status of Egypt with satisfaction 
and gratitude, knowing that it is in the interests 
of the country and of future generations." And 
another loyalist organ, "Al Moayyad," thus 
scored the Ottoman summons to the "Holy War" : 
"Turkey's interference in the present conflict was 
an uncalled-for foolishness, and by her action Tur- 
key has forfeited her right to the Khalifate. Nor 
is Turkey's claim to the Khalifate justifiable. 
Why should the Turk, that old Mongoloid de- 
scendant of Othman, usurp the Khalifate from 
the hands of the true descendants and successors 
of Mohammed?" 

These loyalist utterances did not, however, rep- 



270 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

resent the bulk of Egyptian public opinion, which 
was unquestionably Pan-Islamic and eager for the 
end of British rule. At the outbreak of the Euro- 
pean conflict, before Turkey's entrance had com- 
pelled the British to adopt extreme measures, not 
even a rigorous censorship could entirely suppress 
the virulence of the native press. For example, 
in mid- August, 1914, the influential paper, "Esh- 
Sha'ab," successor to the recently suppressed "Al 
Alam," wrote, ' ' The life of the Holy Khalif ate and 
of the entire Moslem world depends on the sacri- 
fice which the valiant Turkish army will offer. " 
And shortly afterwards it wrote : ' ' Moslems have 
no hope except that the nations of Christendom 
should rise against each other. As for us, who 
are of the Faith, let us stand aloof and watch. But 
let us not forget that the triumph of Germany is 
more in the interest of Islam than the triumph of 
the Slavs." For this utterance "Esh-Sha'ab" 
was permanently suppressed, and when Turkey 
entered the war the British authorities did away 
with the whole native press save a few chosen 
loyalist organs. 

However, Egyptian discontent was merely 
driven underground. The Egyptian army was so 
untrustworthy that the British dared make no use 
of it, but practically interned it for the duration 
of the war. The Turkish raids on the Suez Canal 
aroused suppressed popular emotion, and the 
Turkish Sultan's proclamation to the Egyptian 
people, smuggled into Egypt despite British vig- 
ilance, undoubtedly made a considerable impres- 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 271 

sion. "To my dear Egyptians," ran this docu- 
ment. "You know how England took over the 
direction of the country. It was a perpetual grief 
to me to see you suffering under the English 
tyranny, and I awaited a favorable moment to put 
an end to that state of things. I thank the Almighty 
for having vouchsafed me the happy occasion of 
sending one of my Imperial armies to deliver your 
beautiful country, which is a Moslem heritage. I 
am certain that, with the aid of God, my imperial 
army will succeed in delivering you from the 
enemy and his interference in your affairs, and in 
giving you your autonomy and your liberties. . I 
am certain that love of their country will lead my 
Egyptian Sons to take part in this war of libera- 
tion with all the zeal of which they are capable. — 
Mehmed V." 

The Egyptian Nationalist attitude was clearly 
set forth by a manifesto of its leader, Mohammed 
Farid Bey, issued from his place of exile at Geneva, 
Switzerland, at the beginning of 1915. He pro- 
tested hotly against "the new illegal regime pro- 
claimed by England the 18th of last December. 
England, which pretends to make war on Germany 
to defend Belgium, ought not to trample under 
foot the rights of Egypt, nor consider the treaties 
relative thereto as 'scraps of paper.' The nation 
received this change with very bad grace, and 
awaits with impatience the arrival of the Ottoman 
army of liberation. . . . The Egyptians await with 
calmness, albeit with impatience, the happy out- 
come which will put an end to the subjection of 



272 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

their beloved country and the usurpation of Hus- 
sein Kamel. He and his accomplices will then 
receive the punishment which they deserve." 
However, the English defense of the Suez Canal 
withstood all Turkish assaults, and Egypt, flooded 
with British troops, lapsed into sullen silence. 

In Persia, Turkish efforts were crowned with 
much more tangible success. The Anglo-Russian 
coup of 1911 had brought Persian independence 
virtually to an end. Persia was thenceforth di- 
vided into a Russian "sphere of influence" in the 
north, a British sphere in the south, and a "neu- 
tral" zone between. This state of affairs had, 
however, by no means received the assent of the 
Persian people. The national revival previous to 
1911 had been intense, and this dashing of the cup 
of liberty from their parched lips had plunged the 
Persian patriots into a condition of despairing 
rage which made them ripe for any sort of violent 
action. 

All this was well known to the Turks, who built 
far-reaching hopes upon the prevalent Persian un- 
rest. No sooner had Turkey entered the war than 
columns of light troops were thrown across the 
Persian frontier, while numerous Turkish and 
German emissaries under the able leadership of 
the German minister to Persia, Prince Henry of 
Reuss, sowed disaffection throughout the country. 
So widespread was the popular response to this 
Turco-Teutonic action that for a time it looked as 
though Persia would flame into a national insur- 
rection from end to end. Despite heavy Russian 



TUEKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 273 

and British forces hastily thrown into Persia large 
sections of the country rose in revolt, while the 
Turkish invasion continued to gain ground. 

This naturally excited high hopes at Stambul. 
The scope of Turkish expectations may be judged 
from the proposals for a Turco-Perso-Afghan 
Triple Alliance earnestly discussed by the Turkish 
press at the beginning of 1915. "Among the 
learned and enlightened classes at Teheran the 
idea of a Triple Alliance of Western Asia is gain- 
ing acceptance and strength, ' ' wrote the ' ' Tanine. ' ' 
"This alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanis- 
tan will, of course, be federated with the Triple 
Alliance of Europe — Germany, Turkey, and Aus- 
tria-Hungary. That this idea is most welcome 
not only to the Khalifate but also to all centers of 
Moslem influence goes without saying. We have 
long expected this development. The proposal 
is sure to gain strength as it is brought to the 
serious and urgent attention of the statesmen of 
the parties concerned. ... In our times neither 
religious nor racial ties are essential for the con- 
traction of an alliance. Community of interest is 
the one indispensable thing. The interests of 
Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan are identical, as 
we have so often shown in detail before. United 
and federated with the Central Powers of Europe, 
they will wield a commanding influence in West- 
ern Asia and make a conspicuous contribution to 
the world's progress. They are from olden times 
related one to the other in religion and language, 
and their alliance is a logical necessity. We must 



274 PEESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

repeat that it is based, not on community of re- 
ligion but upon identity of political and economic 
interests, vital needs which must be satisfied; but 
we may admit that, as far as Persia is concerned, 
religious differences are negligible." "Germany 
and Austria," said the "Sabah," "have promised 
to assure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and 
also our sovereignty in Egypt and Cyprus. The 
Austro-German press applaud the idea of a Turk- 
ish-Persian-Afghan alliance. . . . Germany limits 
her policy to economic questions. Such a policy is 
compatible with the rights of the Asiatic nations 
to existence, independence, civilization, and prog- 
ress : and this brings about a community of interest 
between the Triple Alliance and the Asiatic Pow- 
ers. The policy followed by the two groups of 
Powers explains the reason for the profound ha- 
tred that the Asiatic nations feel against the Pow- 
ers of the Triple Entente." 

The one cloud upon the horizon was the Shah's 
hesitation to declare himself openly for the Turco- 
Teutons, thus throwing the weight of the Persian 
Crown into the wavering scales. This soon intro- 
duced a warning note into Turkish appeals. In 
May, 1915, the ' ' Tanine ' ' wrote : ' * When the war 
opened, for Persia to enter the lists against the 
two great Powers, England and Eussia, would 
have been stark rashness and blindness. They 
would have taken frightful vengeance for her folly. 
She was forced to remain neutral. But she has 
the duty of showing that she has the desire and the 
right to live as a nation. If she wishes to pre- 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 275 

serve her national existence when this war ends, 
she cannot forever remain neutral in this mighty 
strife of nations. This pressure upon her to take 
part in the war increases day by day. The en- 
lightened Persians know this as well as we do. 
England and Russia have planned to divide Persia 
between them. She is a big, sweet morsel all ready 
for them to swallow. If these Powers are victori- 
ous in the war, then Persia will be wiped off the 
map, her national existence will be finished, for we 
know how weak peoples fare at their hands in 
such a case. The one hope of Persia 's salvation is 
for her to join us and our allies without delay, for 
events up to the present time give ninety chances 
in a hundred of the final victory remaining with 
Germany and her allies." And in the late sum- 
mer of 1915, the "Tanine" asserted: " Nations in 
the condition Persia is now in are not saved by 
diplomacy. In all friendliness we tell our neigh- 
bors and co-religionists that there is one and only 
one way of salvation. When this war ends, the 
present map of Europe and that of Western Asia 
will be changed. If Persia then hopes to begin a 
period of prosperity, she must now demonstrate 
her worthiness for such prosperity. This war 
will one day end, and around a table, where con- 
ditions of peace will be agreed upon, will meet the 
representatives of those peoples whose sons in 
thousands, yes, millions, have been sacrificed. If 
Persia hopes for decisions from the men at that 
table that will mean life and peace for her, she 
has one thing to do to-day : With the watchword, 



276 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

'Libert} 7 or Death,' she must throw herself into 
the breach, and, with us, trample down the foe." 

The Persian Government was, however, not des- 
tined to adopt any such heroic resolutions. Torn 
between the veiled threats of the Turco-Teutons 
and the even more outspoken menaces of the 
Anglo-Russians, the boy Shah and his timid coun- 
selors fell into a state of terrified irresolution 
and ended by following the traditional Persian 
custom of doing nothing at all. The result was 
what might have been expected. Both sets of 
Powers poured fresh troops into Persia, and be- 
neath the battling combatants and their rival prop- 
agandas unhappy Persia sank into complete an- 
archy. The mass of the Persian people was un- 
questionably hostile to the Anglo-Russians and 
friendly to the Turco-Teutons, but Anglo-Russian 
bribery and intimidation swayed many high-placed 
Persians to the Entente side. 

Thus Persia continues to the present hour — a 
fiercely contested battleground of rival foreign 
Powers and domestic factions. The one thing 
certain is that the land itself is falling into an 
ever-deepening slough of anarchy and ruin. 

Up to the spring of 1916, Turkey remained in an 
optimistic mood. And, despite the failure of the 
Holy War, the disappointment in Egypt, and the 
indecisive operations in Persia, the Turks had 
good grounds for their optimism. The flurry of 
alarm at the Anglo-French attack upon the Dar- 
danelles which began in March, 1915, soon gave 
place to exultation over the invincible obstinacy 



TUEKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 277 

of the Turkish defense. The "Tanine" boasted 
that Turkey had " destroyed the myth of English 
sea-power," and went on: "These Turks, de- 
spised by all the world, heroically dared to bare 
their breasts in defense of their country's fort- 
resses against the attack of her enemy. The Eng- 
lish fleet was, in two days, to silence the forts and 
overthrow the Ottoman capital, and so wipe off 
the Ottoman name from the map ! How different 
the result ! The weak, insignificant Turks proved 
more than a match for proud Britannia, and all 
the world wondered. We boldly faced this enemy 
of humanity and all her threats, and proved all 
her boasting vain. First and most we now re- 
joice, but we have also set an example to be fol- 
lowed by all those suffering oppression under 
British rule. For us the fear of English domina- 
tion, trembling before her absolute power, is a 
thing of the past. Let others follow our exam- 
ple!" 

The collapse of Eussian resistance before the 
Austro-German ' ' drive ' ' into Poland which began 
in June, 1915, greatly intensified the enthusiasm 
of the Turkish press. After the fall of Warsaw, 
the ' * Tanine ' ' wrote : ' ' Eussia is defeated. This 
we see clearly everywhere and in all respects. It 
is not a retreat. It is a rout. The distressing 
plight of the Eussian army as their fortresses 
fall one after another is like an orchard whose 
overripe fruit covers the ground. The fear of the 
pursuing Germans drives them in headlong flight, 
in universal panic, into the interior of Eussia. 



278 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

Cities and towns are deserted. Terror and anx- 
iety reign in Petrograd, in Moscow, in all the chief 
cities of the empire. The evidence of utter defeat 
is overwhelming. ' ' 

Turkish delight grew even sweeter when the 
Teuton's autumn Balkan "drive" annihilated 
Serbia, won over Bulgaria, and opened direct com- 
munication between Constantinople and Berlin. 
In Turkish eyes the war was as good as over. 
"While the Quadruple Entente watches the com- 
plete loss of all its trump cards," wrote the 
"Hilal," "the new Quadruple Alliance has just 
accomplished its object — the junction of its allied 
armies. This junction not only makes the Alli- 
ance invincible in the Balkans, but it puts it in a 
position to threaten the world-power of proud 
Albion. England is perfectly well aware of the 
lot that is to be hers in the very near future. . . . 
Since the war must end where it began, there can 
be no further doubt that we have already entered 
the last phase of the general war." 

These rejoicings were, however, premature. 
Grand Duke Nicholas 's sudden spring upon Erze- 
rum in February, 1916, dealt Turkish optimism a 
heavy blow, and the subsequent fall of Trebizond 
and the overrunning of Turkish Armenia by the 
Russian armies diffused an air of gloom over 
Stambul which not even the surrender of General 
Townshend's British Mesopotamian army at Kut- 
el-Amara could entirely dispel. The economic 
situation was also far from good. The strain of 
prolonged war and the Allied naval blockade were 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 279 

producing acute famine conditions in many parts 
of the empire. 

The Russian conquest of Turkish Armenia 
brought an old problem of Asiatic Turkey once 
more prominently to the fore. The Armenians, 
though greatly reduced by the massacres of Ham- 
idian days, were still an important element in the 
population, and their position on the Russo-Turk- 
ish border gave them opportunities for revenging 
themselves upon their Moslem foes which had 
seriously disquieted the Ottoman Government 
since the beginning of the war. Russia had clev- 
erly made the most of this situation. In Novem- 
ber, 1914, the Russian Government had issued a 
ringing proclamation urging the Armenians to rise 
against their Turkish masters and promising them 
freedom. The large Armenian population of Rus- 
sian Transcaucasia had enthusiastically supported 
Russia, and the "Catholicos" or head of the Ar- 
menian Church, who resided in Transcaucasia, had 
warmly espoused the Russian side. 

All this had produced a deep impression upon 
the Armenians under Ottoman rule, and Turkish 
Armenia was soon seething with unrest. The agi- 
tation was, however, destined to cause the most 
deplorable results. At the beginning of the war 
the Turks had apparently tried to gain over the 
Armenians by inspiring them with fear of falling 
under Russian domination. In November, 1914, 
the Constantinople "Ikdam" thus adjured the Ar- 
menians : ' ' Even if Russia were to take our East- 
ern provinces, it would not be to make them auton- 



280 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

omous under Armenian rule, but merely to add 
them to the Russian Empire. They will make the 
Armenians just a cat 's paw for their own designs, 
and for this there is ample evidence. ' ' 

But the Armenians ' Russophile sentiments soon 
became clear, whereupon the traditional Turkish 
antipathy for the Armenians flamed up hotly as in 
the past. Taking advantage of this mood, cer- 
tain high-placed Armenian-haters like Talaat Bey 
persuaded their colleagues to take drastic action. 
The Turkish Government's decree ostensibly pro- 
vided for the removal of the Armenian population 
from the Russian border provinces to the interior 
of the empire, but the ruthless manner in which 
these orders were carried out precipitated one of 
the most appalling tragedies in human history. 
Allowing for all possible exaggerations, hundreds 
of thousands of Armenians must have already per- 
ished. Nevertheless, Turkish public opinion sanc- 
tions these measures. As a prominent Turkish 
leader, Halil Bey, remarked toward the close of 
1916: "I will say that the loss to the Ottoman 
Empire through the deportation of the Armenians 
has been immense. The Armenian is able and in- 
dustrious, and therefore valuable in the economic 
scheme ; but what could \>e done ? We were at War, 
and therefore obliged to employ every means to 
make secure our position, which was betrayed so 
basely through our confidence." 

Vastly more serious for Turkey was another in- 
ternal difficulty — Arab disaffection. The Arabs 
are not, like the Armenians, a scattered border 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 281 

folk; they are as numerous as the Turks them- 
selves and occupy very much more than half the 
total area of the empire. No Ottoman Turkish 
population is found east of Asia Minor, the inhab- 
itants of Syria and Mesopotamia as well as of the 
Arabian Peninsula being mainly of Arab blood. 
Now Arab and Turk had never gotten on well to- 
gether. Their racial temperaments were too in- 
compatible. Still, down to comparatively recent 
times, their common Islamic faith had united them 
against the Christian world whatever the state of 
their domestic relations. But ever since the 
" Young Turk" Revolution of 1908, the rift be- 
tween the two races had been widening with alarm- 
ing rapidity. The Young Turk ideal had been a 
unified Ottoman state, based upon the unques- 
tioned supremacy of the Turkish language and 
culture, and they had accordingly started in to 
"Ottomanize" all the non-Turkish races of the 
empire. But this had roused the Arabs to mutin- 
ous wrath, for the Arabs considered the Turks 
their mental inferiors and despised Turkish cul- 
ture, or rather declared that such a thing did not 
exist. Furthermore, they themselves were devel- 
oping a "nationalist" movement looking to po- 
litical separation from Turkey and the founding 
of a great Arab Empire. Even before the great 
war, Turkey's Arab provinces were full of sep- 
aratist unrest. 

Turkey's entrance into the European struggle 
and the proclamation of the Holy War did, it is 
true, rally many of the Arabs against the Euro- 



282 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

pean foe. But a considerable disaffected minor- 
ity remained, and these malcontents were steadily 
swelled by Turkish tactlessness and severity. The 
upshot was a revolt of the Grand Shereef of Mecca 
in the summer of 1916 which quickly brought 
Turkish rule throughout Arabia to an end. The 
Shereef proclaimed Arabia's independence and 
courted the friendship of the Entente Powers. 
This was a body blow to the Turks. Their loss 
of the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, gravely 
damaged their prestige throughout Islam, while 
the Arab populations of Syria and Mesopotamia 
might also burst into flame. The Stambul press 
made no secret of its alarm. The authoritative 
"Tanine" wrote: " Interest compels us to use 
force and reconquer the Arab countries at the 
point of the sword. Let us not be hampered by 
gentle scruples, because they are of no avail, and 
because the Arab revival is imminent." 

But Arabia has not been reconquered, and the 
Arab revolt continues to threaten Turkey's hold 
upon her possessions to the east of Asia Minor, 
already menaced as these are by the British in 
southern Mesopotamia and by the Russians in 
the Armenian north. 

Thus the year 1916, which opened so brightly 
for the Turks, closed in a gloom which none of 
the events of early 1917 have been able to dispel. 
Of course the Turks realize that the present strug- 
gle is for them preeminently one of life and death. 
The Entente Powers have formally announced 
their fixed determination to partition the Ottoman 



TURKEY AND THE MOSLEM EAST 283 

Empire, and Entente victory would certainly re- 
duce Turkey to a small and insignificant state upon 
the Asia Minor plateau, if it did not extinguish 
Turkish national life altogether. 

The Turks are therefore increasingly dependent 
upon their Teutonic allies. Their political future 
is thus not particularly bright, menaced as they 
are with utter destruction on the one hand and 
close subordination on the other. 

For that matter, the prospects of the whole Mos- 
lem East are in complete flux, and no certain out- 
come can be predicted at the present hour. Pos- 
sibly in the remoter future a sustained revival of 
the Eastern races together with Europe's relative 
weakening through internecine war may enable the 
whole Moslem world to throw off the Western 
yoke. But this is venturing too far into the realms 
of speculation. 



CHAPTER IX 

BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 

IT is interesting to speculate upon what might 
have been the future of the Low Countries 
had the " Kingdom of the Netherlands," estab- 
lished by the Vienna Congress of 1815, remained in 
existence. This union of Holland and Belgium 
created a state which was almost a first-class 
Power in the Europe of that day, and when we 
consider the subsequent progress of both coun- 
tries, it is highly probable that their united 
strength would have averted their recent misfor- 
tunes. 

However, a united Netherlands was not to be. 
In 1830 the Belgians revolted against their Dutch 
king and set up for themselves. Thenceforth the 
history of the two neighbors was to have little in 
common. Accordingly, we must consider sepa- 
rately their reactions to the European War. 

A. BELGIUM 

When the German invasion of August, 1914, 
dramatically thrust everything else into the back- 
ground, Belgium was facing an acute domestic 
problem — the Flemish- Walloon nationality ques- 
tion. Belgium is compounded of two race-ele- 
ments — the French-speaking Walloons of the east- 

284 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 285 

ern provinces and the Teutonic Flemings, who 
inhabit the low-lying plains of the north and west. 
The Flemings slightly outnumber the Walloons, 
but the Walloons have long played the leading 
role in Belgian national life owing to the superior 
cultural attraction of their mighty kinsman and 
neighbor, France. This French influence had been 
greatly strengthened by the generation of direct 
French rule over Belgium from 1793 to 1814. The 
Flemish element could do little to stem the Gallic 
tide. A small people, speaking a dialect of Dutch, 
their culture could not compare with that of the 
race which had for centuries given the tone to 
European civilization. In fact, at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, the Flemish upper 
classes were largely Gallicized. 

All this explains the Belgian rising of 1830. 
That revolution was the work of the Walloons, 
who saw the despised Flemish culture reviving 
under Dutch rule. The Walloon dream was the 
complete Gallicization of the Flemings and the 
welding of Belgium into a homogeneous Gallic na- 
tion closely connected with France. In 1830 they 
wanted a French king, and only the determined 
veto of foreign Powers prevented the seating of a 
French monarch upon the Belgian throne. Al- 
though disappointed in this, the Walloons suc- 
ceeded in giving the new Belgian state a thor- 
oughly French complexion, Flemish occupying a 
decidedly subordinate position in every depart- 
ment of the national life. 

This settlement, however, contained within itself 



286 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

the seeds of future trouble. The nineteenth cen- 
ture was preeminently the ''Era of Nationalities," 
and before long the nationalist leaven began work- 
ing among the Flemings in truly dynamic fashion. 
In 1830 the Flemish element had been almost in- 
articulate, but twenty years later a cultural revival 
began which has progressed steadily down to the 
present day. 

The Flemings ' first effort was to win back their 
Gallicized upper class brethren, and these, con- 
temptuously dubbed " Franskiljons " and treated 
as renegades, succumbed more and more to popu- 
lar pressure and increasingly abjured their ac- 
quired Gallicism. The Flemings' ultimate object- 
ive was the full recognition of their language and 
culture as the absolute equals of French. 

Here, however, they met with the most deter- 
mined opposition. The Walloons were resolved 
to Gallicize Belgium and refused to surrender the 
privileged position which they had acquired in 
1830. The result was a chronic race-struggle 
which for more than half a century perturbed Bel- 
gium's internal life. This struggle was further 
embittered by religious considerations, most of the 
Flemings being ardent Catholics, whereas the Wal- 
loons were steadily going over to free-thinking 
lai'cism. 

Despite the Walloons' best efforts and privi- 
leged position, the Flemings steadily gained 
ground. The census of 1910 showed the latter 's 
undoubted numerical superiority. In that year 
2,800,000 persons spoke only Flemish, 2,500,000 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 287 

spoke only French, while less than 800,000 spoke 
both languages. And, be it noted, nearly all the 
bilinguals should be accounted Flemings in blood, 
since Walloons usually refuse to learn the "in- 
ferior" tongue. The fact that so small a per- 
centage of the Flemings had any knowledge of 
what was practically the state language showed 
the failure of Gallicization and encouraged the 
Flemings to redouble their efforts for complete 
political and cultural equality. 

Yet the Walloons refused to admit their defeat 
and clung doggedly to their privileges. They 
were, however, pessimistic as to the future, some 
even fearing an ultimate Flemish ascendancy. To 
such a fate they declared they would never submit, 
preferring in that case Belgian disruption in favor 
of an independent Walloon state or annexation to 
France. But this further embittered the Flem- 
ings, who declared that they would either obtain 
their "rights" or join their Dutch cousins in 
a "Great Netherland." Some Flemings even 
sought German aid in this struggle of "Teuton- 
ism's vanguard" against the encroaching Latin 
tide. 

Such was Belgium's disturbed condition in July, 
1914. In fact, certain Belgian writers have as- 
serted that, but for the European War, Belgium 
might have gone to pieces within a comparatively 
short time. 

The German invasion wrought a dramatic 
change. Both races rallied round their country's 
flag and fought desperately against the common 



288 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

enemy. The subsequent hardships and humilia- 
tions suffered under German rule appear to have 
effaced race lines and engendered a common pa- 
triotic longing for freedom. 

The chief cloud upon the horizon of future Bel- 
gian solidarity is the attitude of the exiles. Those 
Belgians who remained at home seem to have 
pretty well forgotten their intestine quarrels. 
But at the time of the German invasion hundreds 
of thousands of Belgians fled the country. Like 
most exiles, these people have ever since then done 
little save brood over their troubles and dream 
of the morrow. As a result of this rather morbid 
occupation many exiles have developed a fanatical 
temper which may cause serious trouble in a re- 
stored Belgium. 

The exiles have sorted themselves largely ac- 
cording to their special racial and cultural predi- 
lections; the Walloons and "Franskiljons" go- 
ing to France, the Flemings to Holland. Amid 
these congenial surroundings their respective 
sympathies have been heightened while their antip- 
athies have been intensified. The Walloons have 
developed an uncompromising hatred of every- 
thing "Teutonic," and many of them exultantly 
declare that one result of the war will be the ex- 
tinction of the Flemish movement and the estab- 
lishment of a thoroughly French Belgium in close 
communion with France. The Walloon exiles also 
tend to be hostile to Holland for maintaining her 
neutrality instead of joining against the Germans. 
Many have been strongly affected by the French 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 289 

"Neo-Imperialist" movement and foresee a 
" Greater Belgium," enlarged not only by German 
districts between Belgium's present eastern bor- 
der and the Bhine but also by several Dutch prov- 
inces, notably Dutch Flanders and the mouth of 
the Scheldt, the Maestricht salient, Luxemburg, 
and even Dutch Limburg. 

All this, however, rouses the ire of the Flemish 
exiles, who, in the hospitable atmosphere of Hol- 
land, have still further developed their proclivi- 
ties toward a " Great Netherland." They reject 
hotly the Walloons' projects for a Gallicized Bel- 
gium and a partition of Holland, and they ardently 
desire a close understanding between the Dutch 
and Belgian nations. 

Such an understanding is being consciously or 
unconsciously furthered by the policy of the Ger- 
man rulers of Belgium. The Germans are doing 
everything possible to encourage Flemish self- 
consciousness, notably by the establishment of a 
Flemish university at Ghent — a thing for which 
the Flemings had vainly agitated for many years. 
The German motive has probably been to reconcile 
the Flemings to German rule, and in this the Ger- 
mans will undoubtedly fail, no Flemings save a 
few ' i Teutonist " fanatics having the least desire 
to become Germans. Nevertheless, the Germans 
are steadily quickening Flemish national con- 
sciousness and are fast placing the Flemish ele- 
ment in a favored position akin to that enjoyed 
by the Walloons previous to the war. If, after 
the war, the Walloon exiles should try to put 



290 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

through their program of general Gallicization 
and aggression against Holland, the present unity 
of the Belgian people in Belgium will end in sud- 
den and disastrous fashion. 

It is to be hoped that when the war is over the 
lessons of adversity will have taught the exiles to 
forget their present dreams in the joy of restored 
national life and in aspirations for a harmonious 
morrow. Otherwise, Belgium's future will be 
anything but a happy one. 

B. HOLLAND 

In Europe's tragedy few episodes have been 
more admirable than the quiet way in which the 
Dutch nation has kept its poise and maintained a 
dignified neutrality under circumstances which 
might well have demoralized a far more powerful 
and better situated people. 

For of all the neutral nations in the present 
struggle, none save Greece is so hard placed as 
Holland. A forlorn islet of peace in a roaring 
flood of war, her position is indeed deplorable. 
Environed by contending armies and embattling 
fleets, her merchantmen pick their homeward way 
through mine-fields and submarines to bring her 
the food that will keep from starvation her dense 
population and the hundreds of thousands of Bel- 
gian refugees now destitute objects of her bounty. 
The mobilization of her entire army ever since the 
outbreak of the European War has added another 
heavy burden to her already overstrained re- 
sources. Holland is to-day living almost exclu- 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 291 

sively upon her savings. These are indeed con- 
siderable, but Holland's needs are great, and her 
main sources of wealth, lying not at home, but 
abroad, are failing one by one. The wealth of 
Holland is proverbial, yet few persons realize 
that by nature she is one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Virtually without coal, iron, timber, 
or stone, unable to feed her dense population by 
her own agriculture, Holland lives primarily upon 
her rich colonies, her merchant marine, and the 
vast transit trade between the German Rhineland 
and the outer world. This last is of capital im- 
portance. What the Nile is agriculturally to 
Egypt, that the Rhine is commercially to Holland. 
The pulsing throb of Germany 's main trade-artery 
is the index of Dutch economic life. Now that this 
artery has almost ceased to beat, only Holland's 
capital and credit stand between her and ruin. 

Yet in this tragic hour Holland rises with a 
proud courage which once more proves her ''the 
little nation with a great heart." On the out- 
break of the European War she took her stand 
upon the firm rock of strict neutrality, and neither 
menace nor cajolery has moved her a hair's 
breadth from that determination. At times the 
pressure has been great, but Holland has stood 
firm. Her resolve is not of yesterday. As she 
builds her dikes, so she has long been raising her 
ramparts of neutrality against that cataclysm 
which wise men have seen gathering these many 
years. Despite the annoyance of her neighbors,, 
she steadily perfected her defensive armaments, 



292 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

and at the outbreak of the present war Holland 
was well prepared against attack from both land 
and sea. 

This firm basing of Holland's policy upon the 
principle of unswerving neutrality and determina- 
tion to prevent their beloved land from becoming 
a cockpit of war rendered the Dutch better pre- 
pared to meet the mental shock of war than any 
other European people. The Dutch knew exactly 
what they intended to do long before the dread 
eventuality actually came to pass, and the enthu- 
siastic adhesion of every shade of Dutch public 
opinion to Queen Wilhelmina's neutrality procla- 
mation at the beginning of August, 1914, showed 
that the Queen had voiced her people 's will. The 
desire to keep Holland at peace is as strong to-day 
as it was three years ago, no political group 
evincing the slightest inclination toward war. In- 
terventionists, like the cartoonist Louis Rae- 
maekers and his paper the "Telegraaf," are 
merely the exceptions which prove the rule. 

The bait of German territory held out by Allied 
publicists in attempts to rouse interventionist sen- 
timent in Holland has fallen on deaf ears; the 
Dutch are a self-contained folk with no desire for 
European expansion save possibly a union with 
the Flemings, and the entrance of hosts of recal- 
citrant Germans into the Dutch family circle, even 
if one excludes the danger of a German war of re- 
venge, would be both disturbing and displeasing 
to Holland's well-ordered domestic life. 

If we turn from the field of self-interest to that 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 293 

of sentiment, we arrive at the same pacific conclu- 
sion. Holland is not pro-anything except pro- 
Dutch, nor distinctly anti-anything save foreign 
intervention. Certain British publicists have as- 
serted that the Dutch were sympathetic to Ger- 
many, but this is untrue. There are, of course, 
strong natural ties between the Dutch and German 
peoples. Nearly related in blood and speech, in- 
tellectual and social intercourse is very close, es- 
pecially in university circles, while most educated 
Hollanders read German books, magazines, and 
newspapers as a matter of course. Economic re- 
lations are also extremely intimate. The vast 
Rhine transit trade is, we have seen, Holland's 
chief source of prosperity, Germany is her best 
customer, and there are more Germans domiciled 
in Holland than all other foreigners put together. 
It is, therefore, not strange that the Dutch upper 
and middle classes are friendly to Germany in a 
general way, while those aristocratic, conservative 
circles represented by ex-Premier Kuyper are un- 
doubtedly pro-German in the political sense. 

But with the mass of the Dutch people this 
last is far from being the case. Holland is em- 
phatically a land of individualism, which in the 
lower classes verges upon license and an unreason- 
ing aversion to any sort of official regulation of 
private affairs, coupled with an intense dislike of 
whatever savors of ''militarism." The Dutch 
and German peoples thus differ widely in tempera- 
ment, and though the Dutch are not positively 
anti-German, there is a latent incompatibility of 



294 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

temper which inhibits sjnnpathetic feeling. The 
flood of Belgian refugees has increased these es- 
tranging tendencies. The sight of so much suf- 
fering and the practical identity of blood and 
speech between the Dutch and the Flemings, who 
form the vast majority of the refugees in Holland, 
have done much to transform negative dislike of 
Germans into positive antipathy. 

Nevertheless, if Holland is not pro-German, she 
is emphatically not pro-British. In the soul of 
nearly every Hollander lies a deep-seated rancor 
against England. No nation has suffered more at 
English hands than Holland, and the Dutch have 
not forgotten England's destruction of their mari- 
time and colonial greatness. This latent hostility 
was sharply fanned by the Boer War, which roused 
in Holland a flood of wrathful grief and sullen 
suspicion, since kept alive by a whole series of 
unfortunate incidents. England's alliance with 
Japan caused lively apprehensions for the Dutch 
East Indies. The bullying tone of many British 
publicists urging Holland to join the Allies and 
threatening her with all sorts of penalties if she 
does not, has been deeply resented by a proud and 
independent people. Lastly, England's wholly 
illegal strangling of Dutch trade and commerce, 
forcing Holland under threat of starvation to that 
humiliating limitation of sovereignty, the "Neth- 
erlands Overseas Trust," has infuriated Dutch 
commercial and maritime circles. Anti-British 
feeling in Holland would be even stronger than it 
is to-day were it not for Germany's equally fla- 



BELGIUM AND HOLLAND 295 

grant violations of Dutch rights by her U-boats 
and Zeppelins. 

However, despite strong feeling against both 
their great neighbors, the Dutch have displayed 
noteworthy self-control. At the very beginning of 
the war the Government appealed for moderation 
in speech and in the press, and forbade anything 
likely to raise popular passions, such as partizan 
demonstrations, the display of belligerent flags, 
and even the exposure of foreign "war" post- 
cards in shop windows. The Dutch people, appre- 
ciating the danger of partizan recrimination, have 
seconded their Government's efforts in admirable 
fashion. Their task was the easier because Dutch 
sentiments toward the belligerents are rather neg- 
ative than positive in character ; a decisive victory 
for either side is regarded as fraught with peril 
to Holland's future, and a stalemate would un- 
doubtedly be the outcome most popular in the 
Netherlands. 

Holland is to-day the most genuinely " neutral" 
country in the world. She may yet be forced into 
the war, but it will not be from lack of effort to 
keep out. 



CHAPTER X 

SCANDINAVIA 

ONE of the most noteworthy episodes of the 
twentieth century has been the "Scandi- 
navian Revival " — the reawakening of the three 
Scandinavian nations, Norway, Sweden, and Den- 
mark, to self-conscious national life and hope in 
a brighter morrow. 

By the world at large it has been, and still is, 
quite the fashion to regard the Scandinavian states 
as belonging to that category of "little nations" 
whose day is over; whose very existence, indeed, 
depended upon mutual jealousies of greater 
neighbors or sentimental consideration for a he- 
roic past. That Scandinavia could ever develop 
within itself such renewed national energy as 
might assure its independent future, probably oc- 
curred to few persons unfamiliar with Scandina- 
via's somewhat obscure internal history. 

This, to be sure, is not strange. A generation 
ago most Scandinavians held similar opinions. 
Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the prevailing note in Scandinavia's political 
thought was a pessimistic acceptance of national 
insignificance, a desire to be let alone, a tendency 
to seek safety in external guarantees rather than 
self-defense. Sweden continued stunned by the 

296 



SCANDINAVIA 297 

Russian conquest of Finland in 1809 and con- 
sumed her surplus energies in chronic bickerings 
with Norway, culminating in the violent separa- 
tion of 1905. For Denmark, also, the nineteenth 
century was a time of loss and sorrow, Denmark 
losing Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia in 1864. 
Amid those clashing imperialisms of world em- 
pires which marked the closing decades of the 
last century, the lot of the Scandinavian peoples 
appeared at first sight to offer little save vain re- 
grets for a dead past. 

Nevertheless it was during just this period that 
the foundations of the Scandinavian revival were 
laid. These foundations were in the first instance 
economic. A century ago Scandinavia was pro- 
foundly poor. Sweden, with her cold, frost-bound 
soil, could never hope greatly to extend her culti- 
vable area. Denmark, though possessed of rich 
farm-land, was very small and had suffered 
greatly from the Napoleonic wars. Norway was 
but a strip of barren mountains. However, all 
three peoples proceeded resolutely to the devel- 
opment of what they had, and the economic 
tendencies of the nineteenth century presently 
brought into play latent resources unknown or 
unutilizable before. Rapid steamship and railway 
transportation gave Denmark an inexhaustible 
market for her farm and dairy products in Eng- 
land and Germany. These same transportation 
facilities unlocked Sweden's vast mineral wealth, 
carrying iron ore and timber from her remote 
mountains to the seaboard and thence to the outer 



298 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

world. In Norway the steamship developed the 
Arctic fisheries and bore to her remotest fjords 
annual freights of tourists with their welcome 
tithes of gold. Furthermore, for Sweden and 
Norway, electricity presently wrought as great a 
miracle as had steam. The myriad torrents and 
waterfalls of these mountain lands became sources 
of wealth as well as things of beauty ; and, already 
richly dowered with iron as they were, this " white 
coal" gave Sweden and Norway the second pre- 
requisite of modern industrial life. Soon fac- 
tories sprang up everywhere, and changed Sweden 
from an agricultural to an industrial land, with 
Norway following close suit. Lastly, as befitted 
the sons of the Vikings, all three peoples remem- 
bered the open sea, Norway especially building up 
a great merchant-marine. In fine, by the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century, the poor and back- 
ward Scandinavia of former days had been trans- 
formed into one of the most prosperous regions 
of the earth, striding forward daily in wealth 
and population. 

The mental and spiritual consequences of all 
this were as obvious as they were inevitable. The 
Scandinavian peoples ceased to gaze sadly back- 
ward into the past. Furthermore, as they looked 
upon their works, they felt a growing pride in 
themselves and in their type of civilization. It 
was their intelligence, their virile energy, which 
had transformed these apparently unpromis- 
ing northlands into realms of prosperity and 
plenty. It was their character which had made 



SCANDINAVIA 299 

them pioneers in the solution of many vexed po- 
litical and social problems. It was their genius 
which had produced masterpieces of literature 
and music gratefully acknowledged by the entire 
world. These achievements, together with a glor- 
ious past, convinced the Scandinavians that theirs 
was a race soul of rare endowment, whose rich 
promise must be preserved and developed to the 
full. Accordingly, the old pessimism disappeared 
before a vigorous, optimistic nationalism. Litter- 
ateurs and savants no longer professed cosmopol- 
itan doctrines: instead they became consciously, 
aggressively Swedes, Danes, Norwegians. Even 
those who realized the somewhat narrowing effects 
of such intensive development of the national 
consciousness asserted that neither cosmopolitan- 
ism nor the predominance of any of the great 
world cultures could be tolerated if these small 
nations were to develop freely their peculiar 
individualities. 

It was with such high hopes for their material 
and spiritual future that the Scandinavian peo- 
ples looked out over the new century. But, as 
they gazed, they grew troubled. While they were 
busied laying down the bases of national revival, 
the outer world had been moving fast. Huge em- 
pires had spread over the face of the earth, near- 
ing, clashing, striking bright friction-sparks with 
every clash. Everywhere economic and colonial 
rivalries were becoming keener, race hatreds 
growing deeper. Europe already suffered from 
that ominous malaise which heralded the present 



300 PEESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

world war. A hungry, predatory spirit was 
abroad. It was an evil day for the "little peo- 
ples." The Scandinavians felt their danger and 
scanned the horizon for latent perils. 

Two dangers patently menaced the future peace 
of the Scandinavian peoples: Germany on the 
south, and Russia on the east. From the stand- 
point of Scandinavian unity against aggression, 
this duality of danger was unfortunate. A single 
peril threatening all alike would have driven these 
kindred peoples forthwith together. As it was, 
Denmark alone felt herself menaced by the Ger- 
man, whom Sweden and Norway considered a 
possible counterpoise to Eussian aggression; 
while this same Eussia was to Denmark a poten- 
tial ally against her German neighbor. For this 
reason the current of national revival, though 
psychologically identical in all three countries, 
had such diverse external stimuli that it branched 
into separate channels. 

Yet whosoever the potential foe might be, the 
paramount issue in all three countries was whether 
or not to arm against him. Accordingly, through- 
out Scandinavia the years preceding the great war 
witnessed a vigorous "preparedness" campaign. 
The political line-up was everywhere the same. 
On the side of preparedness stood the Conser- 
vatives, heirs of the proud, aristocratic tradition 
of national honor, together with the younger gen- 
eration in all classes of society imbued with the 
self-confident optimism of the new time. Against 
preparedness were the old-line Liberals, exponents 



SCANDINAVIA 301 

of mid-nineteenth century cosmopolitanism, and 
the orthodox Socialists with their dogmatic pacif- 
ism and exclusive devotion to internal reform. 

At first the prospects of preparedness did not 
look overbright. The adoption of universal man- 
hood suffrage throughout Scandinavia in the open- 
ing years of the twentieth century had enfran- 
chised the Socialist masses, and a prompt Liberal- 
Socialist alliance had placed pacifist cabinets in 
power in every Scandinavian country. But the 
great international crises which shook Europe 
between 1905 and 1914 gradually convinced Scan- 
dinavian public opinion that foreign perils were 
nigh, while the cynical disregard of right and 
justice displayed by all the Great Powers in their 
treatment of weak nations from Morocco to China 
discredited the Liberal faith in international guar- 
antees and drove home the grim truth that the 
most inoffensive people can find safety only in 
the strength of its own right arm. The pacifists 
fought hard, but the patriotic tide was irresisti- 
ble, and the outbreak of the great war found all 
the Scandinavian countries reasonably well pre- 
pared. 

The first impulse of the Scandinavian peoples 
after the outbreak of the European War was to 
concert measures for the maintenance of their 
neutrality and for defense against possible ag- 
gressions of their giant neighbors. The warmest 
sentiments of Scandinavian unity were voiced in 
all three countries, and this unitary feeling ex- 
pressed itself in acts such as the meeting of the 



302 PBESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

Scandinavian monarchs at Malmo and the Swed- 
ish-Norwegian pledge not to fight against each 
other under any circumstances. 

Unfortunately this era of good feeling has been 
somewhat marred by the divergent sympathies 
and antipathies entertained in the various Scan- 
dinavian countries toward the European com- 
batants. What these divergent sentiments are we 
will now examine in detail. 



A. DENMARK 

In Denmark the national psychology closely re- 
sembles that of Holland, the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the people being for strict neutrality and 
the resolute avoidance of entanglement in the war. 
As in Holland, aristocratic and army circles and 
many of the intellectuals are pro-German, whereas 
the popular masses, extremely individualistic and 
ultra-democratic, are instinctively unsympathetic 
toward Prussian conservatism and " militarism." 

Of course Schleswig-Holstein is not forgotten, 
and there is an " interventionist" group which 
listens eagerly to Allied offers of the "lost prov- 
inces ' ' as a reward for Danish aid. But this party 
is very small and has slight political weight. 
Most Danes declare that they would refuse 
Schleswig-Holstein even if pressed upon them by 
the victorious Allies. The provinces are over- 
whelmingly German, only 150,000 out of their 
1,700,000 inhabitants speaking the Danish tongue. 
The entrance of all those recalcitrant Germans 



SCANDINAVIA 303 

into the small Danish nation would, it is asserted, 
make Danish political life unworkable even if the 
probability of a German war of revenge were by 
some miracle to be entirely excluded. The utmost 
to which most Danes aspire is the annexation of 
the 150,000 Danes of North Schleswig, who dwell 
compactly in a few small districts just south of the 
present Danish border. And even so, Danes gen- 
erally say that they would receive these districts 
only as a free gift from Germany, their forcible an- 
nexation being not worth the future perils to which 
Denmark would be thereby exposed. 

B. NOEWAY 

Norway is predominately pro- Ally. A few in- 
tellectuals, notably Sigurd Ibsen and Bjornstjerne 
Bjornson, are strongly pro-German, but tradi- 
tional economic and cultural ties with the Western 
Powers incline the Norwegian people toward 
England and France. Eussia is frankly feared, 
her longing for the warm-water harbors of the 
Norwegian North exciting universal suspicion and 
dread. But most Norwegians believe that only 
England and France can stay Eussia 's hand, and 
they therefore feel that Anglo-French friendship 
must at all costs be retained. Moreover, Nor- 
way's great merchant-marine and general eco- 
nomic life are entirely at the Western sea-powers ' 
mercy. England 's high-handed regulation of Nor- 
wegian shipping and commerce has, it is true, 
awakened some indignation, but this resentment 
is more than counterbalanced by the deep anger 



304 PRESENT-DAY EUROPE 

roused at the ruthless sinking of Norwegian ships 
by German submarines. So bitter is the resent- 
ment at Germany's U-boat campaign that some 
Norwegians have advocated armed intervention 
on the Allies' side. Most Norwegians, however, 
oppose the abandonment of neutrality except in 
case of a direct violation of Norwegian territorial 
integrity. 

C. SWEDEN 

Sweden's attitude differs radically from that of 
the other two Scandinavian nations. The Swedes 
are an intensely proud people with a glorious 
past and a keen sense of honor. The tone of 
Swedish social life is set by an unusually fine 
aristocracy, and despite recent industrialization 
the backbone of the nation is still a sturdy class of 
independent peasant farmers akin to the old Eng- 
lish yeomen. Swedes never forget that through- 
out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries their 
country was a Great Power, and they recall with 
kindling hearts the days of Gustavus Adolphus 
and Charles XII. Indeed, unlike the other minor 
states of western Europe, Sweden has never 
settled down to the * ' little nation" point of view. 
Even the Dutch, with all their patriotism, have 
renounced all thought of increased authority in 
the world. Sweden, on the other hand, has never 
ceased to consider herself the predestined leader 
of a powerful Scandinavian North. 

The great bar to all such dreams is Russia, the 
traditional foe of Sweden, the destroyer of her 



SCANDINAVIA 305 

former Baltic Empire, the brutal ravisher of Fin- 
land — a country considered an integral part of the 
Swedish fatherland rather than a Swedish depend- 
ency. Ever since the "Eussification" of Finland 
in 1899 the old hatred of Eussia has sharpened into 
downright terror at Russian designs upon Swed- 
en's national life. Before 1899 Finland, as an 
autonomous Grand Duchy, made an ideal buffer 
state, but to-day this friendly buffer has been 
transformed into a huge Eussian intrenched camp, 
and since the beginning of the war Russia's forti- 
fication of the Aland Isles has established a Eus- 
sian naval base only a few hours' easy sailing 
from Stockholm. 

In her despairing terror, Sweden has turned 
more and more to Germany as her only possible 
savior from the menacing shadow of the Bear. 
Accordingly, the European War evoked an out- 
burst of anti-Eussian and pro-German feeling 
throughout Sweden. Noting with joy German as- 
sertions that the war could end only when the 
Eussian colossus had been permanently crippled 
and thrown back upon Asia, many Swedes began 
to call for Sweden's entrance into the war by 
Germany's side, thereby improving a unique op- 
portunity to win back Finland and assure Swed- 
en's future for all time. This movement, known 
as "Activism," attracted men from all political 
parties and social classes, several prominent So- 
cialists even supporting the "Activist" cause. 
Its main strength, however, came from the aristoc- 
racy, the army, the intellectuals, and Conservative 



306 PEESENT-DAY EUROPE 

circles generally. The bulk of the old-line Liber- 
als and Socialists were, as might have been ex- 
pected, for neutrality and peace. Strong pro- 
Ally sentiment was conspicuous by its absence. 

The mainspring of Activism was, as we have 
seen, fear and hatred of Russia. But before long 
Activism was further aided by the rapidly grow- 
ing popular hatred of England. From the very 
beginning of the war Great Britain had used her 
sea-power in decidedly high-handed fashion, in 
flagrant disregard of neutral rights and suscepti- 
bilities. To all this most neutral nations sub- 
mitted with more or less bad grace. Not so 
Sweden. British naval arrogance had touched the 
Swede's tenderest spot — that keen sense of dignity 
for which he has always stood ready to make any 
sacrifice. Alone among neutrals Sweden an- 
swered British encroachments with retaliation in 
kind, seizing British mail-bags and laying an em- 
bargo on Swedish exports to England. British 
threats evoked defiance, while British appeals to 
Swedish self-interest merely called forth angry 
scorn. Typical of the Swedish attitude are the 
protests of the Swedish press at British proposals 
for a regulative organization for Swedish imports 
similar to the "Netherlands Overseas Trust.' ' 
Such recognitions of British usurpation might be 
"well enough for Dutchmen and Americans," 
said the Swedish papers, but they hardly com- 
ported with Sweden's honor. These controver- 
sies with Great Britain are as yet by no means 
ended, and they have awakened in Sweden a hatred 



SCANDINAVIA 307 

of England equaled nowhere else in Europe save 
in Germany. 

Sweden is thus to-day overwhelmingly pro-Ger- 
man and anti-Ally. Her future attitude will prob- 
ably depend upon the course of the war. Should 
victory incline toward the Entente Powers, 
Sweden will almost certainly remain neutral, for 
she knows what her fate would be if she defied 
the Allies and was then left alone with the Eus- 
sian Bear. But if the Germans should break fur- 
ther into Russia, especially toward Petrograd and 
the Gulf of Finland, Sweden would burst into such 
a passion of Activist emotion that she would al- 
most certainly put her fate to the test and "go 
in" against the hereditary foe. 



CHAPTER XI 

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 



DESPITE their geographical propinquity, the 
national psychologies of the two Iberian 
peoples have so little in common that separate 
treatment will throughout be necessary. 



SPAIN 



Spanish political life strongly resembles that of 
Italy. There is the same artificiality of the par- 
liamentary regime, the same administrative cor- 
ruption, the same popular disillusionment, and 
finally, similar, irreconcilable party oppositions to 
the existing state of things. 

Spanish parliamentarism was from the first a 
sickly growth. Despite specious constitutional 
forms and phrases, all real power is lodged in a 
caste of professional politicians who have erected 
a system even more oppressive and corrupt than 
Italian transformismo: the system known as 
caciquism. Caciquism is a sublimated and nation- 
wide Tammany Hall. The system is worked by a 
knot of big bosses {caudillos) at Madrid and is 
enforced by a swarm of local bosses known as 
caciques, who "make" the elections as Madrid 
commands and take their pay in local offices, 
power, and plunder. When the country cries too 
loud a safety-valve is found in an electoral change 

308 



SPAIN AND POETUGAL 309 

of parties, but the relief is a sham, for both the 
great Spanish parties — " Conservatives" and 
' ' Liberals ' ' — play the game of rotation in office to 
perfection and band over the treasury to each 
other at the precise psychological moment. The 
only result of a Spanish "election," therefore, is 
the coming to power of an alternate gang of 
caudillos and caciques zealously imbued with the 
Jacksonian maxim, "To the victors belong the 
spoils." 

All this is well known to the Spanish people, 
which accordingly takes no interest in politics 
and views the kaleidoscopic shifts of "ins" and 
"outs" with a cynical and sullen indifference. 
Irreconcilable protestors against the ruling 
regime exist, but the Spanish people fears tbem 
even more than its present masters. These ir- 
reconcilable parties are the Carlists and the Ee- 
publican-Socialists. The Carlist program is the 
restoration of the Pretender to the throne of Spain 
and the reestablishment of absolutism in both 
church and state. The Eepublican-Socialists dif- 
fer considerably among themselves, but their as- 
pirations tend towards ultra-radical proletarian 
rule and church disestablishment in favor of an 
atheistic lai'cism. To the average Spaniard both 
these alternatives are abhorrent. He, therefore, 
prefers to endure his present ills rather than in- 
voke a cure which would probably prove worse 
than the disease. 

Since Spanish politics are thus widely divorced 
from popular support, it is unnecessary to con- 



310 PRESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

sider the Liberal and Conservative party atti- 
tudes toward the European War in an analysis of 
the Spanish national state of mind. Only the 
Carlists and Republican-Socialists reflect any gen- 
uine body of public opinion. 

One other peculiarity of Spanish national psy- 
chology must be noted. When we speak about 
Spanish "public opinion," we must be careful to 
state what public opinion. In fact, there is no one 
national public opinion in the ordinary European 
sense, because the various racial elements which 
make up the Spanish nation have never wholly 
fused and their diverse ethnic peculiarities ac- 
cordingly tend to align popular sentiment by prov- 
inces on different sides of a given question. These 
provincial differences are very considerable. For 
example : Catalonia is far more akin to Southern 
France than it is to Castile. 

Nevertheless, certain popular tendencies do ex- 
ist which cut across all the national strata. There 
is a universal popular discontent with the ruling 
regime and a keen desire to cure the political 
plagues which eat the heart out of the country 
and render any sound national revival impossible. 
This translates itself into a hatred of "militar- 
ism" and of ambitious foreign policies. Even the 
recent modest expeditions to Morocco were dead 
against the popular will and at one time threatened 
to provoke a revolution. Of course there are 
Spanish imperialists, but these are mostly ambi- 
tious politicians who find scant popular echo. 

Such being the state of Spanish national psy~ 



SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 311 

chology, the outbreak of the European War 
naturally evoked a general call for strict neutral- 
ity. The irreconcilable parties, to be sure, took 
up extreme attitudes on opposite sides. The Re- 
publican-Socialists, like their Italian brethren, be- 
came ardently pro- Ally through love of the Radi- 
cal-Socialist French Republic. The Carlists 
emulated the Italian Catholics in their strong 
pro-Germanism. The province of Catalonia was 
generally pro-French in accordance with its racial 
affinities. Most of the Spanish imperialists were 
pro-German. The dreams of Spanish imperial- 
ism are the annexation of all Morocco, the recov- 
ery of Gibraltar, and the absorption of Portugal. 
The great barrier to the realization of these as- 
pirations is Anglo-French opposition. Teutonic 
agents hastened to whisper that Spain could real- 
ize her hopes as the reward for assistance to Ger- 
many. 

But these very partizanships tended to confirm 
the mass of the Spanish people in their neutral- 
ist determination. Whatever the irreconcilables 
champion is thereby suspect. As for the imperial- 
ists, the Spanish people have learned by bitter ex- 
perience that foreign policy merely spells fat pick- 
ings for politicians and gross mismanagement, 
ending in national humiliation. No legitimate 
Spanish interest was jeopardized by the war, and 
no forward policy was possible in the deplorable 
state of Spanish political life. Accordingly, the 
voice of Spain told the Government in no uncer- 
tain words to keep out of trouble. 



312 PEESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

As to Spanish popular sympathies, they seem on 
the whole to be mildly pro-German. England and 
France are Spain's traditional enemies. Ger- 
many, on the other hand, has in recent years been 
gaining rapidly in Spanish popular favor. Ger- 
man economic penetration has been extraordinary 
and welcome. There are probably nearly 100,000 
Germans in Spain to-day, and they generally get 
on well with the people. Furthermore, the Span- 
iards admire Germany, not so much for her mili- 
tary prowess as for her all-round efficiency — the 
direct antithesis to the sloth, wastefulness, and 
corruption which keep Spain down. Patriotic 
Spaniards have taken Germany as the model for 
that political and social regeneration so vital to 
their country. But these sympathies are strictly 
platonic: they imply no disposition to ally Spain 
with Germany or to make war on the Entente 
Powers. 

Thus Spain remains neutralist to the core. Ex- 
tremists may clamor for intervention and poli- 
ticians may weave fine-spun schemes of imperial 
policy: the heart of Spain remains fixed upon in- 
ternal reform and dreads the lure of grandiose 
foreign dreams. 

B. PORTUGAL 

The dominant fact in Portuguese national life 
is the connection with England, existent since the 
Middle Ages and defined by the Methuen Treaty 
of 1703. It is this English connection which alone 
has preserved Portugal from absorption by Spain 



SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 313 

— a fate unutterably dreaded by the Portuguese 
people. 

The European War thus found Portugal from 
the first aligned solidly with the Entente Powers. 
In accordance with treaty obligations the Por- 
tuguese Government promptly offered England 
its aid, and though Portugal did not enter the war 
until 1916, it rendered the Entente valuable serv- 
ices in its African and Asiatic colonies. 

This action of the Government was heartily en- 
dorsed by the Portuguese people. Portuguese 
public opinion was virtually unanimous for the 
Allies. Portugal was therefore from the first 
practically with the Entente Powers, the rupture 
with Germany being a mere formality regularizing 
previously existing facts. 



CONCLUSION 

OUR survey of present-day Europe is at an 
end. The varying currents of its war psy- 
chology have been analyzed. What is the out- 
standing feature of that analysis? The answer 
must be : Its infinite complexity. 

And, be it here remembered, our study has 
sought unity rather than diversity; its aim has 
been a portrayal of high lights rather than a pho- 
tograph redundant of detail. Only the main prob- 
lems have been touched, while many a minor is- 
sue has been dismissed with a word or passed over 
altogether in silence. Lastly, unity of vision has 
permitted us to include within our purview only 
the reciprocal relations of the European peoples, 
although we should never forget that Europe 
forms but a part of a vaster whole — the world — 
and that its future is indissolubly linked with those 
of America, Africa, and the East. Yet even thus 
simplified, how involved the web of destiny which 
Fate has woven for Europe's children ! 

One lesson, at least, shines clear from out the 
gloom: the futility of simplicist solutions. De- 
spite our natural shrinking, we must recognize 
that the Great War is a normal phase in human 
evolution. Europe's agony is the inevitable tra- 
vail of birth — the birth of a new age. That new 

314 



CONCLUSION 315 

age must evolve normally according to those basic 
laws of life which we so imperfectly understand. 
How futile — perchance how dangerous, then — are 
present efforts to sooth Europe 's anguish with the 
nostrum of a phrase ; or, with the petty yardstick 
of a formula, to plot the evolutionary pathway of 
the morrow. How absurd to assign Europe 's ills 
to a single cause, such as " secret diplomacy," 
" Prussian militarism," ''British navalism," or 
''Pan-Slavism," ahd then, having verbally de- 
molished this poor bogey, to announce the advent 
of the Golden Age. 

No, no ! Life is not so simple as all that. This 
cataclysm was not the work of any man or set of 
men. Its incidents may have been within human 
control. Its substance was the inexorable legacy 
of the past. The ultimate reality of the great war 
thus reveals itself as merely a doffing of the old 
and a putting on of the new. 

What, then, of the future? We cannot tell. A 
little we may venture, but not much. Some 
streams of tendency run fairly clear. We may, 
therefore, predict that, if their course remain un- 
changed, certain results will follow. But will they 
thus remain? The warp of human destiny is 
woven upon one loom, and the threads are inter- 
twined in wondrous fashion. Who can say that 
some hidden strand may not suddenly appear and 
change the pattern in strange wise ? 

This may seem a most unsatisfactory conclu- 
sion. But is it not the truth? Our finite minds 
here wrestle with infinity. To weigh the present 



316 PBESENT-DAY EUEOPE 

and take counsel of the past is wise : so only may 
we pierce a little the mists ahead. But to read 
the future clearly and afar — that is beyond our 
human understanding. 



INDEX 



a 



Abbas Hilmi (Khedive), 268- 

269 
Abdul- Aziz Tchawisch, 265- 

266 
Activism, 305-307 
Adriatic, 147, 160-167, 171- 

172, 229-231 
iEgean Islands (see "Dode- 
canese") 
Afghanistan, 105-107, 273-274 
Africa, 105-106, 172, 260, 266, 

314 
"After the War," 31-38, 62-70, 

115-118 
Aland Isles, 305 
Albania, 164, 174, 234 
Alexeiev (Professor), 189 
Algeria, 105-106, 230 
Allbutt, Sir Clifford, 17-18 
Alsace-Lorraine, 41-43, 57 
America, 94, 114-115, 314 
Anatolia, 104 
Anarchists, 145-146 
Andrassy, Count Julius, 124, 

140 
Andreades (Professor), 247 
Angelov, Vasili, 242-243 
Apponyi, Count Albert, 124, 

133 
Arabia, 280, 283 
Armenia, 206, 278-280 
Armenians, 197, 250, 278-280 
Asia, 76, 106-107, 172, 181- 

182, 184, 201-202, 207, 260 
Asia Minor, 165, 230, 246, 249, 

283 
Atrocities, 44-45, 83-86, 157- 

159 
Attrition, 26, 28-29 
Austria-Hungary, 33-34, 37, 

52, 55, 72-74, 117-118, 119- 

144, 147, 149, 160-168, 176, 



317 



182-187, 191, 224-229, 234- 
235, 244-246, 257-258 
Austrian Germans, 119, 123- 
124, 139-140, 143 



B 



Balkans, 10, 20, 107, 143, 173- 
174, 189, 203-205, 220-259 

Ballod, Karl, 90-91 

Baltic Provinces, 110 

Bandini (Signor), 153 

Barker, J. Ellis, 21-23 

Barres, Maurice, 41-43, 48, 52- 
53 

Barzini, Luigi, 158 

Beauchamp (Earl), 28 

Belgium, 10, 15, 17, 33, 55, 83- 
84, 103-104, 284-290 

Bergson, Henri, 44 

Bernhardi (General Fr. von), 
72 

Bertrand, Louis, 66 

Bessarabia, 257 

Bethmann-Hollweg ( Chancel- 
lor), 96 

Bevione, Giuseppe, 164 

Bjornson, Bjorn, 87 

Black Sea, 189 

Blockade, 90-95, 110-115 

Blume (General von), 92-93 

Bohemia (see "Czechs") 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 121-122, 
225-229 

Bourtzev, Vladimir, 193 

Boyars, 255 

Brailsford, H. K, 10-11 

Brassey (Lord), 28 

British Empire, 15-16 

Bucharest (City of-), 255-256 

Bucharest (Treaty of-), 222, 
239 

Bugatto (Deputy), 136-137 

Bukovina, 257 



318 



INDEX 



Bulgaria, 33, 117, 143, 174, 
204-205, 231-233, 235-246, 
247-248, 254-255 

Bulow (Prince von), 87 

Buzek, Josef, 130 



Caciquism, 308-309 
Caillaux, Joseph, 40 
Callwell ( Major-General C. 

E.), 25 
Carlists, 309, 311 
Caspian Sea, 261 
Castle, D. L. B., 16 
Catalonia, 310 
Catholic Party (Italian), 145- 

146, 150-152, 175 
Caucasus ( see "Transcau- 
casia" ) 
Central Europe (see "Mitteleu- 

ropa") 
Chauveau, Frank, 58-60 
Chesterton, G. K., 13 
Chiappelli, Alessand.ro, 171- 

172 
China, 105-106, 202, 206, 261 
Chlumecky (Freiherr von), 

133-134 
Cippico, Antonio, 173 
Civilization, 28-29, 33, 37, 47, 

66, 76, 78-79, 85, 108, 116, 

126, 129-130 
Constantine (King), 249-253 
Constantinople, 181, 188-191, 

205, 217, 241-242, 246-247, 

264 
Conybeare (Dr.), 14 
Copts, 269 
Corfu, 174 
Corsica, 147, 230 
Crete, 247 

Croats (see "Yugo-Slavs") 
Curzon (Lord), 27 
Cvijic, J., 232-233 
Czechs, 120-121, 127-128, 132, 

135, 138 

D 

D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 156-157, 

168-171 
Dalmatia, 135, 137, 147, 161- 

167, 173, 229-231 
Daugny, Jacques, 61 



Decadence, 3-4, 24 

Delaisi, Francis, 40 

Delbriick, Hans, 73-74, 109- 

110, 116 
Delcassg, Theophile, 41, 239 
Democratic Control ( Union 

of-), 10 
Denmark, 297, 300, 302-303 
Dernburg, Bernhard, 91 
Deschanel, Paul, 49-50, 65-66 
Dictatorship, 23 
Dillon, E. J., 21-23, 25 
Ditfurth (Major-General von), 

86 
Dmowski, Roman, 208 
Dodekanese, 164-165, 248 
Dontenville, J., 58-59 
Doumic, Rene, 48 
"Dread of Victory," 194-195 
Driault, Edouard, 56-60 
Drink, 187-188, 198-199 
Dumba, C. T., 125 
Durham, Mary E., 227-228 



E 



East (Near-), 20, 206-208, 246 

Eastern question, 190 

Egypt, 105-106, 207, 230, 261, 
268-272 

Elsenhans, Theodor, 88 

England, 5, 7, 38, 63, 67-69, 
76-82, 97-99, 105-107, 113- 
114, 143, 152-153, 172, 175, 
200, 207-208, 218-219, 248- 
249, 252, 261, 264-265, 272- 
276, 294-295, 303-304, 305- 
307, 311, 312-313 

Eucken, Rudolf, 77 

"Extirpation," 222-223 



F 



Federzoni (Deputy), 149-150 

Fera (Signor), 156 

Ferrero, Guglielmo, 157, 167 

Finland, 193, 297, 305 

Finot, Jean, 51, 67-68 

Flammarion, Camille, 47 

Flemings, 103, 284-290, 292, 
294 

France, 10, 15, 17, 20, 32, 39- 
70, 82-83, 97, 102-103, 143, 
150, 152, 172, 174, 200, 218, 



INDEX 



319 



237, 239-240, 248-249, 261, 

265, 285, 288-289, 303-304, 

311-312 
Franz-Ferdinand ( Archduke ) , 

122-123, 127, 226 
Franz -Joseph (Emperor), 133, 

142 
French Neo-Imperialism, 56-62 
Friedjung (Dr.), 139 
Frobenius (Colonel), 72 



G 



Galicia, 20, 120-121, 129, 137, 
186, 209 

Gallipoli, 20, 205, 276-277 

Gaul, 56-60 

Germanism (Pan-), 71, 210 

Germany, 9-38, 43-48, 51-70, 
71-118, 139-140, 157-160, 
172, 175, 182-187, 192-193, 
200-202, 208-209, 217-219, 
240-245, 253-254, 262, 265- 
267, 270, 272-273, 287-289, 
292-295, 300, 302-303, 305- 
307, 311-312, 313 

Ghennadiev (Dr.), 239 

Giolitti (Ex-Premier), 167- 
168, 171, 175 

Golytzin (Prince), 216 

Gorky, Maxim, 199-200 

Gosse, Edmund, 35 

Graham, Stephen, 33 

Great Britain (see "England") 

"Great Idea," 220-224, 236- 
237, 246-248, 257-258 

"Great Netherland," 287, 289 

Greece, 65, 113, 174, 203-204, 
233, 239, 246-254, 255 

Guyot, Yves, 55, 65 



Hauptmann, Gerhard, 78-79, 

82-83, 85-86 
Hauser, Henri, 65 
Herv6, Gustave, 61 
Herzog, Wilhelm, 99 
Heydebrand, Dr. von, 114 
High finance, 30 
Hindenburg ( Field- Marshal 

von), 110 
Hirst, Francis W., 28 
Hoetsch, Otto, 108 
Hohenzollern dynasty, 11-12, 

30 34 53 122 
Holland,' 55,' 60, 284-285, 289, 

290—295 
"Holy War," 105-106, 260, 266- 

269, 282-283 
Hoschiller, Max, 65 
Hungary (see "Magyars") 
Hurd, Archibald, 16 
Hussein Kamel (Sultan), 269, 

271 



Imperialism, 5, 40-42, 108- 
110, 125-126, 160, 171-172, 
178-185, 202-203, 217-219, 
224-225, 246-248, 310-312 

India, 105, 207, 266-267 

Intelligentsia, 178-181, 195, 
202, 217-218 

Intervention, 166-171 

Ireland, 7 

Irredentism, 147-148 

Isac, Emil, 142 

Islam, 105-107, 122, 260-283 

Italy, 5, 19, 33, 49-50, 61, 65- 
67, 94-95, 122, 133-137, 143, 
145-177, 229-231, 239, 245, 
248, 268 



Haeckel, Ernst, 77 
Haenisch (Deputy), 98, 116 
Halil Bey, 280 
Hanotaux, Gabriel, 51, 62 
Hapsburg Dynasty, 34, 141 
Harden, Maximilian, 72, 87- 

88, 89-90, 92, 96 
Harrison, Austin, 21 
Hartwig, M. de, 225 
Hate (Cult of), 80-82, 98-100, 

111-113, 115 



Jackh, Ernst, 104-105, 108 
Jacks, L. P., 25-26 
Jahadd (see "Holy War") 
Janni, Ettore, 158-159 
Japan, 78, 172, 202, 260, 263 
Jenks, Edward, 19 
Jews, 197, 255-256 
Joffre (General), 42-43 
Johnston, Sir Harry, 25 
Jonescu, Take, 258 



320 



INDEX 



Kaden ( Lieutenant-Colonel ) , 

81—82 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, 11-12, 38, 

51, 112-113 
Khristov, Cyril, 239, 240-241 
Kipling, Rudyard, 16-17, 18- 

19, 33 
Klein, Dr. Franz, 139 
Kotchubey (Prince), 185 
Kotliarievsky (Professor), 189 
Kultur, 30, 51, 67-68, 77-79, 

100 
Kuropatkin (General), 185 
Kut-el-Amara, 20, 278 



Labor, 8, 10, 23-24, 40, 185, 

194 
Lamprecht, Karl, 77-78 
Lankester, Sir E. Ray, 18 
Latinism, 46-47, 49-50, 59, 

156-157, 161 
Latinism (Pan-), 65-66, 156- 

157 
Leger, Louis, 54-55 
Lenin, 194-195 
Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, 43-44 
Leuthner, Karl, 108-109 
Liebknecht, Karl, 75 
Liechtenstein (Prince Alois), 

139 
Likowski (Mgr.), 131 
Lilly, W. S., 18 
Lissauer, Ernst, 80 
Lithuania, 110, 192 
Lloyd-George ( Premier ) , 24- 

25, 26-27 
Loreburn (Lord), 28 
Lusitaniu disaster, 18 
Luxemburg, Rosa, 75 

M 

Macedonia, 222, 231-234, 238- 
240, 244-246, 251-252 

McClellan, George B., 148 

Magyars, 119-120, 124-126, 
132-135, 139-141, 143 

Maklakov, V. A., 213-214 

Malta, 147, 230 

Marmottan. Paul. 58-59 



Mayer, E. W., 94-95 
Meda (Deputy), 151-152 
Mediterranean Sea, 147-148, 

152-153, 207 
Mehmed V (Sultan), 270-271 
Menshikov, 186-187, 188 
Mesopotamia, 20, 104, 278, 281- 

283 
Methuen treaty, 312 
Meyer, Eduard, 116 
Miguline (Professor), 207 
Mijatovitch, Chedo, 226-227, 

228-229 
Militarism, 11-13, 15, 30, 34 
Miliukov, Paul, 184 
Mitrofanov, Paul, 184 
Mitteleuropa, 118, 139-140, 143, 

245 
Mohammed Farid Bey, 271-272 
Mohammedans (see "Islam") 
Molden, Bernhardt, 106-107 
Moltke (Count von), 90 
Momtchilov, M., 241 
Mongolia, 202, 206 
Monod, Wilfred, 49 
Montenegro, 228 
Moravia (see "Czechs") 
Morf, Heinrich, 99-100 
Morocco, 106, 261, 263, 310 
Moslems (see "Islam") 
Miinsterberg, Hugo, 76 



N 



Nabokov, V., 185 
Narodna Odbrana, 226 
Narodni Savetz, 239 
Natali, Giulio, 156 
Nationalism, 146-150 
Naumann, Friedrich, 72, 118 
Near East, 20, 206-208, 246 
Neo-Imperialism ( French ) , 56- 

62 
Neutrality, 148-149, 151-155, 

159, 166-171, 175, 250-253, 

293, 295, 310-312 
Neutrals, 33 
Nice, 147 

Nicholas II (Tsar), 182, 189 
Nicholas Nicholaievitch (Grand 

Duke), 184, 208-209, 278 
Niemetz, 186 

Norway, 298, 300, 303-304 
Novoselski, Dr., 198-199 



INDEX 



321 



Ohnet, Georges, 48-49 

P 

Pacifism, 10, 30, 39-40, 50-51 
Palyi, Eduard, 139 
Pan-Germanism, 71, 210 
Pan-Latinism, 65, 66, 156-157 
Pan-Slavism, 72-73, 109-110, 

125-126, 141-142, 182, 190, 

208-211, 238-239, 241 
Pashitch (Premier), 229 
Pavlovitch, Michael, 185 
Peace, 26-31, 51-52, 96, 111- 

113, 143, 192, 200-202, 217- 

218 
Persia, 105-106, 201-202, 206- 

207, 261, 272-276 
Persian Gulf, 207, 261 
Petkov (Professor), 240 
Philhellenism, 248 
Philippovitch, Eugen von, 139 
Pichon, Stephen, 51-52 
Pobiedonostsev, C., 181 
Poland, 20, 110, 120, 128-131, 

137-138, 140-141, 192-197, 

208-214 
Portugal, 66, 312-313 
Posen, 129, 131 
Protitch, M., 226 
Prussia (see "Germany") 



R 



Radoslavov (Premier), 239 
Ramsay, Sir William, 36-37 
Rasputin, Gregor, 216 
Re, Arundel del, 162-163 
Reaction, 196-197, 216-217 
Reclus, Onesime, 53, 59 
"Red Week" (The-), 5, 148, 

177 
Regeneration, 48-49, 88-89, 

187-188, 197-200 
Republicans, 145-146, 150, 155- 

156, 176, 309-311 
Reuss (Prince Henry of), 272 
Reventlow (Count Ernst zu), 

90, 94, 103 
Revolution, 177, 179-180, 194- 

195, 200 



Reynaud, Louis, 48 
Rheims Cathedral, 45, 86 
Rhine, 40, 55-61, 291 
Richepin, Jean, 63-64 
Rohrbach, Paul, 78, 107-108 
Rolland, Romain, 50-51, 68, 85 
Rosen (Baron), 184 
Rumania, 66, 141-142, 244, 

254-259 
Russell, Bertrand, 24, 28 
Russia, 5, 8, 10-11, 15, 32-33, 
72-80, 97, 107-110, 122-127, 
129-133, 140-141, 143, 163- 
164, 175, 178-219, 225, 237- 
239, 241-246, 257-258, 261, 
264, 272-280, 300, 304-305 
Ruthenians (see "Ukraine") 



S 



Sabatier, Paul, 51, 68 

Salandra (Premier), 150 

Salonika, 232-233, 247, 251 

Savoy, 147, 230 

Sayce, A. H., 17 

Sazonov, Sergius, 203 

Scandinavia, 296-308 

Scarfoglio, 152-153 

Schleswig-Holstein, 302-303 

Schrors, Heinrich, 83 

Schiiller, Ludwig, 88-89 

Senussi, 106, 268 

Serajevo, 72, 185, 226, 228 

Serbia, 8, 33, 72-74, 95, 122- 
132, 161-167, 174, 182, 184- 
185, 203-205, 223-235, 237, 
238, 246, 249, 254-255 

Shaw, George Bernard, 29 

Shiites, 105, 261 

Simmel, Georg, 88 

Slavism (Pan-), 72-73, 75-76, 
109-110, 125-126, 141-142, 
182, 190, 208-211, 238-239, 
241 

Slavs, 10-11, 54-55, 120-122, 
191, 223-224, 231, 235-236 

Solidarity (European), 37 

Sonnino, Sydney, 159 

South Slavs (see <c Yugo- 
Slavs") 

Spain, 66, 308-312 

Stahl, Felix, 101 



322 



INDEX 



Starvation, 89-93, 110-111 
Stolypin, P. A., 179-180 
Stoyanovitch, Costa, 233 
Straits (The), 188-191, 207, 

249 
Struve, Peter, 184 
Stunner ( ex- Premier ) , 215 
Submarines, 93-94, 114-115 
Sudan, 266 
Sunnites, 105, 261 
Sustersics (Deputy), 127 
Sweden, 296-298, 300 
Syndicalism, 5, 146-148, 150, 

176-177 
Syria, 52, 281 



U 

Ukraine, 110, 121-122, 131- 

132, 138, 140-141, 183, 186- 

187, 193 
Union of Democratic Control, 

10, 24 
United States of America, 94, 

112, 114-115 
Unity (German), 14, 16, 34, 

52-65, 71 
Unrest, 3-6, 72, 145-148, 176- 

177 



Venizelos, Eleutherios, 249-253 
Vierordt, Heinrieh, 81 
Viviani, Rene, 50 
Voboryov, K., 187 



W 

Walloons, 284-290 

War (after the), 31-38, 62- 

70, 115-118 
Warsaw, 137-138 
Weisskirchner, Dr., 139 
Wells, H. G., 11, 17, 35-36 



Tabu, 19 

Talaat Bey, 280 

The Straits, 188-191, 207, 249 

Ticino, 147 

Tisza (Premier), 124, 140 

Transcaucasia, 105 

Transylvania, 141-142, 257- 

258 
Trasformismo, 146, 308 
Trentino, 135, 136, 147 
Trgste, 135-136, .60-161, 229- W-Ug g"-*^} "^ 

Troubetzkoi (Prince Eugene), ^ b 

190 v 

Tunis, 105, 147, 230 x 

Turk e ey! aT 2o! 05 33, 52, 104-107, Yugo-Slavs, 121 -127, 135-136, 
117, 143, 188-191, 204-208, 161-lb7, 2Z4-^J1 

220-221, 227-244, 248, 260- 
283 z 

Turner, Sir A. E., 18 

Tyrol, 136 Zulawski, George, 130 



H 63-79 



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